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# Thought, Existence and Reality

*as viewed by*

F. H. BRADLEY and BERNARD BOSANQUET

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE OHIO  
STATE UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIRE-  
MENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY


BY

WALTER SYLVESTER GAMERTSFELDER, A.B., D., Ph.D.

Former Fellow in Philosophy in the Ohio State University, Assistant  
Professor of Philosophy in Hubert College

The Ohio State University

1928



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The Ohio State University  
1920

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## KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

Brad. = Bradley

Bos. = Bosanquet

*Appearance* = *Appearance and Reality*

*Essays* = *Essays on Truth and Reality*

*Logic* = Bradley's *The Principles of Logic*

*Principle* = *The Principle of Individuality and Value*

*Value* = *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*

*Essentials* = *The Essentials of Logic*

*Distinction* = *The Distinction Between Mind and Its Objects*

*Phil. Rev.* = *The Philosophical Review*

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## PREFACE

This work is an attempt to offer, in brief form, a comparative and somewhat critical study of the views of Mr. F. H. Bradley and Professor Bernard Bosanquet on the subject, *Thought, Existence and Reality*.

The problem of the relation of thought and reality occupies a place so much at the center of metaphysics that one finds it quite impossible to treat the views of such able and voluminous writers as Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet without some reference to the philosophical positions of Subjectivism, Neo-Realism, Pragmatism, and Pluralism, positions more or less in opposition to the Neo-Hegelianism of Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet. The writer has tried to make explicit, as much as space would permit, the exact relation of these positions to Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet on the problem at issue, but has been forced to make this aspect of the work entirely subordinate to the main theme. cursory attention is also paid to the relation of our authors to Kant and Hegel, as well as to Josiah Royce and Henri Bergson.

In addition to the works of Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet, and of others, quoted herein, the writer has gathered much help for interpretation and criticism from numerous articles in *Mind* and in *The Philosophical Review*. The references to Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet's works are in every case to the latest editions.

I take this means of acknowledging my debt of gratitude to the members of the Department of Philosophy in The Ohio State University for their untiring service and constant inspiration during the years of my graduate work. This study was begun and completed under the supervision and with the counsel of Doctor Joseph A. Leighton, to whom I owe much. Doctor R. D. Williams gave me many valuable suggestions, and Doctor A. E. Avey rendered much aid. I am also under great obligation to Doctor George F. Arps, of the Department of Psychology, who directed my work in Psychology. I am alone responsible, however, for anything in this treatise justly open to adverse criticism.

W. S. G.

HOBART COLLEGE,  
GENEVA, N. Y.  
June, 1920.



## CHAPTER I

### THE NATURE OF THOUGHT

The nature of thought is fundamental to the philosophical systems of both Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet. It is so in any philosophy which claims systematic character. The view taken of the nature of thought becomes more significant and imperious as a philosophy inclines to identify logic and metaphysics. Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet agree in defining logic as an inquiry into the structure of knowledge, and knowledge is viewed as an organic structure—the work of thought which constructs or reconstitutes and sustains reality. It is thus clear that for Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet the nature of thought and theory of reality are reciprocally related.

The task of exhibiting the nature of thought is one side of the problem of the entire treatise, but in this chapter we shall limit the discussion to four main points, namely, 1) The limits of thought, 2) Immediate experience and its relation to thought, 3) Formal principles of thought, and 4) The general and specific nature of thought, in the systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet.

It seems desirable at the outset to define thought in relation to such mental states as sensation, sense-perception, feeling and will, and to consider the significance of these forms of consciousness.

Prof. Bosanquet clearly follows Hegel in regarding thought as coextensive with finite experience. He says: "Thought, we are insisting, is not a separate faculty of something known as the intelligence. It is the active form of totality, present in all and every experience of a rational being."<sup>1</sup> Thought participates in all forms of human experience. Sensation, sense-perception, knowing, feeling, and willing are only so many aspects of thought. The essence of thought is an ideality, a pervading continuity, which runs through every form of consciousness.<sup>2</sup> It is thus that the difficulties of an Associationism are avoided. Consciousness is a 'stream of presentation'<sup>3</sup> in which the elements are tied together by a pervading identity. It is this pervading identity which for Prof. Bosanquet is the essence of thought. Just how this unity of consciousness functions will

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Principle*, p. 59. See also p. 280; Hegel, *Enc.* §§ 379, 471.

<sup>2</sup>Bos., *Principle*, pp. 60-61. *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 39 n.

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Essentials*, p. 21.

be made clear when we come to treat the specific nature of thought and the judgment.

Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, while not so explicit as to the comprehensiveness of thought, nevertheless is in general agreement with Prof. Bosanquet. He makes a reservation, however, in favor of feeling.<sup>1</sup> In his *Essays* Mr. Bradley tells us, "Now, if by consciousness we understand the being of an object for a subject, this assumption, I should say, is at least disputable. To my mind consciousness is not coextensive with experience."<sup>2</sup> Mr. Bradley proceeds in this chapter on "Consciousness and Experience" to discuss consciousness, except in the case of feeling, as relational in form. "Feeling," he holds, "is immediate experience without distinction or relation in itself. It is a unity, complex but without relations. And there is no difference between the state and its content, since, in a word, the experienced and the experience are one."<sup>3</sup> Prof. Bosanquet makes a similar reservation for feeling, which, as he says, "has its own form of reality, but is not relational,"<sup>4</sup> but when in his later work *The Principle of Individuality and Value* he asserts that "thought is the life of feeling" (p. 63 and p. 65), he seems to include it under thought. Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet agree in the view that consciousness is not the original genetic form of human experience. An undifferentiated mass of feeling appears first and this is regarded as "a state as yet without either an object or subject."<sup>5</sup> For Prof. Bosanquet this primal form of experience seems to be only an hypothesis and of no further consequence in his system. Mr. Bradley, however, while granting that thought is present in sensation, sense-perception, will<sup>6</sup> and imagination,<sup>7</sup> reserves for 'feeling' a place below the relational form of thought. The special significance of this doctrine for knowledge and reality will be pointed out later.

It must be pointed out that Mr. Bradley, while granting that thought is present in all forms of consciousness except feeling, exhibits an overt tendency to emphasize thought as a function of the intellect; and intellect is viewed in a way analogous to Kant's discursive Understanding (*Verstand*). This position implies, to a limited extent, a departmental view of the mind, or, what is the same thing, a lapse into faculty psychology. In his work on *Appearance and Reality* Mr. Bradley says, "The actual starting point and basis of this work is an assumption about truth and reality. I have assumed that the object of metaphysics is to find a general view which will satisfy the intellect, and I have assumed that whatever succeeds in doing this is real and true, and that whatever fails is neither."<sup>8</sup> He seems

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Essays*, pp. 192, ff.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 192.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 194.

<sup>4</sup>Brad., *Essays*, p. 364.

<sup>5</sup>*Appearance*, Appendix pp. 553-554; see also *Essays*, p. 221.

<sup>6</sup>Bos., *Essentials*, p. 22 n.

<sup>7</sup>Brad., *Essays*, p. 194.

<sup>8</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, pp. 473, 474.

to divide experience into three departments and to make metaphysics, as also the whole structure of knowledge, a product of the intellectual department. The peculiar and one-sided emphasis of feeling, on the one hand, and on the other, the treatment of thought proper as wholly discursive and relational in character—self-contradictory in itself, seems to be an inevitable consequence of this departmental view of the mind. Yet, it must be noted, he does claim that every aspect of one's being "can and does express itself intellectually."<sup>1</sup> This claim is quite forgotten, however, in the major portion of his works. Prof. Bosanquet avoids this fundamental error by making thought co-extensive with experience and by contending for the absolute unity of human experience. He readily allows that for purposes of treatment in psychology, and as an analytic view in philosophy, it is permissible to view mind from the standpoint now of cognition, now of feeling, and now of will; but certainly in his view of knowledge as a whole and in the functioning of mind *qua* mind, human experience is a unity, permeated throughout by thought.

(Both Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet recognize the existence of an 'immediate experience' which is the starting point for the knowing process. Mr. Bradley, for example, says, "We . . . have experience in which there is no distinction between my awareness and that of which it is aware. There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one, with which knowledge begins; and, though this in a manner is transcended it nevertheless remains throughout as the present foundation of my known world."<sup>2</sup> Prof. Bosanquet asserts that "Reality is given for me in present sensuous perception, and *in* the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with it. The real world, as a definite organized system, is *for me* an extension of this present sensation and self feeling by means of judgment. . . . There is a presence of a something in contact with our sensitive self, which, as being so in contact, has the character of reality."<sup>3</sup> So far there is an emphasis upon an aspect of immediacy in sense-perception at the beginning of knowledge, and so far there is agreement between Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet. But here we meet with a significant statement on the part of Mr. Bradley, namely, "the recognition of the fact of immediate experience opens the one road, I submit, to the solution of ultimate problems,"<sup>4</sup> and we must inquire into its implications.) As Mr. Bradley admits,<sup>5</sup> while it opens a road, it also gives rise to difficulties, and we are inclined to feel that the road it opens is rather a blind alley and the source of more problems than it solves.

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Essays*, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup>Brad., *Essays*, pp. 159-160; see also *Appearance*, p. 260.

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 72.

<sup>4</sup>*Essays* p. 160.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

We are concerned here only to make clear the fundamental difference between Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet on the point of immediate experience. The specific application of the doctrine to special problems will be taken up later. In the first place let us ask, exactly what does Mr. Bradley mean by immediate experience and what use does he make of it? Mr. Bradley offers a special treatment of this point in his *Essays*, Chapter VI and Appendix to Chapter VI. Reference is also made to it in his discussion of Judgment, *Logic*, Chapter I. Consciousness, according to Mr. Bradley (and correctly), involves a subject-object relation. But experience does not begin with consciousness. Experience begins below consciousness, i.e., below a relational form of mind, in feeling "which is without distinction in itself. It is a unity, complex but without relations."<sup>1</sup> "There is here no difference between the state and its content, since, in a word, the experienced and the experience are one."<sup>2</sup> "Everything is on one side felt, and the experienced is, also in part, still no more than felt."<sup>3</sup> "And on this felt background depends the unity and continuity of our lives, lost hopelessly by Associationism, and lost no less hopelessly by the identification of experience with consciousness."<sup>4</sup> The point to which we call special attention, and one seriously open to question, is this immediate experience as a "unity, complex but without relations," a unity which Mr. Bradley holds saves the unity and continuity of life from being hopelessly lost by Associationism and no less hopelessly lost "by the identification of experience with consciousness."

Now, perhaps, no one would wish to deny that there is a sense in which all experience has an 'immediate' or 'given' aspect. Prof. Bosanquet readily affirms that "Reality is given for me *in* present sensuous perception and *in* the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with it," and that the "real world, as a definite organized system," is an extension of this immediate experience by means of the judgment.<sup>5</sup> But he goes further: "The given and its extension differ not absolutely but relatively; they are continuous with each other, and the metaphor by which we speak of an extension conceals from us that the so-called 'given' is no less artificial than that by which it is extended."<sup>6</sup> Again, he says, "Immediacy is a character that may be assumed by any mental complex or object,"<sup>7</sup> Prof. Bosanquet thus clearly views the immediate character of experience as only an aspect, not to be viewed as non-relational or in any way to be clearly set over against the extension of the 'given' through judgment.

<sup>1</sup>*Essays*, p. 194.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>5</sup>*Bos., Logic*, Vol. I, p. 72; see also p. 3.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>7</sup>*Bos., Logic*, Vol. II, p. 296.



Mr. Bradley, indeed, sometimes seems to agree with Prof. Bosanquet. "Everything that is given us, all psychical events, be they sensations, images, or reflections, or feelings, or ideas, or emotions—every possible phenomenon that can be present—both is 'this' and has 'thisness'" (the "that" and the "what" as elsewhere used<sup>1</sup>). Here he seems to employ 'immediate experience' merely as the "focus of presentation which lights up its content,"<sup>2</sup> i.e., as the shifting point of contact between reality and the percipient self which serves as the subject of every judgment of perception. This is also the sense in which Prof. Bosanquet employs the term; but he is careful to add that the given and its extension do not differ absolutely.<sup>3</sup> "But, as all reality is continuous, the subject is not *merely* this given spot or point."<sup>4</sup> And again, he says, "It is not true that there is any purely immediate experience. Immediacy is merely a form which any content can take, and which is peculiar to none."<sup>5</sup> In this position Prof. Bosanquet follows Hegel as the latter effectively argues against the immediacy doctrine of Jacobi—a doctrine akin to that of Mr. Bradley. Moreover, Prof. Bosanquet's conception of immediacy seems entirely in harmony with a correct psychological analysis of experience.<sup>6</sup> Psychology knows nothing of a *mere* or indeterminate 'given.' Every item of human experience, if it is something, must have quality, and if it has quality, it has relation. It is this or nothing. Mental events are not first simply *there* and afterwards mysteriously clothed with determinateness; they have a character from the beginning, though vague in some instances, and this is their special way of being *there*.<sup>7</sup> When Mr. Bradley asserts of 'immediate experience' that it is a "unity, complex but without relations," it would seem that either he is using these terms out of their ordinarily accepted sense or they are self-contradictory. Unity implies an identity of differents, or it means nothing. It therefore implies relation. A "unity, complex but without relations" is a contradiction in terms. It seems preferable then, in agreement with Prof. Bosanquet,<sup>8</sup> to treat immediacy as a "phase and not a stratum of experience," in which all or any of its objects may participate and may totally pass into,<sup>9</sup> the marks of thought and the stamp of objective relations being in no way obliterated by the transition. Thus all experience is fully of the 'work of thought' and there is nothing to be gained in making a clear line between the immediate and the mediated.

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Logic*, p. 64.

<sup>2</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 72.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Principle*, p. 297; see also *Logic*, Vol. II, pp. 296, 297, 298.

<sup>6</sup>H. H. Joachim supports Prof. Bosanquet in his view of immediate experience. See *The Nature of Truth*, pp. 55ff.

<sup>7</sup>The following statement by A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 133, on the relation of substance and quality is pertinent here: "The notion that things have a *that* or substance prior to their *what* or quality, and consisting simply in 'being' which is not this or that determinate mode of being, is thus unmeaning as well as superfluous."

<sup>8</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 298.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 297.



But we must go on to suggest briefly the consequences of this doctrine of immediacy for Mr. Bradley's theory of reality and incidentally to notice its consequence upon his doctrine of thought. It is through his doctrine of immediacy that Mr. Bradley hopes to find an opening of the road to the solution of ultimate problems. Immediacy or feeling, he declares, is a 'whole.' "In mere feeling or immediate presentation, we have the experience of a whole," a whole containing diversity but not parted by relations.<sup>1</sup> Thought breaks up this unity of presentation so that the 'what' stands over against the 'that'—the predicate is opposed to the subject.<sup>2</sup> Thought seeks to overcome this opposition by pursuing a series of implications suggested by the two sides of the opposition. It thus erects an ideal construction which we call knowledge; but it never fully extricates itself from the tangle of relations. Thought starts with the unity of immediate experience, where experience is, or is in direct contact with, reality, and seeks to build up to a unity, like the immediacy of feeling, at the upper limit of thought. But for thought to reach such an immediacy is thought's suicide.<sup>3</sup> "Thought is relational and discursive, and, if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide; and yet, if it remains thus, how does it contain immediate presentation?"<sup>4</sup> In consequence of this dilemma, thought is abandoned as giving an apprehension of Reality and refuge is taken in the sentiency of immediate experience. "My way of contact with Reality," says Mr. Bradley, "is through a limited aperture. For I cannot get at it directly except through the felt 'this,' and our immediate interchange and transfluence takes place through one small opening."<sup>5</sup> Mr. Bradley goes on, however, "Everything beyond," i.e., beyond the felt 'this,' "though not less real, is an expansion of the common essence which we feel burning in this one focus."<sup>6</sup> In his chapter on "Degrees of Truth and Reality" in *Appearance and Reality*, Mr. Bradley develops this latter point and even gives it weight as furnishing a clue to the nature of Reality, but again and again, in other portions of his work, he returns to show an equal respect for the prick of sense and for the unique character and content of immediate experience. (Thus, for Mr. Bradley, we touch Reality in the immediacy of sense-perception. Thought which starts by working on the diversity in this 'felt whole,' builds its ideal structure of knowledge, but all the time, in a limited sense, leads away from Reality. That knowledge is not adequate to apprehend Reality (this we shall see more plainly later), is one side of the consequence of Mr. Bradley's self-made dilemma. The other side of the consequence, following in part from his partial view of immediate experience, is his view of Reality as "one Experience, self-pervading and superior to relations.")<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, p. 159.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 146, 160.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 260; see also p. 253.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 552.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

The problem of the relational character of thought we shall reserve for later treatment. But a word must be added upon Mr. Bradley's use of the content and character of immediate experience as a clue to the nature of Reality. We are reminded, in this connection, of Henri Bergson's use of Intuition. "But it is to the very inwardness of life" (and by life he means Reality) "that *intuition* leads us—by intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely."<sup>1</sup> "But, in default of knowledge so-called, reserved to pure intelligence, intuition may enable us to grasp what it is that intelligence fails to give us, and indicate the means of supplementing it."<sup>2</sup> We have here expressed in philosophies diverse in a most fundamental respect, the emphasis of an identical tendency, a tendency previously expressed in Jacobi and Lotze, namely, on the one hand, to take a one-sided view of thought, to identify it with the work of the intellect—bare cognition, and to make it abstract, resulting in its condemnation and abandonment as the 'open road' to Reality, and, on the other hand, to take a one-sided view of another phase of experience, to exalt it into a stratum of experience and rely upon it to keep us in touch with the real. The motives for this agreement of tendency, however, in the case of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bergson are decidedly different. For Prof. Bergson, Consciousness is an instrument of action,<sup>3</sup> and intuition and intelligence represent the splitting up or division of a single original biological function through its impact with matter (or environment). It is a product or creation resulting from the persistent struggle of the *élan vital* to go forward and express itself. With Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, immediate experience, to which the real is present—as though one had in this a peep-hole through which to view Reality—is below consciousness, *of* consciousness at all, and like a background underlies every conscious process, forming the nexus of identity for life.

There is doubtless an element of truth in Mr. Bradley's contention that there is an experience which is immediate. But, as Prof. Bosanquet affirms, "It tells us nothing to assert that an experience is immediate; for there are countless immediates and there is nothing that cannot be immediate."<sup>4</sup> That is to say, an immediate experience is a bare *is*, unless it is something more. As J. S. McKenzie says, "Sentiency is a sort of whole; but it is a whole simply because it is nothing else, because it is entirely undifferentiated—or, at least, undifferentiated so far as regards any distinction between form and content, subject and object."<sup>5</sup> "Sentiency has a kind of reality. It has, so to speak, all the reality it wants;

<sup>1</sup>*Creative Evolution*, Trans. by Mitchell, p. 176.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 177.

<sup>4</sup>*Principle*, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>5</sup>*Mind*, N. S., Vol. 3, 1894, p. 318.

but this is because it does not want reality at all. . . . Sentiency simply is there for itself, and wants nothing more."<sup>1</sup> To set up the 'whole' as found in so poor a form of experience, an experience upon which consciousness has not acted, as the best analogy of Reality, and to condemn thought as inadequate to the apprehension of Reality on the same grounds, seems indeed to be a cheap road to the Real. We shall have occasion to return to this point in our treatment of judgment.

We turn next to a consideration of some of the formal principles of thought, namely, the Law of Identity and the Law of Contradiction, which are especially at issue in our theme. Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet agree that these principles are not *a priori* but derived from experience, and that they "acquire their content *pari passu* with experience itself of which they merely express the animating principle of growth."<sup>2</sup> The charge, then, (in what sense valid, we shall consider later) that they "start consciously or unconsciously with certain axioms, and from these reason downward"<sup>3</sup> is denied as baseless, though both make use of the term "axiom" in their treatment of these topics.<sup>4</sup> Prof. Bosanquet, however, specifically calls them postulates which operate "as guides to knowledge" and "which lead to their own subsequent substantiation in a concrete form." Mr. Bradley, speaking of origin, says (and Prof. Bosanquet employs language to a similar purpose<sup>5</sup>), "the method actually followed may be called in the main the procedure used by Hegel, that of a direct ideal experiment made on reality. What is assumed is that I have to satisfy my theoretical want, or, in other words, that I resolve to think."<sup>6</sup> So while Mr. Bradley leaves himself open to the charge of treating the Law of Identity and the Law of Contradiction as axioms in his *Logic*, it is clear that this position is openly denied in his *Essays*, and we conclude that Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet agree in regarding them as postulates which operate as guides to knowledge. Whether they hold strictly to this interpretation remains to be treated later.

Having considered the origin of these formal principles of thought, we go on to inquire into their meaning and use. Again, we find agreement in employing Identity as implying identity-in-difference.<sup>7</sup> Identity without diversity is viewed as tautologous and hence unmeaning. The complementary character of identity and diversity, though not stated, is clearly implied. Prof. Bosanquet asserts that "the Law of Identity must

<sup>1</sup>Mind, N. S., Vol. 3, 1894, p. 319.

<sup>2</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 209.

<sup>3</sup>Brad., *Essays*, p. 311.

<sup>4</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, pp. 208-209. Brad., *Logic*, pp. 132, 136.

<sup>5</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, pp. 209, 216.

<sup>6</sup>Brad., *Essays*, p. 311. See also Bos., *Value*, p. 230.

<sup>7</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 210; Brad., *Logic*, p. 131.



be taken to signify *at least* that it is possible to make judgments that have a meaning and are true."<sup>1</sup> The judgment "A is A" is an absolute tautology which excludes difference, and in such a judgment "identity itself disappears and the judgment vanishes with it."<sup>2</sup> "Identity without difference is nothing at all."<sup>3</sup> So far, then, there is absolute agreement between Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet—the principle of Identity must be interpreted so as to allow the making of a judgment that has meaning and is more than a bare tautology; it must be taken to signify *identity-in-difference*.

When we come to the application of this principle, we notice the beginning of a divergence between Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet. Mr. Bradley reveals a tendency to abandon the complementary view of identity and difference and to take Identity as bare identity, while Prof. Bosanquet holds more consistently to the complementary view. The difference between Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet on this point may be stated otherwise by saying that Prof. Bosanquet maintains more strictly an epistemological point of view while Mr. Bradley tends to an ontological or existential point of view. All thinking, it is agreed, takes place in the form of judgment. Every judgment is the reference of an ideal content to Reality.<sup>4</sup> Reality is present in preceptive judgment by some spot or point which is in sensuous contact with the percipient,<sup>5</sup> and every judgment, whether perceptive or universal, affirms some content of Reality.<sup>6</sup> Judgment, when expressed, appears in the form of a proposition containing subject, predicate and copula, stated or implied. Thus in the judgment, the subject stands for or represents ideally that part of Reality of which something is affirmed or denied, and the predicate represents an ideal qualification of the reality represented in the subject. So far there seems to be full agreement. But here begins a difference with respect to judgment which involves the principle of Identity. According to Mr. Bradley, all judging involves abstracting, it consists in applying an abstract universal to a logical subject, yet this abstract universal does not exist except in someone's head. In other words, to follow Mr. Bradley's argument, all thinking involves a separation of 'existence' and 'content,' the 'that' and the 'what,' and "the two are inseparable."<sup>7</sup> But thought requires this separation, because thought is ideal. "Without an idea there is no thinking, and an idea implies the separation of content from existence." "Ideality lies in the disjoining of quality from being."<sup>8</sup> So in judgment, a predicate, a

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 210.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Brad., *Logic*, p. 131.

<sup>4</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 1, also Vol. I, p. 73; Brad., *Logic*, p. 55.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 73; Brad., *Logic*, p. 28, 44.

<sup>6</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 74.

<sup>7</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, p. 162.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 163.

“mere ‘what,’ a mere feature of content”<sup>1</sup> is predicated of a reality or existence. (Mr. Bradley employs the term “existence” to signify the raw material of experience. It is the “Being” of Hegel.) But this is contradictory. How can a ‘mere what,’ a mere feature of content be predicated of a ‘whole,’ namely, a reality given in the content of the ‘that’? So thought reaches out to add another quality or attribute ; it transcends its present form or stage in an effort to bridge the gulf between the ‘existence’ and the ‘content.’ “By pushing this self-transcendence to the uttermost point, thought attempts to find there consummation and rest.”<sup>2</sup> But meanwhile, the subject, too, “is expanded until it is no longer what is given. It becomes the whole universe, which presents itself and which appears in each given moment with but part of its reality. It grows into an all inclusive whole, existing somewhere and somehow, if we only could perceive it.”<sup>3</sup> Thus thought is never able to heal this fatal disease, in fact were it able to do so, thought would cease to exist.

The point to which we wish to call special attention is this supposed effort of thought to erase completely the difference between subject and predicate. Having interpreted the principle of Identity as useless and meaningless except when taken to signify identity in difference, why insist, as Mr. Bradley does, that now it shall mean abstract or bare identity? Why require that the content of the predicate in a judgment be transformed into the existential stuff of the subject? Why attempt to resolve a duality which is ultimate and which is grounded in the very nature of consciousness, and in consequence condemn thought as purely relational and discursive? The ultimate source of Mr. Bradley’s error here, it seems to me, is two-fold: 1) A one-sided view of immediate experience and what is given there, and 2) an assumption as to the character of Reality. But here we must notice how Prof. Bosanquet obviates the difficulty and whether his interpretation of the principle in operation is not overstrained on another side.

According to Prof. Bosanquet, thought has an abstract character, but this quality is not fatal to thought’s adequacy to keep us in contact with the real.<sup>4</sup> The aspect of abstraction in knowledge is eliminated in the process of the development of knowledge. “Abstraction—when considered as a method *par excellence* is one of the processes by which Reason armed with reflective ideas, breaks into concrete data in search of the unity of the universal.”<sup>5</sup> “Thus the guiding idea of abstraction is a provisional idea,”<sup>6</sup> that is to say, thought must analyze before it can synthesize, or rather, thought is a process of synthesis as well as analysis. And this is

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 166.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 61; Vol. II, p. 20.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 21.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

equal to saying that thought must see difference before it can declare identity. Thus "the law will then mean that, in spite of or in virtue of the difference expressed in a judgment, the content of judgment is a real identity, that is to say, has a pervading unity. It says that there is such a thing as identity in difference, or in other words . . . synthesis of differences referred to reality."<sup>1</sup> Thought, then, for Prof. Bosanquet offers no problem because of its abstract character, for, as he says, "we shall be inclined to see in thought the principle of concreteness rather than abstraction."<sup>2</sup>

But Prof. Bosanquet goes on to make an assertion about Reality upon the basis of the principle of Identity, a principle which is interpreted as purely formal in character: "We are only expanding what is implied in the allegation of real identity if we say that the law 'A is A' ultimately asserts the thoroughgoing unity of Reality."<sup>3</sup> "Its simple affirmation leaves no room for any discontinuity in the real world . . . Reality, therefore, is one throughout."<sup>4</sup> The full implications of these statements founded upon the application of the principle of Identity are clearly set forth in Prof. Bosanquet's treatment of the 'concrete universal.' This point is to be treated later, and here we shall pause long enough only to question the power of a formal principle to say anything about Reality as a whole. It must be assumed, of course, in any philosophy which would not cut from under it its ground, that Reality is rational, i.e., that it responds in some way to the activities of mind, but no formal principle, admitted as necessary to reason at the outset, can be legitimately extended to affirm anything specific about the nature of Reality. In other words, a purely formal principle cannot without adequate grounds be extended to the rôle or function of a constitutive principle.

With respect to the Law of Contradiction, Prof. Bosanquet says, "The Law of Contradiction is but the complement of the Law of Identity,"<sup>5</sup> and Mr. Bradley agrees.<sup>6</sup> As a formal principle of thought, it means "that a statement and its denial cannot both be true"<sup>7</sup> in the same sense; that is, if 'A is B,' A cannot equal not-B. Mr. Bradley reminds us that, in the interpretation of this principle, as in the case of Identity, we must avoid taking it as signifying tautology,<sup>8</sup> i.e., "A is not not-A." So far, then, there is agreement between Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, namely, that the laws of Identity and Contradiction are simply the expression, the one in positive form, the other in negative form of the *principle*

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 210.

<sup>2</sup>Bos., *Principle*, p. 56.

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 210.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 112.

<sup>5</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 211.

<sup>6</sup>*Logic*, p. 137.

<sup>7</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 212.

<sup>8</sup>*Logic*, p. 136.

of consistency. This means, when interpreted in relation to thought, that thought must be consistent with itself.

We have already referred to Mr. Bradley's peculiar use of the principle of Contradiction, namely, his affirmation that the judgment involves a self-contradiction because the predicate asserts a 'content' of the subject which is never quite equal to the 'that' implied in the subject. This, as we maintain, is a reversion to the tautology implied in the views of Boole and Jevons; it takes identity as abstract or bare identity. We pause here merely to state that Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet differ quite fundamentally on a point of interpretation. We must also call attention to an application of the principle of Contradiction which is accepted by both Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, and which throughout this work must be held up to criticism. On this point Prof. Bosanquet says, "The Law of Contradiction simply confirms and reiterates that assumption of the unity of reality which the Law of Identity involves. Reality, the Law of Contradiction asserts, is a *consistent* unity."<sup>1</sup> This statement appears quite harmless at first glance, and it really is so, if not overworked. But the Law of Contradiction, as we shall see, is identified by Prof. Bosanquet with the principle of Individuality which is everywhere employed by him > as a criterion of reality. Mr. Bradley, too, admits that in his treatment of the Law of Contradiction he must dip into metaphysics.<sup>2</sup> Having pointed out the relation of this principle to the Law of Identity, he says, "and if we desire to glance in passing at the metaphysical side of the matter, we may remind ourselves that the real is individual, and the individual is harmonious and self-consistent."<sup>3</sup> It is this "metaphysical side of the matter" which comes to the fore, we assert, in Mr. Bradley also, and becomes for him the 'absolute criterion' by which all finite existence is > measured and condemned as 'appearance.' We repeat, it is to the extension of this formal principle of thought to a metaphysical principle which is to sit in judgment upon the real, that we object.

It will be found convenient at this point to consider the dialectical character of thought in the systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet. For Hegel, there can be little doubt, the dialectic is the constructive movement of thought by which the raw material of experience—existence or Being—is lifted, so to speak, out of the immediacy at the lower extremity of thought by a process of mediation to the immediacy of absolute knowledge, at the upper extremity of thought. It is a dynamic principle according to which both knowledge and Reality are constructed and sustained, for with Hegel they are one. It may be stated at once that for Prof. Bosan-

<sup>1</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 213.

<sup>2</sup>Brad., *Logic*, pp. 135-137.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 137.



quet, following Hegel, the dialectic is a constructive principle which more and more brings into evidence the very nexus of experience, the 'concrete universal.' Yet in the end, as we shall see, he rejects it as falling short of the Absolute. Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, as Prof. Sabine finely states, accepts and rejects it at once: "It is accepted in so far as Mr. Bradley regards thought as a pursuit of consistency which cannot stop short of the inclusion of an absolute totality of conditions; this clearly suggests Hegel's ideal of a self-differentiating, concrete thought. The principle is rejected, however, in that this movement of thought is not really the rational self-development of the Absolute itself; it is the manipulation of terms in relation, of abstractions which can never themselves reach the goal of perfect unity in diversity."<sup>1</sup> Thought for both Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet is a process of Othering<sup>2</sup> through which, in an effort to follow out the implications of content in the subject and the predicate of a judgment to a larger, richer and more consistent whole, the dialectic functions as an instrument for ironing our contradictions.<sup>3</sup> Every suggestion to self-completion is swallowed up in a larger whole. It is the effort to include the totality of conditions which underlie a judgment that is at the root of the movement to include the Other; or, stated otherwise, the object in the judgment is not independent and self-sufficient, its true nature lies outside of itself as well as inside. Thus "it presents something already beyond it," to use Mr. Bradley's phrase,<sup>4</sup> i.e., it suggests its own completion. "Thought is always found with, and appears to demand, an other."<sup>5</sup> Thus comprehensiveness and coherence are achieved by following out these suggestions of self-completion and unity.<sup>6</sup>

For Prof. Bosanquet, thought begins, as for Hegel, in the relatively particular and abstract, and proceeds to the universal and concrete; and by this development of knowledge through the dialectic, nothing is lost or left behind.<sup>7</sup> Consciousness is a continuous judgment, and every judgment is a 'synthesis of differences,'<sup>8</sup> not a sum of units. This view of consciousness, according to Prof. Bosanquet, enables us to see the "connection between individuality and actual existence."<sup>9</sup> Prof. Bosanquet throughout appeals to the principle that the "truth or reality is the whole,"<sup>10</sup> and this, he maintains, is implied in the principle of Identity and the principle of Contradiction. The dialectic of thought functions in experience,

<sup>1</sup>*Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 23, 1914, p. 555.

<sup>2</sup>*Brad., Appearance*, p. 175-176.

<sup>3</sup>Contradiction consists in the identification of the diverse. *Brad., Essays*, p. 228; *Bos., Principle*, pp. 223-224.

<sup>4</sup>*Essays*, p. 225.

<sup>5</sup>*Brad., Appearance*, p. 175.

<sup>6</sup>*Essays*, p. 233.

<sup>7</sup>*Bos., Logic*. Vol. I, pp. 60-61.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>10</sup>*Principle*, p. 41.



whether sensation,<sup>1</sup> sense-perception,<sup>2</sup> feeling,<sup>3</sup> or will.<sup>4</sup> Each and every experience of the human consciousness reaches beyond itself, and in this self-transcendence of thought we have the revelation of its essence, the 'concrete universal.' For Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, consciousness is conterminous with experience as constituted by the subject-object relation. Consciousness is 'superinduced on,' and is supported by, feeling, feeling being taken as an experienced whole.<sup>5</sup> It begins with the diversity latent in immediate experience, which is a "unity, complex but without relations,"<sup>6</sup> and upon this relatively particular and abstract material it works. "We always have more content in the presented subject than in the predicate," says Mr. Bradley.<sup>7</sup> The 'given' "changes in our hands, and it compels us to perceive inconsistency of content."<sup>8</sup> "This content cannot be referred merely to its 'given' 'that', but is forced beyond it, and is made to qualify something outside."<sup>9</sup> Thus the process or dialectic of self-transcendence gets under way. "Because the given reality is never consistent, thought is compelled to take the road of indefinite expansion."<sup>10</sup> At each step or stage in the Othering, in which it pursues a clue to self-completion by the swallowing up of content in larger wholes, it attains not only greater comprehensiveness but coherence as well, and these are the very marks of truth. In fact, as we shall see in Chapter III, degrees of truth and reality are measured by the amount of wideness and consistency attained through the dialectic of self-completion. The process of the dialectic, then, for Mr. Bradley stands rooted in two fundamental facts: 1) The fact that there is more content in the presented subject than in the predicate; and this is due to the fact that "we find in the subject two special characters," a) sensuous finitude and b) immediacy;<sup>11</sup> and 2) "the predicate on its side is itself not free from endlessness. For its content, abstracted and finite, necessarily depends on relation to what is beyond."<sup>12</sup> For Prof. Bosanquet, the dialectic springs out of the inherent abstraction and particularity of the 'given,' on the one hand, and, on the other, its working dynamic is the imperious tendency of experience to attain the concrete and the whole.<sup>13</sup> "The normal and natural working of intelligence, then, is creative and constructive, tending towards the concrete and the continuity within differences. The universality which is its mainspring is in itself a *nisus* to the concrete."<sup>14</sup> In the final analysis, we may say, the motives at the base of the dialectic movement of thought

<sup>1</sup>*Principle*, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>5</sup>*Essays*, pp. 192, 195.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 194.

<sup>7</sup>*Appearance*, p. 176.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 166.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 177.

<sup>13</sup>*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 135; *Principle*, p. 33.

<sup>14</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 184.

toward a self-consistent whole—the individual, in the case of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet is one and the same. They agree, further, in maintaining that the movement of thought does not culminate in giving us Reality or the Absolute. An important difference, however, appears in that Mr. Bradley acknowledges the breakdown of thought at the beginning while Prof. Bosanquet admits it at the end; and it is this which accounts for the difference of view as to the nature of thought.

So far we have discussed only the sense in which Mr. Bradley accepts the dialectic of Hegel. Exactly at what point does he reject it, and what are the consequences of its rejection? We have pointed out that the root of the dialectic is the infinite richness of the content of the 'given' in the subject, and the endless character of the predicate. Thought works on the relational character of the material offered in the diversity of content in subject and predicate. "Consider first the subject that is presented," he says. "It is a confused whole that, so far as we make it an object, passes into qualities and relations. And thought desires to transform this congeries into a system. But, to understand the subject, we have at once to pass outside it in time, and again also in space. On the other hand these external relations do not end, and from their own nature they cannot end. Exhaustion is not merely impracticable, it is essentially impossible, . . . but this is not all. Inside the qualities, which we took first as solid end points of the relations, an infinite process breaks out."<sup>1</sup> Thus we find ourselves entering an irresolvable nest of difficulties, namely, the unintelligible connection of qualities and relations discussed in *Appearance and Reality*, Chapter III. The content of the subject strives unsuccessfully to eliminate diversity or contradiction. Or, on the other hand, take the predicate, and what do we find? Here again is endlessness. The predicate, on its side, has a content which is abstract and finite and "necessarily depends on relation to what is beyond."<sup>2</sup> No sooner does thought enter upon the suggested relation beyond, than it finds itself in a *progressus in infinitum*. We end in the hopeless abyss of terms and relations. Accordingly, we are not only unable to remove the contradictions latent in the subject and predicate taken separately, but we find the same difficulty in the relation between subject and predicate.<sup>3</sup> In the latter case, we have an 'existence' and 'content,' a 'that' and a 'what.' We cannot get either the 'that' by itself or the 'what' by itself. We have seen that each reaches beyond itself to its Other. Again, if we try to combine them, our efforts are futile. As the 'what' or predicate enlarges to fill up the content of the 'that' represented in the subject, the 'what' itself expands. 'Content' never fills up

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, p. 178.

<sup>2</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, p. 177.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

'existence;' truth can never be identified with reality. Yet "truth is the object of thinking,"<sup>1</sup> thought seeks an all-inclusive whole, a perfect and absolutely harmonious system, a "unity, complex but without relations." It would "be an immediate, self-dependent, all-inclusive individual. But, in reaching this perfection, and in the act of reaching it, thought would lose its own character. Thought does desire such individuality, that is precisely what it aims at. But individuality, on the other hand, cannot be gained while we are confined to relations."<sup>2</sup> Here, then, we are face to face with the breakdown of the dialectic—it fails to give us Reality, and the cause of its breakdown is inherent in the very nature of thought, namely, its relational and discursive character. "Thought is relational and discursive, and, if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide; and yet, if it remains thus, how does it contain immediate presentation?"<sup>3</sup>

It is entirely relevant here to ask, as does Prof. George H. Sabine,<sup>4</sup> if this partial rejection of the dialectic on the part of Mr. Bradley does not seriously imperil his criterion of truth, namely, non-contradiction, as he employs it? It certainly does involve it in considerable ambiguity, if it does not make it wholly inapplicable. On the one hand, the criterion can apply only in the case of judgments, for here alone do we find the separation of 'existence' and 'content.' On the other hand, it is the function of judgment to seek a higher immediacy. Now every judgment is contradictory, and "the coherence which judgment mediates must always be the concrete unity in difference of immediate experience."<sup>5</sup> Now does Mr. Bradley mean that this concrete harmony and coherence is identical with the non-contradiction of judgments? It seems not. For the judgment cannot attain full immediacy and remain judgment. Yet judgment alone can be contradicted and nothing can contradict a judgment but a judgment. So we seem brought to the necessity of a choice between two criteria—either the concrete harmony produced through judgment or the absence of self-contradiction.<sup>6</sup>

But let us ask whether it is necessary for us to accept either horn of the dilemma proposed by Mr. Bradley, namely, that "thought is relational and discursive, . . . and yet, if it remains thus, how does it contain immediate presentation?"<sup>7</sup> May it not be that the root of this difficulty, as suggested before, is in Mr. Bradley's 'lurking preference' for sentiency, on the one side, and a strained view of the analytic function of mind, on the other side? Let us see how Prof. Bosanquet obviates the difficulty, if at last he does. We have already pointed out that Prof. Bosanquet

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, p. 165.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>4</sup>*Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 23, 1914, p. 555.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 555-556.

<sup>7</sup>*Appearance*, p. 170.

finds nothing in the 'immediate experience' of which Mr. Bradley speaks to furnish a clue as to what truth or Reality ultimately must be. When Mr. Bradley defines the 'individual' by reference to a uniqueness found in the 'this' and defines it as "the only one there is of its sort,"<sup>1</sup> Prof. Bosanquet says it is making individuality rest upon designation, and this is a mistake.<sup>2</sup> "Individuality cannot possibly rest on designation; and . . . what does so rest is not Individuality but Particularism"—the very absence of individuality.<sup>3</sup> The 'this' in immediate experience is for Prof. Bosanquet merely the point of our immediate contact with reality, but because it is only a point, it is particular and abstract and must be extended (mediated, Hegel would say) to be of any truth value. And, moreover, the "given and its extension differ not absolutely, but relatively, they are continuous with each other,"<sup>4</sup> and it is only by a metaphor that we distinguish them. The unique depends "on completeness of explicit conditions and not on designation, and thus we are intensifying and not enfeebling it as we tend to complete the organization of experience through ideas."<sup>5</sup> So the experience which Mr. Bradley describes as a "unity, complex but without relations" below thought and which thought enviously seeks to encompass or become, simply does not exist as such, and what does exist in this experience is at the opposite pole from Individuality which is the criterion of truth and reality for Prof. Bosanquet as for Mr. Bradley.

Now to the other horn of the dilemma—is thought hopelessly relational and discursive? Here we must reply that Prof. Bosanquet's answer, as Mr. Bradley's, is not free from ambiguity. Mr. Bradley, as we have observed, seems to take a pessimistic view of thought except in a few instances, particularly in his chapter on "Degrees of Truth and Reality" in *Appearance and Reality*, where he defends the thesis that in so far as knowledge attains greater or less wideness and consistency, we have higher and lower degrees of truth and reality. But this chapter, with the other isolated instances of this position, certainly stands in a relation of quantitative minority to the space given to an elaboration of the relational and discursive character of thought. With Prof. Bosanquet just the opposite is true; it is only in isolated instances that we find him sounding a pessimistic note and particularly in his *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 261 n., where he says: "If a perfect individuality is not to be experienced in the form of discursive thought, that is nothing surprising, and in no way suggests that it may not be approachable through that form." And again, "It is perhaps hardly necessary at this time of day to say that I have now in principle adopted Mr. Bradley's view of the relation of thought to reality.

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Logic*, p. 77.

<sup>2</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 260.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 260-261.

<sup>4</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 72.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 261 n.

with which the ideas of my earlier work, *Knowledge and Reality*, were more or less in conflict."<sup>1</sup> But Prof. Bosanquet goes on to speak of a reservation, "I shall refer below to a reservation on this view which I still entertain and which I think is consistent with the attitude of this work. The point is merely that there is more analogy between the work of thought and solid and complete reality than Mr. Bradley, treating thought as solely discursive, seems to allow."<sup>2</sup> To the point of exhibiting this closer analogy we now address ourselves. The treatment of this point will also enable us to see how in another point Prof. Bosanquet differs from Mr. Bradley, namely, in the use of the criterion of truth and reality—which is the same for both—as a constructive rather than a subversive principle.

A general statement must suffice here, as the more detailed treatment of theory of judgment in Chapter III will also bear upon the point. To come to the heart of the matter, let us see how Prof. Bosanquet views the essence of thought. "Thought is essentially the *nisus* of experience as a world to completion of its world. The *intervals of conscious reflection*"—and these are what Mr. Bradley constantly emphasizes, whereupon he declares that thought is discursive—"are merely one of its forms of advance, and are not in their paleness and meagerness characteristic of thought, which is essentially organic and concrete."<sup>3</sup> Chapter II, in Prof. Bosanquet's book on *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, is intended to exhibit the true nature of thought. We can give only a few instances: "It is only in part, then, that our thought is discursive; it has also an intuitive aspect, in which it remains, within itself, secure in the great structures of its creations. The ultimate tendency of thought is . . . to constitute a world."<sup>4</sup> "If its impulse is away from the given it is towards the whole—the world. . . . We do not lose directness and significance as we depart from primary experience; on the contrary, every detail has gained incalculably in vividness and meaning, by reason of the intricate interpretation and interconnection, through which thought has developed its possibility of 'being'. . . . Following this clue, we shall be inclined to see in thought the principle of concreteness rather than abstraction, and to recognize the highest truth or reality of which thought is capable in the fullest experience, the most self-contained world which finite minds can attain to from any given point."<sup>5</sup> Thus it is clear that for Prof. Bosanquet the essence of thought is the 'concrete universal' which, as he says, "embodies the *nisus* of thought to individuality." For Mr. Bradley, on the

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 288 n. and following.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 272; italics mine.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>5</sup>Mr. Bradley, too, recognizes individuality as a character of thought in the more constructive parts of his system, as e.g., *Appearance and Reality*, Chap. XXIV, but certainly for the most part he emphasizes the relational and discursive aspect of thought.

other hand, as pointed out above, the essence of thought is its relational and discursive character.<sup>1</sup> In the case of Prof. Bosanquet, essence is found in thought's inwardness, and in the case of Mr. Bradley, essence is found in its outwardness. Prof. Bosanquet takes thought in its wholeness and comprehensiveness; Mr. Bradley takes it in its incidental and partial character. This seems to me to be the ultimate difference between Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley upon the nature of thought. And Prof. Bosanquet's reservation in the end, it seems to me, brings him no nearer to thought's adequacy to reality than in the case of Mr. Bradley, if we take Mr. Bradley at all seriously in his chapter on "Degrees of Truth and Reality." Prof. Bosanquet says, "One reservation, it seems to me, must be made upon the doctrine that thought is essentially discursive and relational. It points only to an anticipation of the fuller experience, and as I am quite aware, not to any achievement of it. But it appears to me suggestive and more than that, I cannot see my way out of it."<sup>2</sup> He goes on in language which further tends to mitigate the discursive character of thought: "I draw no general conclusion but this, that thought which can thus deposit an *apparent* solid individual, is not so far removed from the nature of the fuller experience as an exclusive study of the discursive S P judgment tends to make us suppose."<sup>3</sup> The only conclusion which it seems to me we can validly draw from this is that, on the point of thought's adequacy to apprehend the real, Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley are in the end in absolute agreement, namely, *that thought must ultimately fall short*. This difference, however, obtains, as Prof. Bosanquet himself points out, his view allows of a closer "analogy between the work of thought and solid and complete reality than Mr. Bradley, treating thought as solely discursive, seems to allow."<sup>4</sup>

In this view of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, which regards thought as ultimately incapable of apprehending reality, we have an analogy, though imperfect, to Prof. Bergson's static conception of thought, a view which also finds thought inadequate to apprehend the real.<sup>5</sup> Thought in the view of Prof. Bergson is the work of the intellect.<sup>6</sup> On this point, Prof. Bergson is more nearly in agreement with Mr. Bradley than with Prof. Bosanquet who views thought as coextensive with human experience. For Prof. Bergson thought is an instrument of action in the service of the will to live,<sup>7</sup> and in this respect he departs from both Mr. Bradley and Prof.

<sup>1</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 292.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 293; italics mine.

<sup>3</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 292.

<sup>4</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 288.

<sup>5</sup>The analogy in the case of Mr. Bradley, though still imperfect, is closer than in the case of Prof. Bosanquet. In so far as they employ the concept of Individuality both as a partial achievement of thought or knowledge and as a criterion of truth and reality, they are, of course, in disagreement with Prof. Bergson.

<sup>6</sup>*Creative Evolution*, trans. by Mitchell, pp. 137 ff.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 152.

Bosanquet and is in agreement with the Pragmatists. Thought as a function of the intellect, then, for Prof. Bergson finds its exclusive employment in the world of inert matter,<sup>1</sup> upon the unorganized solids,<sup>2</sup> in a word, where mechanism reigns. It has a gift for mathematics and mechanics. "The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life," says Prof. Bergson,<sup>3</sup> and life, in his view, is reality. Here, perhaps, we may say, Prof. Bergson more nearly agrees with Mr. Bradley who views thought as discursive and relational in essence. It is significant, however, that neither Mr. Bradley, Prof. Bosanquet nor Prof. Bergson have left themselves, as they think, entirely out of touch with reality. Mr. Bradley, as we pointed out above, takes refuge in 'immediate experience' and slightly in the structure of knowledge which has some analogy to the concrete wholeness of the Absolute Experience. Prof. Bosanquet flees from immediate experience and insists that Reality cannot be gotten through a "peep-hole" in an experience below consciousness proper. Only after the arduous labor<sup>4</sup> of constructing a thoroughly harmonious and consistent system of knowledge—the *apparent* individual—have we a vantage point from which to view Reality. "In fact the Real must be of the nature of the essence of thought. Prof. Bergson takes refuge in 'intuition,' which resembles Mr. Bradley's 'immediate experience,' though he describes it as something like instinct—a divining sympathy—"a conscious, refined spiritual instinct."<sup>5</sup>

The motives which lead to this disparaging view of thought's capacity to apprehend reality directly, in the case of each of these writers, has a metaphysical origin; it rests upon a preconceived notion as to the nature of reality. In Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet it takes the form of an extension of purely formal principles of thought to the value of existential or ontological principles; i. e., in their application formal principles become principles of content. In the case of Prof. Bergson, a sharp distinction between intelligence or thought proper and intuition is made on the ground of a dualistic metaphysics. Intellect and intuition represent the splitting up of a function originally one. There occurs a division of labor, so to speak, due to the necessity of coping with a diversified environment, intellect taking over the function of knowing in solids and intuition confining its work to knowing the mobile—life. We shall have an occasion in the next chapter to inquire whether this inadequacy of thought to apprehend the real may not be avoided by the removal of unnecessary metaphysical assumptions and by a strict regard for the proper use of fundamental principles of thought.

<sup>1</sup>*Creative Evolution*, Trans. by Mitchell, p. 155.    <sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>4</sup>*Principle*, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup>Thilly, Frank, *History of Philosophy*, p. 578.



## CHAPTER II

### THE CONTINUITY OF THOUGHT AND ITS OBJECTS

Having treated the problem of the nature of thought in general, we now turn to consider a more particular question, the relation of thought to its objects.

Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet take up an idealistic position from the outset and maintain it throughout, assuming that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* proved conclusively the reciprocal relation and mutually indispensable character of mind and object. While mindful that the problem of how mind knows object and how object is known by mind is by no means a dead issue, especially since a school of philosophers, the Neo-Realists, persists in keeping it alive, they devote the greater portion of space to a critical study of the categories of thought and object with a view to determining their degrees of truth and reality respectively. Taking their stand, then, upon the breakdown of pure Empiricism in Hume and the achievement of Kant, namely, that knowledge is possible and that relations are internal in character, or, in the words of Prof. Bosanquet, "condemning as irrational *ab initio* the doubt and the inquiry whether knowledge is possible,"<sup>1</sup> their problem is actually subsequent to this. "Knowing is essentially a process of trying out assumptions in actually dealing with reality," they maintain, and "the categories are simply the most general assumptions of all rational experience, the principles of synthesis which are universal in their application."<sup>2</sup>

So the philosophical position of both Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet is accurately described by the term "Speculative Philosophy." Prof. Bosanquet specifically rejects Idealism as equal to Panpsychism or Mentalism and calls his position that of speculative philosophy. Discussing the spirit of post-Kantian speculative philosophy, Prof. Bosanquet says: "all difficulty about the general possibility—the possibility in principle—of approaching reality in knowledge and perception were flung aside as antiquated lumber." What is undertaken is the direct adventure of knowing, "of shaping a view of the universe which would include and express reality in its completeness."<sup>3</sup> It seeks to exhibit what can and what

<sup>1</sup>"Realism and Metaphysics," *Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 26, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup>J. E. Creighton, "The Copernican Revolution in Philosophy," *Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 22, pp. 137-138.

<sup>3</sup>*Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 26, p. 8.



cannot maintain itself when all the facts are confronted. "Not how did you get it? where did it spring from? *but* does it hold water? does it enable us to think all the facts together?"<sup>1</sup> This philosophical position, openly accepted by Prof. Bosanquet, applies equally well to Mr. Bradley whom he follows in many respects. In fact Mr. Bradley's treatment of "Primary and Secondary Qualities" in Chapter I, *Appearance and Reality* and "Relation and Quality" in Chapter III, and his view of the category of Relation, clearly places him in the list of whole-hearted idealists; and certainly his treatment of the relative character of categories and things in the remaining portion of this treatise clearly entitles his work to be called speculative. The *Essays*, also, are of a similar nature, intending, as he says, to throw light upon his former works.

But Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet by no means neglect to make solid their position as idealist. In considering the argument on this point, it will be found convenient to consider the position of Neo-Realism on the subject of thought and its objects. The question will arise, whether after all Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet do not lapse into the Kantian or pre-Kantian position (when the logic of their position forces them to hold that thought is inadequate to apprehend Reality) by undertaking to prove too much, namely, that thought and its objects are absolutely continuous.

Let us notice, first of all, that for Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet mind is in the midst of its objects from the beginning. The fatal dualism of separating mind from its object and then laboring to bring them together in some satisfactory relation, is absolutely avoided, *at least at the outset*. Leaving aside the difference between Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet on the nature of the 'given' in immediate experience, already discussed in Chapter I, we may assume their views for the present, as related to the present problem, to be in practical agreement. Consciousness involves a subject-object relation.<sup>2</sup> This position is carefully guarded throughout. The common sense view, of course, involves a separation between mind and reality. But this, Prof. Bosanquet says, "is an absolute *cul-de-sac*. If the objective is that which is outside perception, the objective is out of our reach, and the world of our perception can never be objective."<sup>3</sup> This position will become clearer if we note their doctrine of ideas, or, in other words, their view of the relation of mental states to reality. "No mental states in a human consciousness," says Prof. Bosanquet, "are mere mental states, but all contain matter that has been and may be significant."<sup>4</sup> Mr. Bradley employs language to a similar effect in his

<sup>1</sup>*Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 26, pp. 8-9. <sup>2</sup>*Essentials*, pp. 10-11; see also *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>Brad., *Essays*, p. 192.

<sup>4</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 295.

*Logic* (pp. 2-3) where, after calling attention to the manner in which certain psychologists in England have tried to distinguish between ideas and sensations, he goes on: "But, intent on this, we have as good as forgotten the way in which logic uses ideas. We have not seen that in judgment no fact ever *is* just that which it *means*, or can mean what it is; and we have not learnt that, whenever we have truth or falsehood, *it is the signification we use, and not the existence.*"<sup>1</sup> So while Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet distinguish between mental states and their signification, they do insist that mental states are never apart from *meaning*.<sup>2</sup>

'Idea', then, is the name given to a mental state *when referred to something objective*, and this 'idea' is a universal, i.e., a general signification, and it is employed by mind as a symbol or meaning. This will be clear from the following: "The difference between mental states and ideas with a meaning lies in the 'use' of the former. . . . All sensational or perceptual contents, at least in a human consciousness, bear the stamp of some symbolic relations. . . . There are no ideas which are not directly or indirectly affirmed of reality, and therefore *a fortiori* none which are not symbolic or significant."<sup>3</sup> Again, "In judging, we use ideas, but the ideas which we use are not mere particular mental images . . . and which, *qua* particular psychical states on a level with mere sensations, never recur. Ideas . . . are general in their signification."<sup>4</sup> Mr. Bradley's position, as I read his *Logic* (pp. 2-11), is the same. I quote but a few instances and briefly: "I intend to use idea mainly in the sense of meaning."<sup>5</sup> "The 'idea' has here become an universal, since everything else is subordinate to the meaning."<sup>6</sup> "The idea in judgment is the universal meaning."<sup>7</sup> "Judgment proper is the act which refers an ideal content (recognized as such) to a reality beyond the act . . . . The ideal content is the logical idea, the meaning as just defined."<sup>8</sup> So far, then, we see that mental states are never a stream of *mere* psychical states. This is not to deny, however, that it is possible and legitimate to ignore the logical aspect of images in the mind and to view them with the psychologist as mental existences which are original, which never wholly recur and which are quite untransferrable by means of language.<sup>9</sup> But it is the logical aspect which is important for epistemology and from this viewpoint psychical states, whether they be sensations, perceptions, images, emotions or feelings, or volitions, are never devoid of meaning. This means, moreover, that they are always referred, or have a reference, to something

<sup>1</sup>*Logic*, pp. 2-3; italics mine.

<sup>2</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 295.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, see also p. 296.

<sup>4</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 68, and ff.

<sup>5</sup>*Logic*, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 10; see also *Essays*, p. 331.

<sup>9</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 40 ff.

objective.<sup>1</sup> Thus, in the very nature of consciousness, we have exhibited that dual aspect of subject and object which is essential to its being. And as long as psychical states persist in mind, so long is there a reference to the objective; and, as Prof. Bosanquet says, "human intelligence has in principle the form of a continuous judgment, in which no psychical elements escape from contributing to meaning, and no meanings are ultimately unaffirmed."<sup>2</sup> The simplest act of mind, then, is a judgment. "Every idea has its existence in the medium of judgment."<sup>3</sup>

But we must go a step farther and ask, exactly what is the objective world? Prof. Bosanquet is careful here to conserve all that is implied in the above doctrine of 'ideas' and their objective reference. He says, "It is not admitted, the reader should remember, that the world of meanings is separable from the world as affirmed. It is merely the latter looked at in a fragmentary way."<sup>4</sup> "The world of objective reference and the world of reality are the same world, regarded in the former case as composed of isolated though determined contents, and in the latter case as composed of contents determined by systematic combination in a *single* coherent structure."<sup>5</sup> (We shall ask later whether and in what sense reality is a *single* coherent structure.) These statements clearly mean, if they have any significance, that there is no other world than that of mind's objective reference. Psychical states are the mind's response to modifications of the bodily organism. These psychical states are interpreted, they are 'ideas' or meanings, and every idea has an objective reference. True, the particular psychical images which the mind generates from moment to moment and which never recur are not *qua* images referred to the objective world; but these images universalized, in the act of thought itself, are subordinated to a meaning and this meaning is what has objective reference.<sup>6</sup> Thus there is a sense in which psychical states, e.g., a sensation, may exist without being 'named,' without becoming a 'fixed reference' or meaning. This is not to be understood, however, as implying that any psychical state which has not been 'named' or given 'meaning' is, as such, merely subjective. Every psychical state has an objective reference *ab initio* and the process of giving it 'meaning' is really the act of making it a 'fixed reference;' for as Prof. Bosanquet says, "it is quite true that a sensation takes a different rank in knowledge when it has been attended to and named."<sup>7</sup> A similar course of argument is pursued by Mr. Bradley in his *Logic*, Chapter I, on "The General Nature of Judgment," also in his *Essays*, Chapter III, on

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 5; Brad., *Essays*, pp. 28ff.

<sup>2</sup>*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 39 n; see also p. 4, and Brad., *Essays*, p. 29.

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 36.

<sup>4</sup>*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 39 n.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, pp. 39-40, 68-69; Vol. II, p. 298.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup>*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 17 n.

"Floating Ideas and the Imaginery." Mr. Bradley, however, admits<sup>1</sup> that in his treatment of ideas in his logic he does make use of some "objectionable expressions," yet he does not see how a careful reader could be led astray by them. Closing the note, he says, "I should have added that from the first and throughout, Prof. Bosanquet has consistently advanced the true doctrine."<sup>2</sup>

Still it must be explained further how it is that 'my world' is not merely *mine* but *yours* also, and how it is that my mind apprehends an *objective world*—things connected in space and time? Mr. Bradley deals with the errors of Subjectivism in Chapter XXI, in his work on *Appearance and Reality* and again in his *Essays*, Chapter XI. The argument consists in showing that the evidence for the existence of other selves is of the same character as that for the existence of the private or personal self. The nature of the inference in both cases is the same.<sup>3</sup> The objective character of nature is established by observing that in the judgment there is an objective aspect, namely, the aspect which refers an ideal content to reality, as well as a 'subjective' or 'irrelevant' aspect.<sup>4</sup> Prof. Bosanquet's statement of the case against Subjectivism is perhaps more explicit, and since he is in practical agreement with Mr. Bradley, we shall state his position more at length.

That Subjective Idealism is a valuable propaedeutic to philosophy and especially to logic, Prof. Bosanquet readily grants.<sup>5</sup> In fact he insists that one cannot really understand the problem of logic, much less solve it, without appreciating the strength and weakness of Subjectivism. As a theory of reality, Subjective Idealism is antipodal to naive realism. It maintains "that we cannot get at anything but in terms of consciousness."<sup>6</sup> So far Subjectivism is quite harmless, nay more, so far it insists upon a truth overlooked by naive realism. It is only when consciousness, in this connection, is interpreted as *my* consciousness merely that it becomes objectionable. How, then, can we justify the assumption that our consciousness of the world of objects has objective validity and is not dependent upon *my* mind? This is the problem.

It must not be forgotten that other individuals and minds are an important part of *my world* and that they constitute the most significant part, doubtless, of that which is object for me and is in interaction with *my* mind. Thus, in all communication with my fellows, I must meet them in the world of objective reference.<sup>7</sup> 'Meanings,' 'names,' etc., are very largely, if not wholly, a social product. If it were not so, we would be

<sup>1</sup>*Essays*, p. 29 n.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>See especially *Appearance*, pp. 254 ff.

<sup>4</sup>*Essays*, pp. 328 ff.

<sup>5</sup>*Logic* Vol. II, pp. 311 ff.

<sup>6</sup>Bos., *Essentials*, p. 19.

<sup>7</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 69.

alone in the world. "Objective reference is the substance of the convention by which rational beings communicate with each other and with themselves."<sup>1</sup> *My world*, then, though it exists in the medium of my mind, will also in the main exist in your mind as well, and in the mind of our fellows. Moreover, herein lies the greatest obstacle to the doctrine known as Subjective Idealism: If meanings and 'objective references' were merely my own, an Objective Idealism would be impossible.<sup>2</sup> The logical motive of Subjective Idealism is "that a universe severed from the life of mind can never fulfill the conditions of self-existence" and in this insight it is substantially correct.<sup>3</sup> But Subjective Idealism claims too much, in fact, it claims what cannot be established logically, when it asserts that the self-existence of objects is conditioned by *my* mind. It is experience, either direct or indirect, which constitutes an essential condition of the existence of objects. It becomes clear from the above consideration in what sense it may be truthfully said that mind not only constructs but sustains the world of reality. Why should it not, if, as pointed out above, the 'subject' occupies an equal place with the 'object' in the subject-object relation which constitutes consciousness?<sup>4</sup> "The underlying question seems to be whether in cognition we are co-operating in the self-maintenance of reality, as ourselves organs within it; or are apprehending *ab extra* something finished and complete apart from us. *Of these types of view it is the former that has prevailed in my treatment.*"<sup>5</sup>

Our second question, namely, how is it that *my mind* apprehends an objective world of things connected in space and time, has in principle been answered, but it may be well to add a few remarks. Briefly the answer is, because the world is just such a world of things connected in space and time and we "know things as they really are."<sup>6</sup> We must avoid the view, as Prof. Bosanquet says, "that judgment is a transition from mental state to mental state."<sup>7</sup> Consciousness has in principle the form of a continuous judgment; and, moreover, consciousness always appears as holding things in relation. Take an instance of visual perception, say a view of the desk. What is in consciousness is not merely 'this book,' but 'this book' in relation to desk or pencil. In fact what we have in any form of consciousness is things in relation, spatial or temporal, or both. Thus, as Prof. Bosanquet says, "Consciousness is consciousness of a world only in so far as it *presents* a system, a whole of objects, acting on one

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Bos., *Distinction*, p. 38.

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, p. 312.

<sup>4</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, pp. 42-43; p. 232.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, p. 314; italics mine. See also p. 312.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 309.

<sup>7</sup>*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 39 n. Cf. William James on "The Stream of Thought," *Principle of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 224 ff.



another.<sup>1</sup> . . . .” Prof. Bosanquet’s illustration of the circular panorama is pertinent here and clearly portrays the conclusion he draws, viz., “the whole world, for each of us, *is* our course of consciousness, in so far as this is regarded as a system of objects which we are obliged to think.”<sup>2</sup>

The doctrine of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet on the relation of thought to its objects, as above set forth, is clearly in conflict with the view that the objects of knowledge are independent of their being known, a doctrine more or less generally held by the so-called Neo-Realists of whom Profs. Ralph B. Perry and Edwin B. Holt are typical American representatives. Prof. Holt states the position of Neo-Realism on this point as follows: “The entities (objects, facts, etc.) under study in logic, mathematics, and the physical sciences are not mental in any usual or proper meaning of the word ‘mental.’ The being and nature of these entities are in no sense conditioned by their being known.”<sup>3</sup> A comparison of these conflicting views will advance our study and add further light upon the main theme of this chapter.

The first argument of the Neo-Realist against such a position as that of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet is that it “is founded on the assertion of the primacy of consciousness,”<sup>4</sup> and the course of procedure is called the “fallacy of argument from the ego-centric predicament.”<sup>5</sup> This is the initial reaction of Neo-Realism to all forms of Idealism which it assumes are the same in principle with the Idealism of Berkeley.<sup>6</sup> Discussing “The New Idealism and the Cardinal Principle,” Prof. Perry says, “It is clear that the cardinal principle of idealism remains what it was with Berkeley. It is asserted that consciousness in some form, especially consciousness in its cognitive form, is the one necessary and universal condition of being.”<sup>7</sup> Now this interpretation of idealism misses the point entirely of such an idealism as that of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet. The fundamental principle of Berkeleyan idealism is stated in the familiar expression, “*esse est percipi*.” For Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet objects may exist without being perceived. They readily grant that an object, physical thing, or scientific principle is distinct from the act of knowing. Our exposition of the doctrine of ideas, as maintained by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, clearly provides for the distinction between mind and its objects. But what they do maintain is that (1) mind and object are reciprocally indispensable, and that (2) reality to have any meaning must be a system

<sup>1</sup>*Essentials*, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

<sup>3</sup>*The New Realism*, p. 472.

<sup>4</sup>R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 156.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 158.

<sup>6</sup>G. E. Moore’s argument in “The Refutation of Idealism,” *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XII, 1903, pp. 433 ff., it seems to me, resolves itself into the same position.

<sup>7</sup>R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 155.

based upon the progressive organization of experience. What is implied, then, in this doctrine, is that, in order to say anything significant about an object or about reality as a whole, we must have recourse to experience either directly or indirectly. Prof. Perry says, "It did not occur to him"—Berkeley—"apparently, that a natural body, like a tulip, can belong both to the order of ideas and *also* to another and independent order."<sup>1</sup> But certainly there is nothing in the doctrine of ideas maintained by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet that requires us to identify the 'being' of the 'tulip' with its 'being perceived.' Furthermore, 'idea' is a 'meaning' and as such it is *referred* to the object, *not identified with* the object. We are therefore inclined to feel that the summary classification of all idealism under the category of Berkeleyanism is a gross misinterpretation of such an idealism as that of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet.

But Prof. Perry grants that the 'new idealism' does add one new argument, viz., "the 'synthetic' function of consciousness."<sup>2</sup> The treatment of this point will carry us into a study of the character of relations, upon which Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet are in fundamental disagreement with Neo-Realism. Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet maintain, as we shall see, that relations are internal or organic, i.e., terms are altered by their relations; the Neo-Realists, on the other hand, maintain that some relations are external, some relations do not affect the nature of the terms related. Restricting the discussion here to the problem of the relation of mind and the object, the doctrine of Neo-Realism implies that some objects or parts of reality are self-existent or non-mental.<sup>3</sup> Prof. Perry states the issue between the Neo-Realists and the position of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet in *The New Realism*, page 164, from which I quote briefly. The particular reference is to Prof. Bergson and Mr. Bradley, but it applies to Prof. Bosanquet as well. "The real world, ultimate reality, cannot be disclosed by analysis. . . . It is not a collection, not a class, not an organic unity, but it in some sense just One—One Absolute or One Evolution. Analysis can at best have only a pragmatic justification. . . . The attacking party grants that wholes are manifolds and complexes—in some sense—but holds that the parts or elements are all constituted by their relations to all other parts in the complex. Briefly, there is a universal interpenetration! But this is the theory of internal relations.<sup>4</sup> . . ." This is a summary statement of the position of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet. From the standpoint of Neo-Realism, the issue may be stated thus: "The fact is that the theory of internal relations does not have a *universal* application. *The infinite complexity of terms does not exist, or*

<sup>1</sup>*Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 127.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 156.

<sup>3</sup>*The New Realism*, p. 167.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.



*subsist.*"<sup>1</sup> This argument, of course, is directed with special force against Mr. Bradley's doctrine of terms and relations. But the fallacy in the doctrine of internal relations, as viewed by the Neo-Realists, is clearly stated by Prof. W. P. Montague as follows: "That fallacy consists in the assumption that the nature of the parts of a complex depends upon the nature of the whole complex, and consequently, that knowledge of merely a part of the truth must as such be false. . . . We do not have to have all truth in order to have some truth. I can misapprehend some qualities of an object without misapprehending its other qualities."<sup>2</sup> The position of the Neo-Realists is intended to show, not that the internal theory of relations has no application, but that it has not universal application and that some external relations exist.<sup>3</sup>

Let us study the position of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet on the doctrine of relations. It may be that they have overworked the theory of internal relations in such a way as to make the reaction of Neo-Realism justified, in part, at least. We will consider Mr. Bradley's position first. In his work, *Appearance and Reality*, he sets out as an observer in search of Reality. Beginning with the common sense view 'that things are real,' he shows that a thing is unintelligible apart from mind. Take the obvious distinction between primary and secondary qualities. May we solve the problem of the 'thing's' reality by saying that the former are the reality and the latter derivative? The argument shows that while secondary qualities exist "only for an organ" and are mind dependent because apprehended only in perception,<sup>4</sup> the primary qualities are equally relative to mind, for the "extended comes to us only by relation to an organ,"<sup>5</sup> i. e., it must exist to a percipient organism. Thus in a world where there were no percipients and no perception, neither primary nor secondary qualities could exist. So far Prof. Bosanquet is in entire agreement with Mr. Bradley.<sup>6</sup> His argument in *The Distinction Between Mind and Its Objects* points out that while Realism claims to have disposed of the primary and secondary qualities on its doctrine, he "cannot see how the tertiary qualities, say, for example, those which we call aesthetic, can have justice done them on this principle."<sup>7</sup> Take the tertiary qualities, say, beauty or delightfulness. "If you reserve anything for a mind stripped of objective contents, you must, as realism admits, reserve pleasure and pain. But if so, all qualities involving pleasure and pain are mind depend-

<sup>1</sup>*The New Realism*, p. 167.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 299.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 167.

<sup>4</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 12 f.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>6</sup>H. H. Joachim also offers an admirable defense of the internal character of relations in *The Nature of Truth*, Chapter II, "Truth as a Quality of Independent Entities."

<sup>7</sup>Bos., *Distinction* p. 22.



ent. . . ."<sup>1</sup> Thus Prof. Bosanquet argues that because tertiary qualities, which involve pleasure and pain, are mind dependent, all qualities which involve pleasure and pain are mind dependent. The alternative before the realist, says Prof. Bosanquet, is to assign all sense content to the mind, or to assign aesthetic content to physical reality.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet solidly maintain throughout that some form of continuity between mind and its objects must be allowed, else as Prof. Bosanquet says, "on one side we have a *caput mortuum*, on the other, an empty synthetic function."<sup>3</sup> So far, it would seem to the writer, Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet have validly held their ground against Neo-Realism. For, as pointed out above, any effort to conceive any part of reality, however remote or near, however microscopic or large, involves the assumption that it is in some form present to a percipient. Thus, again, in the end, any conception or statement about the part, whether it be quality or complex of qualities, must have a reference, direct or indirect, "to reality as experienced or as constructed from experience."<sup>4</sup>

Let us pursue the problem further from the standpoint of Mr. Bradley. Mr. Bradley carries the inquiry as to the character of relations into a hopeless tangle. Accepting the view that the particular relations which enter into the constitution of things are nothing apart from a mind that apprehends the relation, these relations, according to Mr. Bradley, become unintelligible when looked at in their real connection with mind. "The arrangement of given facts into relations and qualities may be necessary in practice, but it is theoretically unintelligible."<sup>5</sup> The situation may be stated thus: If thought would traffic in objects or things, it must deal with them in terms of qualities and relations, but these distinctions which thought must make, if it would know, involves an infinite regress of terms and relations. Thus the whole process is infected with contradiction; or, from another viewpoint, "Relation presupposes quality, and quality relation. Each can be something neither together with, nor apart from, the other; and the vicious circle in which they turn is not the truth about reality."<sup>6</sup> It is evident that here we are face to face with Mr. Bradley's doctrine that all thought involves abstraction, as pointed out in Chapter I.

Before criticising this doctrine of relations, let us notice in passing how this doctrine of relations, and with it the principle of Contradiction—Mr. Bradley's Absolute Criterion, becomes the instrument of his subversive dialectic, a process by which all finite things are revealed to be 'appearance' and not Reality. The major portion of *Appearance and Reality* is given

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Distinction*, p. 36.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>4</sup>Leighton, J. A., *The Field of Philosophy*, 2nd. ed. p. 450.

<sup>5</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, p. 25.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

over to a testing out of finite existences to see if they have the power of self-maintenance. Mr. Bradley first examines things, but finds that the relation between the thing and its qualities is unintelligible.<sup>1</sup> He then selects the commonly accepted categories which human thought employs in its reference to reality. Relation, quality, space, time, motion and change, causation, activity, the Self and its various meanings, good, evil, error, and God,—all these and others, by a minute and detailed analysis, are found to be incapable of self-maintenance because they imply incoherence or contradiction. In every case the supposed reality is found self-discrepant, and in consequence is classed as an 'appearance' and not Reality. The dialectic in which the leading interests of life are measured and cast aside as 'appearance' is destructive rather than constructive. In this use of the dialectic, Mr. Bradley departs from Hegel and differs considerably from Prof. Bosanquet. As J. S. McKenzie says: "He takes up, one by one, all the leading interests of life, and throws each of them aside, saying to it, as it were, 'thou has sinned and come short of the glory of the Absolute.' Hegel, on the other hand, is merciful"—and we may add, Prof. Bosanquet, also;—"and, as soon as any particular interest has confessed its sins, as soon as it has laid bare the contradictions that are involved in it, its sins are forgiven, and it is taken up into the bosom of the Absolute."<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Bradley's difficulty here, as noted in Chapter I, is a preconceived notion of the character of Reality, a conception having its source in a one-sided view of the 'given' in immediate experience and supported in his system by a distorted view of the principle of Contradiction. We referred to the latter in the first chapter of this work as involving an invalid extension of a purely formal principle to the status of a material or constitutive principle. Mr. Bradley's assumption throughout is that Reality must be a 'whole' like that given in immediate experience, a "unity, complex but without relations" a whole in which all the parts are swallowed up in an all-inclusive being. He insists in looking at any part of the 'whole' from the standpoint of this all-inclusive being. Against this viewpoint and interpretation of the doctrine of relations, Neo-Realism (also Pragmatism and other forms of Pluralism) is a valid reaction. We shall consider here only to what extent Mr. Bradley's doctrine of relations contributes to his purpose in showing that the finite cannot as such be real.

The most fundamental of all the alleged self-contradictions in Mr. Bradley's list is that inherent in the category of relation, for this one is relevant to all the rest. Mr. Bradley constantly reminds us that "relations are unmeaning except within and on the basis of a substantial whole. . . .

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 19 ff.

<sup>2</sup>*Mind*, N. S., Vol. 3, 1894, p. 334.

Plurality and relatedness are but features and aspects of a unity."<sup>1</sup> Now it is entirely pertinent in this connection to ask if Mr. Bradley's procedure in taking a part of reality, say, matter or a self, and treating it as the whole of reality, is not in itself an abstraction, questionable and contradictory. If we are to start the business of philosophy from the level of human experience—and this is avowedly Mr. Bradley's purpose at the outset,—let us take the objects of the world as they present themselves to a normal human percipient. A finite percipient never perceives an object in all its conceivable relations; he never cares to perceive it thus. His perception is always relevant to purpose (and this certainly should satisfy Mr. Bradley's desire to conform to experience) and when an object meets this end, there is no other test to which it may be validly put. One can lift the object, as Mr. Bradley does, out of the world of perception and purpose into a conceptual world and start the process of terms and relations, which is known at the outset to involve a *regressus ad infinitum*, and we have the fallacy of confusing the perceptual and the conceptual, as in the case of the Eleatic Zeno. Or, we may insist, as Mr. Bradley does, that we view relation apart from the terms related. The relation then will want a *relation* to hook it on to a term. But this new relation will want a relation to hook it on to a relation which is hooked on to a term, and so on *ad infinitum*.<sup>2</sup> But such a procedure, whether in the instance of Mr. Bradley or that of Zeno, is plainly an abstraction—it has no counterpart in concrete experience. Rejecting, then, Mr. Bradley's clue as to the nature of Reality in 'immediate experience', rejecting also his extension of the formal principle of Contradiction to the status of a constitutive principle, and keeping the problem of the nature of relations on the level of finite experience, we may see that relations are *relevant* to purpose and be prepared to accept the consequences, Absolute or no Absolute. On this basis, nothing becomes unreal (as Prof. Bosanquet says), unless it is taken for that which it is not. A doctrine of relations thus interpreted with reference to purpose (though Mr. Bradley's doctrine seems to be relevant to the purpose of proving the Absolute) is really a doctrine of 'relevant relations' and implies that, where they exist, relations are internal in character, but some relations are so irrelevant (to purpose) that they make no difference and are so far external. The doctrine of relations as held by Mr. Bradley practically requires that all relations be viewed as equally relevant, and such a doctrine certainly flies into the face of experience. Some form of pluralism, and not an Absolutism, follows from a true view of the problem of relations.

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, p. 142; see also pp. 228, 364, 392, and especially 574 ff.

<sup>2</sup>See *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1911-1912, Hastings Rashdall on "The Metaphysics of F. H. Bradley," pp. 198-199.



We will now notice how Prof. Bosanquet makes use of the doctrine of relations to enforce his view that mind and object form a continuity, that the finite is really only relative, and that Reality, in the end, as Mr. Bradley maintains, is an all-inclusive whole. A fundamental error in Neo-Realism, according to Prof. Bosanquet, consists in the fact that it persists in placing mind 'here' and object 'there,' whereas the true view requires that we view mind or consciousness as a world.<sup>1</sup> "Mind is never confronted by one object only. . . . If there is a mind on one side, there is at least a complex of objects on the other."<sup>2</sup> But this is not all: "On one side' and 'on the other' are incorrect expressions. . . . I should compare my consciousness to an atmosphere, not to a thing at all. Its nature is to include. The nature of its objects is to be included."<sup>3</sup> "I never seem to think in the form, 'my mind is here and the tree there.' Mind takes itself *ab initio* as a world, not as an object in a world."<sup>4</sup> In this doctrine of 'consciousness as a world,' we have the clue to Prof. Bosanquet's theory of the continuity of mind and its objects. In describing his awareness, in any instance, Prof. Bosanquet says, it is always in terms of some conjunction or preposition, e.g., 'and,' 'before,' 'behind,' or 'beside.' "It is never just one object aware of another. . . . This suggests to me that *ab*

*initio*," says Prof. Bosanquet, "one kind of thing is a whole, and another is a fragment. A mind is a whole—an object is a fragment. . . . For what is real must surely be a whole, whatever else may be its character."<sup>5</sup> Already we feel the ground slipping from under our feet. Granted that mind is like an atmosphere and that objects thus apprehended are related in the form of 'and,' 'before,' 'behind' or 'beside,' why give mind priority by concluding that *in the wholeness or unity aspect* of this experience we have a clue to the nature of the real? Are not the separate elements or objects enveloped by the mind as an atmosphere really and truly aspects of this single experience, and as such, are they not equally entitled to suggest something as to the nature of the real? Prof. Bosanquet points to a common error on the doctrine of relation of mind and object, but certainly the argument does not prove all that is claimed for it. The 'difference' aspect in the above doctrine is quite as relevant as the 'identity' aspect.<sup>6</sup>

But Prof. Bosanquet adds a further argument. "Whether a certain object is continuous with the nature of mind is no question of mere origin or concomitant variation; it is a question of what sort of thing the object is, and what sort of thing mind is, and whether or no the one is connected with the other by inherent character. . . . What comes to me as

<sup>1</sup>*Essentials*, pp. 14-15; *Distinction*, pp. 26-27.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

<sup>5</sup>*Distinction*, p. 28.

<sup>6</sup>*Bos., Logic* Vol. II, p. 279.

something not to be reasoned away is, in a word, the life of mind; or, if we prefer the old technical language, its explicit unity."<sup>1</sup> Prof. Bosanquet is here directing our attention to the essence of mind or thought which, for him, is 'unity,' a 'world,' the 'principle of concreteness,' the 'concrete universal,' the tendency to Individuality.<sup>2</sup> In the pages which follow our quotation, Prof. Bosanquet makes out a good case for objective idealism in showing that the primary, secondary and tertiary qualities of objects, as illustrated in the case of the 'unity' in the bar of steel, the 'color blue,' and the artistic effects of the color blue, respectively, are mind dependent, but it is difficult to see that he has done more. Moreover, when such Neo-Realists as Mr. Bertrand Russell assert the reality of universals apart from the mind,<sup>3</sup> we have in Prof. Bosanquet's argument as to the nature of thought an unanswerable reply. Prof. Bosanquet's doctrine of the universal as the "working connection between particulars," as "the life of the particular,"<sup>4</sup> and as being mind dependent, stands solidly against the realist's view of universals as independent of mind, especially when we remember that all sensations and perceptions are shot through with such connections. But, again, to advance from an argument which shows the reciprocally indispensable character of mind and object to the position that only the 'whole' is the real, is hardly justified. It is again an over-emphasis of one side of a content which has a dual aspect. Mr. Bradley has the tendency, as we observed, to emphasize the 'difference' aspect to the neglect of the 'identity' aspect of thought. Prof. Bosanquet, like Mr. Bradley, takes the internal character of relations too seriously, though he errs on the side of overemphasizing the 'identity' aspect of thought. He seems to feel that if the Realist's contention is granted, 'Identity in Difference must go.' We may allow that 'Identity in Difference' must go in the end, but it means that '*difference must go as well as identity.*' Taking his cue as to the nature of the real from the nature of consciousness to be a 'whole,' (a doctrine acceptable with limitations,) as well as from the synthetic function of consciousness, Prof. Bosanquet's argument reveals a tendency present in Mr. Bradley, namely, to view all actual and conceivably possible relations as equally relevant. Undoubtedly the universe is one and rational; at least we assume this to get under way with thought. But the character of this unity is just the point at issue. To argue that because thought proceeds by identity in difference (as we shall see more fully below) and because concreteness and unity is the very nature of thought, therefore Reality must be concrete and individual to the extent

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<sup>1</sup>*Distinction*, pp. 31-32.

<sup>2</sup>*Principle*, pp. 54 ff.

<sup>3</sup>*The Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 142 ff.

<sup>4</sup>*Distinction*, p. 34.

of annulling all discreteness, seems to me to prove too much and so far to be false.

Doubtless, as Prof. Bosanquet insists, the failure of twentieth century Realism is that "it neglected to inquire into the conditions of self-existence."<sup>1</sup> Mind must be given due credit for its place in the universe; in fact, it must be given a place "in the center of Reality."<sup>2</sup> Purely external relations relate nothing and are therefore unthinkable. It is an abstraction of the grossest sort to maintain that a term may exist out of relation. It is, as Prof. Bosanquet charges, the setting up of a 'tiny Absolute' and every term so abstracted is so far an Absolute. But, granting that Realism goes too far in its contention that terms may exist out of relation, it is quite unnecessary and unwarranted by experience to shift to a doctrine of universally equal and relevant relations, as is implied in Prof. Bosanquet's position. There is another alternative, namely, the doctrine of "an indefinite variety of degrees in the internality of relationships,"<sup>3</sup> and it is just such a doctrine that is justified by experience. Such an interpretation of the internal character of relations conserves the valid rights of purpose and selective attention in the knowledge process, which rights and claims are sadly ignored in any doctrine of equally relevant relations. Thus, when Prof. Bosanquet asserts that "the nature of being a world or whole, is what I take to be the condition of self-existence,"<sup>4</sup> we are forced to ask, What whole? Certainly not the whole universe of existence, the all-inclusive whole or Absolute. Our finite limitation incapacitates us to apprehend such a 'whole'. The only 'world' or 'whole' to which we can and actually do refer an object of knowledge as a test of self-maintenance is the world of human purpose and endeavor. Such a reference keeps us within the bounds of actual and possible experience, while the doctrine of Prof. Bosanquet carries us beyond it.

<sup>1</sup>*Distinction*, p. 38.

<sup>2</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, pp. 305 ff., 314 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Leighton, J. A., *Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 23, 1914, pp. 21 ff.

<sup>4</sup>*Distinction*, p. 38.

## CHAPTER III

### KNOWLEDGE, EXISTENCE AND REALITY

Our inquiry in this chapter will lead us to study the nature and structure of knowledge from three standpoints chiefly: 1) That of the process by which knowledge is constructed, 2) That of the whole body of knowledge and the relation of part to the whole, and 3) That of the relation of knowledge to existence and to reality. We shall wish to know also how Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet view the criteria of truth and of reality.

Since judgment is the function by which knowledge is attained, an inquiry into the nature of judgment will give us insight into the character of knowledge. But the process of building the body of knowledge, according to Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley,<sup>1</sup> is identical with the mental construction of reality.<sup>2</sup> Thus, while studying the process by which knowledge is attained, we shall see how and in what sense reality is constructed and sustained. We shall observe, also, that the theory of judgment for Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet has implications regarding the general nature of reality. The intricate problem of the relation of mental states to judgment and to reality, together with the difference of view between Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet on the doctrine of immediate experience, have been considered in Chapter I. The question of the relation of mind to its objects and the reaction of Neo-Realism, including the problem of the character of relations, has been discussed in Chapter II. So we leave aside these points and consider here the theory of judgment as it affects theory of knowledge and theory of reality.

Judgment is involved in the simplest act of thought, it is "coextensive with affirmation and denial, or, which is the same thing, with truth and falsehood."<sup>3</sup> In judging we make use of ideas, not as mere particular psychical images, but in the sense of 'meaning' or 'general signification.'<sup>4</sup> Moreover, these ideas are referred, directly or indirectly, to reality.<sup>5</sup> Mr.

<sup>1</sup>This is Mr. Bradley's view in the constructive part of his system, especially his chapter, "Degrees of Truth and Reality" in *Appearance and Reality*.

<sup>2</sup>Bos., *Essentials*, p. 22; *Logic* Vol. II, p. 314.

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 67; Brad., *Logic*, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, pp. 68 ff.; Brad., *Logic*, p. 10.

<sup>5</sup>Doctor Thompson's interpretation of Prof. Bosanquet's theory of judgment in *Studies in Logical Theory*, by John Dewey, pp. 87 ff., seems to me to involve a gross misunderstanding of his real view. I do not understand Prof. Bosanquet to hold that judgment is a function by which connection is made between a world of ideas on one side, and a world of reality, independent of thought, on the other.



Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet agree in affirming that judgment consists in the "reference of ideal content to reality."<sup>1</sup> No idea is ultimately unreferred. This is clearly implied in Mr. Bradley's chapter "On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary," where he states that there is no "such thing as an idea which merely floats."<sup>2</sup> The same view is implied in Prof. Bosanquet's doctrine that consciousness is in principle a continuous judgment.<sup>3</sup> This doctrine, that in every judgment a reference of 'ideal content' is made to Reality, is significant and leads to consequences of metaphysical importance. In the perceptive judgment, we are in actual contact with some phase or aspect of reality. "Reality is given for me," as Prof. Bosanquet says, "*in* present sensuous perception and *in* the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with it."<sup>4</sup> (Mr. Bradley's doctrine of immediate experience clearly places him in harmony with Prof. Bosanquet on the point that in the perceptive judgment, we are in immediate contact with reality.<sup>5</sup>) Every judgment will, in the end, be found to qualify Reality, though in judgments other than the perceptive type explicit ideas take the place of the immediate subject. "Such ideas disguise but do not remove the reference to Reality as the ultimate subject in every judgment," says Prof. Bosanquet.<sup>6</sup> Every judgment, accordingly, might, without altering its meaning, be introduced by the phrase 'Reality is such that.'<sup>7</sup> Thus, it is plain, the process of building, on the one side, the structure of knowledge, and on the other, defining the nature of reality,<sup>8</sup> begin together at our point of contact with reality and are carried along *pari passu*. "The real world, as a definite organized system," says Prof. Bosanquet, "is *for me* an extension of this present sensation and self feeling by means of judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain such an extension."<sup>9</sup>

At this point we must note, as before indicated, that the paths for Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet begin to diverge. Both find judgment working on the diversity present in sensuous perception. For Prof. Bosanquet, the 'given' is particular and abstract, and must await the working out of its implications through thought and further experience for its meaning. Thus "The 'given' and its extension differ not absolutely but relatively; they are continuous with each other."<sup>10</sup> Mr. Bradley calls our attention to a "unity, complex but without relations,"<sup>11</sup> below the subject-object relation which constitutes consciousness, a unity which, though transcended

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Logic*, pp. 10, 55; Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 73, Vol. II, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>*Essays*, pp. 28 ff.; see also *Appearance*, pp. 366 ff.

<sup>3</sup>*Logic* Vol. I, p. 39.

<sup>4</sup>*Logic* Vol. I, p. 72.

<sup>5</sup>Brad., *Essays*, pp. 159 ff.

<sup>6</sup>*Logic* Vol. I, p. 74.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>8</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 97.

<sup>9</sup>*Logic* Vol. I, p. 72; see also p. 73.

<sup>10</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 72.

<sup>11</sup>*Essays*, p. 194.

"both remains and is active."<sup>1</sup> Mr. Bradley goes on, "it is not a stage which shows itself at the beginning and then disappears, but it remains at the bottom throughout as fundamental. And, further, remaining it contains within itself every development which in a sense transcends it."<sup>2</sup> Consciousness somehow (the difficulty here is discussed in Chapter I) works on the diversity which it finds in this 'whole' of immediate experience below cognition. This 'given,' for Mr. Bradley, is indeed abstract and particular, and points ahead for its meaning, but he insists that thought is never able to overcome the abstraction with which it begins. Thought from the very beginning is relational and discursive; it aims to remove this lack of wholeness or concreteness and to return to a unity of the character with which it began (or out of which it rises). Having fully discussed the fundamental difference between Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet on the question of immediate experience and pointed out the psychological impossibility of accepting an indeterminate given in human experience, we pause here only to note again that for Mr. Bradley an experience below the level of consciousness opens a road "to the solution of ultimate problems;"<sup>3</sup> that is, (1) it offers a clue to the nature of reality, and (2) it sets up an ideal for knowledge. It does nothing of the sort for Prof. Bosanquet. For him, "*Immediacy is not a stratum of consciousness, but a phase* which all or any of its objects participate in and may totally pass into."<sup>4</sup> Thus what is immediate is also in some degree thought. "It is the objective relation—the externality of the cognized object—which is then in abeyance so far as immediacy is complete."<sup>5</sup> We must note, however, that Prof. Bosanquet has (1) a clue to the nature of Reality, and (2) a hint as to the ideal of knowledge. It is the fact of the nature of consciousness to be a 'world' or 'whole' to which we called attention in Chapter II. So while both have a clue to the solution of ultimate problems in some aspect of human experience, the fact that they choose different aspects is the source of a fundamental difference in their views as to the nature of thought. But before taking up this difference, we will pursue further our discussion of judgment.

Every judgment when expressed—whether written or spoken—takes the form of a proposition or sentence. But there are essential differences between a judgment and a proposition. For Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet the proposition is merely the enunciative sentence which *represents* the judgment.<sup>6</sup> This enunciative sentence, when analyzed grammatically, is found to be made up of subject, predicate, and copula. Now

<sup>1</sup>*Essays*, p. 161.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>4</sup>*Logic* Vol. II, p. 297; italics mine.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>*Bos.*, *Logic* Vol. I, p. 75.



"the judgment, however complex, is a single idea."<sup>1</sup> The relations within it are not relations between ideas but are a part of the 'idea' which is predicated. Yet within this 'idea' as a 'whole' which constitutes every judgment—for consciousness is always a 'world,' and judgment is always an act of consciousness and is thus a 'world,'<sup>2</sup>—subject and predicate are present and distinguishable as constituting the identity in its differences.<sup>3</sup> Thus, as Prof. Bosanquet says, the subject and predicate in the judgment are differences within an identity, whereas "in the proposition they are isolated parts of an extended whole; and the copula, which in judgment is merely the reference that marks predication, . . . becomes in the proposition an isolated part of speech."<sup>4</sup> Another difference between judgment and a proposition is evident from the nature of judgment as a single idea, namely, that while the proposition involves priority in time between subject and predicate, the subject and predicate in the judgment do not. In Judgment "we never have an S first and then tack a P on to it; we always have an inchoate judgment or a choice of judgments."<sup>5</sup> Not only is there no transition in time between subject and predicate in a single judgment (though there may be time in arriving at a judgment and a judgment may persist or endure when arrived at), but the passing from judgment to judgment is not to be viewed as involving open breaks. When it is affirmed that consciousness is in principle a continuous judgment, it is not meant that these judgments are conjoined by *external* ties merely; the ties are *internal*. Just as subject and predicate in a single judgment constitute an identity in difference, the next judgment, if we may so speak, is constituted by gliding over into a new identity in diversity occasioned by selective attention and interest. Thus subject and predicate are modified *pari passu*, and a continuous identity is maintained. It is upon the ground of the continuous identity of judgment and judgment that Prof. Bosanquet is able to say that "the truth, the fact, the reality may be considered, in relation to the human intelligence, as the content of a single persistent and all-embracing judgment."<sup>6</sup> "Judgment breaks up into judgments as rhomboidal spar into rhomboids, but nevertheless it is one through its whole extension. . . . The question is one of continued identity, and therefore must be dealt with as concerning organized wholes or systems. . . . A mere extension of a system, or a mere omission of a system, does not bring us to a new and different system."<sup>7</sup> It is because of this continuity in the nature of judgment that

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 76.

<sup>2</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, p. 314.

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 77.

<sup>4</sup>*Logic* Vol. I, p. 3; see also p. 6, and *Essentials* p. 41.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 81.

Prof. Bosanquet asserts "that in entering upon the world of thought my consciousness enters upon the experience of logical necessity—the *nisus* towards complete expression."<sup>1</sup> Every judgment, irrespective of type, according to Prof. Bosanquet, answers to the above description and the different types of judgment are only so many forms which thought must take in its effort to define reality.<sup>2</sup>

We now return to consider a point previously suggested (and already discussed to some extent in Chapter II), namely, the difference between Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet on the nature of thought. Let us notice again, briefly, Mr. Bradley's view of thought as essentially discursive and relational. We will approach the doctrine here from the standpoint of the judgment. Mr. Bradley says, "In judgment an idea is predicated of a reality. . . . The predicate is a mere 'what,' a mere feature of content, which is used to qualify further the 'that' of the subject."<sup>3</sup> "The predicate is a content which has been made loose from its own immediate existence and is used in divorce from that first unity."<sup>4</sup> "The point is whether with every judgment we do not find an aspect of existence, absent from the predicate but present in the subject, and whether in the synthesis of these aspects we have got the essence of judgment."<sup>5</sup> Now truth is the object of all thinking and truth is attained in the "predication of such content as, when predicated, is harmonious, and removes inconsistency and with it unrest. And because the given reality is never consistent, thought is compelled to take the road of indefinite expansion. If thought were successful, it should have a predicate consistent in itself and agreeing entirely with the subject."<sup>6</sup> But, "let us assume that existence is no longer different from truth, and let us see where this takes us. It takes us straight to thought's suicide."<sup>7</sup> Thus it is the very nature of thought to be "discursive and relational," for "if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide; and yet, if it remains thus, how does it contain immediate presentation?"<sup>8</sup>

We have already observed that this view of thought follows from a one-sided view of an aspect of experience, namely, immediate experience, which predisposes Mr. Bradley to a particular doctrine of the nature of reality, and, also, from the tendency to misinterpret and extend a purely formal principle of thought. It was observed, further, that Mr. Bradley's difficulty may be viewed as arising out of his tendency and practice of taking the category of relation abstractly, that is, lifting it out of the realm of concrete experience into a purely conceptual realm, thus falling into the

<sup>1</sup>*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 78.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 85; *Essentials*, p. 61.

<sup>3</sup>*Appearance*, p. 163.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*



error of the Eleatic Zeno. We may notice further, that as Hastings Rashdall points out, there is a specific tendency towards Spinozism in Mr. Bradley's doctrine of judgment.<sup>1</sup> When Mr. Bradley speaks of the divorce between the 'that' and the 'what,' 'existence' and 'content,' and describes thought as aiming to heal this disease, which it must do to attain perfect truth, what is he doing but setting up for thought an ideal which, if realized, would lead us to the One Substance in which thought and existence are but aspects? Or, again, when he asks us to think of all thought as involving the reference of mere adjectives to a reality which, in his ultimate view, transcends the distinction between the thinker and the objects of his thought, we seem on a fair road to Spinozism. As Hastings Rashdall observes, he does avoid an outright Spinozism in not asking us to view the Absolute as transcending mind and matter. But we ask again, why set up for thought an ideal which, if realized, would annul its use? Certainly, it is not thought's purpose to reduce all 'content' to 'existence,' unless we accept the bias in Mr. Bradley's conception of the clue to the solution of ultimate problems in immediate experience.

Viewed from a slightly different standpoint, we may say that Mr. Bradley's error on the relation of subject and predicate is similar to that of Lotze. When Mr. Bradley asks us to view the dilemma in predication thus: "If you predicate what is different, you ascribe to the subject what it is *not*; and if you predicate what is *not* different, you say nothing at all,"<sup>2</sup> we have the same difficulty observed by Lotze, *Logic* Bk. I, Chapter II, § 54: "This absolute connection of two concepts S and P, in which the one is unconditionally the other, and yet both stand over against each other as different, is a relation quite impracticable in thought; . . . They must either fall entirely within one another, or they must remain entirely separate, and the impossible judgment, 'S is P,' resolves itself into three others, 'S is S,' 'P is P,' 'S is not P.'" L. T. Hobhouse<sup>3</sup> has pointed out the error here, and space will only be given to a statement of the fallacy. Both Mr. Bradley and Lotze seem to require that, in practice, a judgment be either tautologous or involve contradiction. The first alternative seems to be unmeaning and useless, so the second alone is left. But is a real contradiction involved? Are terms *in themselves* contradictory, except those in the form A and not-A? And is it not true that terms *become* contradictory and mutually exclusive *only* when they claim to occupy the same place in the same sense in some particular system of facts? If in an analytic judgment, for example, the judgment starts with an unan-

<sup>1</sup>*Proceedings of the British Academy, 1911-19, 12* "The Metaphysics of Mr. F. H. Bradley", p. 438.

<sup>2</sup>*Appearance*, p. 20; see also p. 361 and *Logic*, p. 94.

<sup>3</sup>*The Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 158 ff.

alyzed whole as subject and ends in the knowledge of an analyzed whole, as e.g., sugar is *sweet*, we find the significance and progress of such a judgment in the recognition of a quality before unrecognized. If the judgment is made at all, it will be made with a view to analyzing out of the whole some unrecognized quality. Otherwise, certainly, there will be no judgment. If it is replied, but 'sweet' does not equal 'sugar,' hence the judgment is contradictory, we reply that it is not taken as such by the person judging. To interpret it so is to reject the only sense in which Identity is intelligible, namely, identity in difference. Prof. Bosanquet, clearly, has not followed Lotze and Mr. Bradley into this error, and Hegel also avoids it.<sup>1</sup> Thus in all predication, as Hobhouse says, "we predicate that which the subject really is, but it is not apart from the predication known to be."<sup>2</sup> As Hobhouse insists, we must study the judgment from the standpoint of thought and not from that of the proposition. This may be partly the source of Mr. Bradley's difficulty. When we remember that a judgment is a single 'idea,' a 'whole,' (and this is, in fact, Mr. Bradley's position at times,) and as Prof. Bosanquet says, view the S and P as distinguishable aspects of a single act of consciousness, not separated in time, but indicating an identity in diversity, it seems to me that we have removed the conception that P is tacked on to S. Viewed in this light, there can be no contradiction in the judgment 'A is B.' 'A is B,' as a judgment, is a 'whole' in which A and B are recognized as in the relation, say, C.<sup>3</sup>

We are now ready to notice how Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet arrive at their respective views of Reality. Since their methods have points of striking difference, it may be well to treat them, in part at least, separately.

We have already noticed that Mr. Bradley has a clue to the nature of Reality in the 'wholeness' of 'feeling' in immediate experience in which the percipient is in touch with reality. "There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one, with which knowledge begins; and, though this in a manner is transcendent, it nevertheless remains throughout as the present foundation of my known world."<sup>4</sup> This 'wholeness' in the immediacy of 'feeling' remains throughout Mr. Bradley's system as a criterion both of truth and reality, though he does say it is not an ultimate criterion. This criterion consists, as he says, "in that which satisfies our wants, and is found to be where we have felt uneasiness and its positive opposite. That in which I feel myself affirmed, and which contents me, will be the general head under which falls reality, together with truth, goodness and beauty."<sup>5</sup> Another side of this criterion is Mr. Bradley's interpretation

<sup>1</sup>*Werke* Vol. IV, p. 34. Quoted from Hobhouse, *The Theory of Knowledge*, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 164; see pp. 165 ff.

<sup>3</sup>See also L. T. Hobhouse, *The Theory of Knowledge*, p. 167 and note.

<sup>4</sup>*Essays*, pp. 160-161.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 178.



of the principle of Contradiction which he seems to extend to the status of a constitutive principle. In his *Essays*, Chapter VI, "On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," the burden of argument is to show that if we place any object before us short of that which is complete and all-inclusive, we have the feeling of uneasiness, while if we allow this incomplete and unstable object to advance in the direction of completeness, the uneasiness tends to be removed and the satisfaction increases. "Hence we can form (I need not ask how) the idea of an object with all uneasiness removed entirely, an object which utterly satisfies. . . . We form in other words the idea of an all-inclusive Reality. And this idea, being set before us, may so far satisfy us as true and real."<sup>1</sup> This is one side of the matter. We continue on this side of the matter when we notice how Mr. Bradley applies his 'Absolute Criterion' in the first book of his *Appearance and Reality*. Without establishing the validity of his standard for measuring reality, as he employs it, he at once sets to work judging phenomena and condemning them as 'appearance,' proceeding throughout as though he had established his criterion. In justification of this procedure, he says, "For, if you think at all so as to discriminate between truth and falsehood, you will find that you cannot accept open self-contradiction. Hence to think is to judge, and to judge is to criticize, and to criticize is to use a criterion of reality. . . . Ultimately reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by the fact that, either in endeavoring to deny it, or even in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity."<sup>2</sup> We have already observed how (Chapter II) Mr. Bradley takes up the various ways of regarding reality in *Book I, Appearance and Reality*, and seen how he finds them vitiated by self-discrepancy. Not one is able to stand up before his criterion. The dialectic by which Mr. Bradley condemns every phenomenon and finite category, we observed, is subversive; and, if we were to accept this position as Mr. Bradley's ultimate view, we should have to conclude that he is agnostic. But, though thought is discursive and relational, and every category by which we seek to apprehend reality self-discrepant, and for this reason falls short of apprehending reality, yet this is the dark and dismal conclusion to which Mr. Bradley arrives in *Book I, Appearance and Reality*, also in Chapter XV, on "Thought and Reality;" in fact this is the conclusion to which he arrives throughout his written works, with the exception of Chapter XXIV in *Appearance and Reality*.

Mr. Bradley's chapter on "Degrees of Truth and Reality"<sup>3</sup> is his only extended attempt to offer any constructive theory of knowledge, and this

<sup>1</sup>*Essays*, p. 182.

<sup>2</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 136-137.

<sup>3</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 359 ff.



is indeed quantitatively out of proportion with the portion of his works in which he employs his principles destructively. Here alone, he uses his 'absolute criterion' constructively. In this chapter he first reviews the paradoxes involved in the nature of thought and restates his previous conclusion "that truth is relative and always imperfect."<sup>1</sup> But he goes on, "We have next to see that, though failing in perfection, all thought is to some degree true. On the one hand it falls short of, and, on the other hand at the same time, it realizes the standard."<sup>2</sup> "Our judgments hold good, in short, just so far as they agree with, and do not diverge from, the real standard. We may put it otherwise by saying that truths are true, according as it would take less or more to convert them into reality."<sup>3</sup> Since Prof. Bosanquet also asserts that truth and reality in the end have the same character, namely, a character of positive self-subsisting individuality, it may be noticed that we have arrived at a point where the paths of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet converge into one course of procedure. We may, therefore, from this point treat them together.

We have endeavored throughout to show that Prof. Bosanquet takes a positive and constructive course of procedure. As indicated in Chapter II, Prof. Bosanquet avoids the difficulties which Mr. Bradley finds in predication by maintaining the unitary character of the judgment, that it is constituted as a 'whole,' viewed as an identity in difference. Thus for Prof. Bosanquet the essence and chief character of thought is its tendency toward a 'whole'—the 'concrete universal,' and this is the clue to Individuality.<sup>4</sup>

We may now gather together in a summary way Prof. Bosanquet's view of the criterion of truth and reality and observe how it compares with that of Mr. Bradley. From the very beginning Prof. Bosanquet has insisted upon viewing consciousness and the judgment as a 'world,' a 'whole,' which, as thought advances, only widens its diameter. This, it seems to me, is the central clue to his criterion of truth and reality. When he employs the principle of Contradiction, it is in harmony with this initial position. Thus we find such statements as the following: "Logic, or the spirit of totality, is the clue to reality, value, and freedom."<sup>5</sup> "The whole is truth."<sup>6</sup> "The appeal to 'the whole' is not a detached or arbitrary procedure, but the same thing with the principle otherwise known as the principle of non-contradiction."<sup>7</sup> The "individuality of truth" is constantly asserted.<sup>8</sup> "Truth and reality lie in approximation to the whole. And this postulate, which is one with the law of contradiction, lies at the root

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, p. 363.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>*Principle*, p. 52.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 41; see also *Logic* Vol. I, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>8</sup>*Logic* Vol. II, p. 179.

of Logic."<sup>1</sup> ("When we speak of a thing as real, we imply that it is complete and self-existent.")<sup>2</sup> We have gone far enough to show that, in the end, Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley employ the same criterion of truth and reality.

Leaving aside for a moment Mr. Bradley's preference for the sentiency of immediate experience, we may take him seriously in his chapter on "Degrees of Truth and Reality"<sup>3</sup> and observe how truth and reality is found for both Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, not in the immediate (which, as we saw, for Prof. Bosanquet is abstract and particular), but in the perfectly mediated, to use Hegel's language, in the perfectly individual, the coherent or non-contradictory.<sup>4</sup> Knowledge for both is the system of judgments affirmed and sustained by mind. It is a structure which, though beginning in immediacy, in the particular and the abstract, and though never without immediacy and the abstract as aspects, it tends by growth and development toward a unified and coherent system. To trace in some detail this tendency to system is the task now before us.

The foregoing discussion has clearly brought out that the content of a judgment is always an 'idea,' i.e., a recognized identity in difference. This identity is related to its difference as a whole to its parts.<sup>5</sup> The relation of identity in difference in judgment is like the relation of the general policy of a government to the details into which the principles of government are carried; or, again, like the moral character of a man as related to the several acts of his actual life. "In this wide sense, as a synthesis of differences, not as a sum of units, the relation of whole and parts is a fundamental relation in all judgment."<sup>6</sup> With this view before us as the character of judgment, we go on to notice just how and in what essentially consists the process of thought to constitute a totality.<sup>7</sup>

Here Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet are on common ground with Hegel. For Hegel this power of thought to constitute a system is set forth in his treatment of those aspects of thought which he calls 'mediation' and 'negation.' Hegel views thought as a process of mediation, which, because of the negative element in it, is able to constitute a 'whole.' The universals which thought employs are not formed by abstraction from the particulars; the universals are the pervading unity of the particulars. A further aspect of the teachings of Hegel which is repeated, though in modified form, in the systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, is his view of the relation of mediation and immediacy. Pure immediacy for Hegel, as for Prof. Bosanquet, is meaningless. For Hegel there is no indeterminate 'given.'<sup>8</sup> The immediate and the mediated are inseparable except by an

<sup>1</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 312.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 192; see also, *Ibid.*, pp. 265 ff.

<sup>3</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 359 ff.

<sup>4</sup>*Appearance*, p. 364.

<sup>5</sup>*Bos., Logic* Vol. I, p. 90.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup>*Enc.* § 78.

abstraction. Thus there is nothing immediate, in the view of Hegel, which may not become mediated, and *vice versa*. The completely mediated for Hegel is the ultimately true and real, as for Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley. The process of mediation, then, is a development away from the particular and abstract, away from the seemingly accidental and arbitrary, to the universal and the individual, the necessary and vital—to the all-inclusive reality.

The process according to which thought advances to concreteness and totality in the systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet is the same in principle as that in Hegel's doctrine, though it appears under a slightly different terminology. For Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet it is in the functioning of the concrete universal in the identity in difference which everywhere pervades thought that we find one side of the process; the other side is the Othering aspect of thought or the function of Negation. Since Mr. Bradley refers his readers to Prof. Bosanquet's *Logic*, rather than to his own, for the best treatment of this point, we shall follow Prof. Bosanquet mainly.<sup>1</sup> We will treat these two sides of the process in the order mentioned.

The universe, which we assume to be in some sense one, presents itself to us as divided, disconnected and many.<sup>2</sup> In the simplest activities of thought such as recognition, discrimination, comparison, and identification, inference is at work. In these processes, in which judgment is at work as above described, one judgment gliding into another by the internal rearrangement of parts of content, we have what Prof. Bosanquet calls immediate inference or the direct reference of ideal content to reality.<sup>3</sup> The ground of the inference (or of the transition from judgment to judgment) is implicit rather than explicit. In other words, we may say, the identity or universal which in fact governs the transition from judgment to judgment is not in consciousness. "Of course it has a result in consciousness, but the mind is not aware of the limits and pervading ground of the process from which this result emanates."<sup>4</sup> But not all inference is immediate, much is mediated; that is, it is a process guided by reflective ideas, involving grounded selection resting upon either 'presupposed subsumption,' as in the case when one recalls a man's name upon seeing him, or upon general connection of content, as when gait, voice, and gesture help one to his identity.<sup>5</sup> Thus in mediated inference we have conscious ground for the connection of parts and the whole, and in consequence have an indirect reference of content to reality. Now the very heart and core of all inference, whether immediate or mediate, is the aspect of identity in thought, or, as Prof.

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, p. 366 n.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 367.

<sup>3</sup>*Logic* Vol. II, pp. 19 ff.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 25.



Bosanquet calls it, (to distinguish it from the abstract and powerless universal of formal logic,) the 'concrete universal.' In all thinking, whether inductive or deductive—in induction, inference is viewed from the side of difference, and in deduction, inference is viewed from the side of identity or the universal,<sup>1</sup>—it is this 'concrete universal' which plays the important part. Thus for Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley (in so far as he takes a constructive point of view) the life of thought consists in binding different to different upon the ground, conscious or unconscious, of a pervading identity. The world, in the view of both Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley, is made up of a body of particulars in relation, not of two kinds of existences, particulars and universals, the former copies of the latter. This view is reiterated by Mr. Bradley. He says, for example, "The universe is one in this sense that its differences exist harmoniously within one whole, beyond which there is nothing."<sup>2</sup> The same doctrine is clearly set forth throughout Chapter XXVI on "The Absolute and its Appearances," where he maintains that there is a reciprocal relation and interdependence between the universal and its differences; e.g., "Reality seems contained in the totality of these its diverse processes, and they on their side each to be a partial appearance of the universe."<sup>3</sup> Prof. Bosanquet takes the same position in his *Logic* and his work on *The Principle of Individuality and Value*. In the latter, he gives an entire chapter—Chapter II on "The Concrete Universal"—to an exposition of this doctrine. He says: "Reality . . . is one throughout."<sup>4</sup> ("To deny the self-existence of any finite real is not to assert that Reality could be complete without it.) Nothing is self-existent, but nothing is non-contributory."<sup>5</sup> Prof. Bosanquet's interpretation of the principle of Identity is insistent in its emphasis that identity without difference is meaningless and that a world of mere differences is no 'world' or universe at all. (We may conclude, then, that Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet agree in viewing the world of reality as made up of universals exhibited in differences, or conversely, as differences bound together into a totality by a pervading identical character. In inductive inference, thought works upon the differences with a view to dragging "into consciousness the operation of the active universal as a pervading unity of content on which inference depends."<sup>6</sup>) In deductive inference, the process consists in starting with a universal and predicating of it a content present, but not previously recognized.) Thus, as Prof. Bosanquet suggests, the mainspring of knowledge is the 'concrete universal;' moreover, it is by or through this principle that thought involves necessity and knowledge as a whole involves determinateness or system. When

<sup>1</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 119.

<sup>2</sup>*Appearance*, p. 144.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 466.

<sup>4</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 211.

<sup>5</sup>*Logic* Vol. II, p. 253.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6.

it is asserted that inductive or deductive proof consists in the systematic and necessary connection of content in thought,<sup>1</sup> it is the identity or universal aspect of thought to which reference is made. No knowledge is gained by joining mere particular to particular. Knowledge presupposes system or synthetic connection, and it is just this function which is assumed by the 'concrete universal.'

The *new* and *different* are no obstacles to the proper functioning of the universal of thought. They are only the occasion for a further modification of the universal so as to include these differences; "That is to say, that an existing connection of thought, when confronted with new matter, is able to reproduce itself in a new form which is at once appropriate to the new matter, and continuous with the connection as previously thought."<sup>2</sup> In this way the continuity of thought is maintained and in fact provided for. "The existing connections or universals with which the mind is stored, act as clues among the new experiences which confront us,"<sup>3</sup> enabling thought to advance by incorporating the new through the refashioning of the old, and by means of this, rising to a higher level of necessity, determinateness, and individuality. This character of the universal, by which it is capable of taking on new shapes as demanded by new matter, is what provides thought with the nexus toward individuality.

It is the very opposite of this living, active, and growing universal that Prof. Bergson has in mind when he describes the work of the intellect as binding same to same. We have already called attention to this fallacy of Prof. Bergson in connection with our study of Mr. Bradley's tendency to find contradiction in all predication. The root of the whole difficulty and error lies in not taking seriously and consistently the principle of Identity in the sense of identity in difference, the only sense in which it has any meaning. To take Identity as pure and abstract not only reduces all judgment to tautology, but it reduces all thought to the equational and mathematical form of Jevons and Boole. Inductive inference resolves itself into induction by incomplete enumeration or inference from particular to particular, which results in a greater or less degree of probability; or, viewed otherwise, all differences are viewed in practice as quantitative, the method of substitution is applied and inductive inference becomes a problem in mathematics.<sup>4</sup>

As opposed to this static conception of the universal of thought, Prof. Bosanquet states his view thus: "The normal and natural working of intelligence, then, is creative and constructive, tending toward the concrete and to continuity within differences. The universality which is its main-

<sup>1</sup>*Logic* Vol. II, p. 171.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>The equational logic of Jevons is criticised by Mr. Bradley, *Logic*, pp. 343 ff.



spring is itself a *nisus* to the concrete. This operative continuity is not represented by the linkage of the same to the same. Its law—the law of intelligence—is not the law of Identity, unless the law of Identity is construed in a way that takes it deep into the postulates of organic systematization.”<sup>1</sup> The same conception of the universal as related to its differences is maintained in Mr. Bradley’s *Logic*, pp. 281 ff., and elsewhere. I quote but a few instances: “Given any presentation X, which has a content such as . . . *a b c d e* . . . , it asserts that the oneness of this presentation is in a certain sense a connection of its content. The *fact* of the presentation absolutely disappears. What is left behind is a result. . . . But this result is not a phenomenon, not a particular image or relation of such images. It is an alteration of the mind, which shows itself to us as a tendency to pass from content to content. It is a connection, not between this *a* and this *b*, or this *c* and this *d*, but between the universals *a* and *b*, or *c* and *d*. It is a quality of the mind which manifests in the fact that, if we have one part of the content which appeared in X, then . . . this bare universal *a*, *b*, *c*, or *d*, when given with a different set of particulars, may reinstate by its ideal identity any other of the universals, *a*, *b*, *c*, or *d*. . . . What works is the connection between the universals, and the basis of that working is the ideal identity of some element in what is present and what is past.”<sup>2</sup> “To suppose the presence and the operation of universals in all reproduction, introduces a unity into our view of the soul. It enables us to interpret all stages of mind as the growth of one principle.”<sup>3</sup> Again, and further seeking to refute psychological Associationism, Mr. Bradley says, “Let us give up Similarity + Continuity + Obliviscence or Primitive Credulity. Let us postulate Identity + Contiguity, and then all is easy. But there are two things we must remember. The contiguity is a connection of universals, and is therefore not the contiguity of the Association school. And the identity is not present to the mind. The mind, if you keep to simple cases, knows nothing of any difference. It goes straight from what is given to an additional fact.”<sup>4</sup>

Let us now give attention to the other side of the activity of thought, namely, Negation, to observe how it facilitates the process towards totality. Negation may be viewed first from the standpoint of the judgment.<sup>5</sup> At first view, as Prof. Bosanquet says, it appears to say nothing. But upon closer investigation, it will be found evident that a negative judgment appears only in the face of a question or suggestion. Something is before the mind and as such is so affirmed or sustained. Whether Affirmation

<sup>1</sup>*Logic* Vol. II, p. 184; see also pp. 210-211.

<sup>2</sup>*Logic*, pp. 281-282.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 284 and ff.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 303-304.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 279.

or Negation is prior in consciousness, is of no ultimate importance, though it would seem that "in the beginnings of knowledge . . . Affirmation is prior to Negation, both as one remove nearer to reality, and as supplying the reality within which alone Negation has a meaning."<sup>1</sup> But certainly Negation has its importance in knowledge and is increasingly significant as knowledge approaches system and reality approximates an organized whole. Thus, in a sense, Affirmation and Negation alike become double-edged, each involving the other. Bare Negation, of course, is of no value or significance to knowledge, as it tells us nothing. It is not grounded. Significant thought, as we have seen, requires an *identity-in-difference*, and just as tautology aims at bare identity, so a bare denial aims at bare difference, and the later is as unmeaning as the former. Significance must, therefore, be positive, and for this reason Negation to be of value for knowledge must have positive meaning. This means that in the end the negative judgment, as the affirmative, refers an ideal content to Reality.<sup>2</sup> It means, furthermore, that as Negation cannot be the affirmation of bare difference, it presupposes to that extent an identity and hence system. Thus, as Prof. Bosanquet states, "Significant Negation, then, like hypothesis, is intelligible within and with reference to a system judged to be actual."<sup>3</sup>

It is when we look at Reality from the standpoint of a systematic whole that we begin to see the full importance of Negation. Let us view it together with Contradiction. Predicates, we are told,<sup>4</sup> are not intrinsically contrary; they become so only under certain conditions by which they are united. "Contradiction consists," Prof. Bosanquet maintains, "in 'differents' being ascribed to the same term, while no distinction is alleged within that term such as to make it capable of receiving them."<sup>5</sup> In other words, contradiction consists in bringing terms together without proper mediation. The contradiction may be eliminated by the introduction of intermediate terms. We find such contradiction arising, e. g., when we ascribe to a phenomenon the feature of ultimate reality, as Mr. Bradley does in (*Book I, Appearance and Reality*.) The phenomenon is incomplete, not self-existent; it is at once found to imply something else, it reaches out to its other. Now this spirit of 'otherness,' as illustrated in the phenomenon when taken for the all-inclusive Reality, a spirit of seeking to overcome the contradiction of the 'given' by self-transcendence,—this is Negativity.<sup>6</sup> This is exactly the sense in which Negativity is employed, according to

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 281.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 287.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 289.

<sup>4</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, pp. 562 ff; *Principle*, pp. 223 ff.

<sup>5</sup>*Principle*, pp. 223-224; see Brad., *Appearance*, pp. 562-563; also *Mind*, N.S., 1909, p. 496.

<sup>6</sup>Bos., *Principle*, p. 228.



Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley. Human life and experience, as well as the actual world without, is full of contradictions. These contradictions consist in unmediated connections—groundless connections. Thought cannot thus rest. Thought wishes to bring the contradictory terms together into harmony. Moreover, thought does not desire mere sameness or identity; "Thought cannot do without differences, but on the other hand it cannot make them."<sup>1</sup> Thus thought in demanding a ground or a reason<sup>2</sup> passes out into its other, and this into its other *ad infinitum*, towards a whole or concrete system. Contradiction from this standpoint is not a deadlock in a system; it is only a check in experience due to a misfit in the systematization of experience,<sup>3</sup> and "Negativity is simply the *logical, conscious* expression of difference."<sup>4</sup>

This brings us to the very heart of our inquiry; and we ask, "What results from the resolved contradiction?" Prof. Bosanquet answers, "A successful embodiment of 'negativity,'"<sup>5</sup> and this means order, system, increasing unity. "It is the spirit of system and self-consciousness—the intimate nature of a being which, while acting and expanding, is yet at home with itself—distinguishable or self-distinguishing, in and throughout the intimate union with its contents in expansion and in action."<sup>6</sup> Negativity, then, is fundamental in everything finite and real; in the phenomena of the external world; in the categories of human thought; in the experiences of the inner life; in the living activity of thought itself, everywhere there is a tendency to self-transcendence. The fragmentary tends to complete itself as a whole. Thus the negative aspect of thought, as the positive, expresses in its innermost nature a *nisus* toward totality or system.<sup>7</sup>

We may obtain further light upon the relation of knowledge to Reality, if we consider again, briefly, how, for Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley, the judgment constructs and sustains Reality. It is in viewing the judgment in its innermost essence as an *affirmation about Reality*, and further, in viewing consciousness as a continuous judgment (or a stream of judgments internally related), as opposed to the isolated judgment or proposition abstracted from the stream of thought, that we find the meaning implied in this position. The construction of Reality, as indicated in Chapter II under our treatment of the doctrine of ideas, takes place in our reference of "ideal content to reality," a process which interprets and amplifies the relatively 'given,' making it part and parcel of the structure of knowledge.<sup>8</sup> The impossibility of getting an original datum into consciousness, i.e.,

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, p. 562.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Principle*, p. 230.

<sup>4</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 289.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Principle*, p. 230.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 230-231.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 231.

<sup>8</sup>Bos., *Essentials*, p. 30.

one untouched by mind, is the first essential point. The second consists in the fact that the relatively 'given,' interpretatively affirmed, is affirmed "subject to being a part in the whole, and the consciousness of this reservation is essential to the affirmation."<sup>1</sup> Thus every judgment involves a 'world' in that the very condition of affirmation is the system of judgments into which the new judgment must take its place coherently.

Now it is not claimed by Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley that the whole system of judgments constituting knowledge is consciously present at any moment of judgment. Only a part of this system is present, the forces of attention at the time of judging being upon the new judgment and only the most relevant parts of the whole system being present about this judgment. Just as in visual perception, consciousness may be viewed as a field of interrelated objects with a small part of the field in the focus of attention—the field being related to the whole of possible perception, so with the system of judgments which constitute the structure of knowledge, only a part of the system is present in consciousness, and even the parts shade off from the center, where judgment is functioning with varying degrees of conscious presence. Thus the new judgment receives from its background of system its organized, systematic individuality; but at the same time it contributes to the coherence and unity of the whole.<sup>2</sup> The argument here implies that there is a very real necessity in judgment, namely, the necessity incident to system in the increasing coherent structure of knowledge.<sup>3</sup> A further implication of this view of judgment is that truth and reality lie ahead of thought, and not behind it "as the (Neo-Realists contend) "Truth and reality lie in approximation to the whole."<sup>4</sup>

It is clear from the above that, in so far as every judgment takes its place in the system of judgments which constitute knowledge, and "knowledge," as Prof. Bosanquet says, "is the medium in which our world, as an inter-related whole, exists for us,"<sup>5</sup> reality as a whole is not only sustained but further constructed in every judgment.<sup>6</sup> Physical construction, however, it follows from the theory of judgments, is not a true analogy of the construction by which mind 'builds' reality. The latter is the true construction and the former is a poor analogy. We construct only when we follow a plan or principle and make what we mean.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, in physical construction, the relative degree of 'foreignness' of the material is greater than in the case of the mental construction of reality, and the process is largely mechanical, while in mental construction the process is a vital one.<sup>8</sup> This is why the analogy breaks down. Thus, when the conception of 'idea'

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, p. 315.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 2, 3.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 190 ff.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 312.

<sup>5</sup>*Essentials* p. 22.

<sup>6</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, p. 265.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 319; Vol. I, pp. 42 f.

<sup>8</sup>*Logic* Vol. I, p. 2.



as meaning is grasped, when judgment is viewed as continuous and as involving a 'world,' a 'system,' we comprehend how, for Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, the world of reality is constructed and sustained by judgment.

But, as observed above, the judgment has distinguishable aspects, namely, subject and predicate. Each of these "must be regarded as a partial expression of the nature of reality, and the subject will always be the Reality in one form, and the predicate, reality in another form."<sup>1</sup> As Mr. Bradley suggests, the judgment involves the separation of 'existence' and 'content,' which is the representation of reality in two forms. "The ultimate and complete judgment," as Prof. Bosanquet asserts, "would be the whole of reality predicated of itself,"<sup>2</sup> i.e., the diversity between subject and predicate would be removed, 'existence' and 'content' would coincide. But, while our logical judgments grasp varying portions and fragments of this ultimate judgment, some gathering up into the system of knowledge whole provinces of reality, others merely enlarging, interpreting or analyzing the content of a simple sense-perception,<sup>3</sup> none of them ever attains the ideal; in fact, as Mr. Bradley observes, should judgment do so it would be thought's suicide.<sup>4</sup> Thus all that can be attained in the system of judgments or in knowledge is varying degrees of truth and reality. System and coherence can never become perfect. Thought always falls short of Individuality, and hence, of Reality.<sup>5</sup> This clearly is the position of Mr. Bradley in his chapter on "Thought and Reality,"<sup>6</sup> and the failure of thought is due to its relational and discursive character. Thought cannot resolve the relation between 'existence' and 'content,' which is the essence of judgment. "The end, which would satisfy mere truth-seeking, would do so just because it had the features possessed by reality. It would have to be *an immediate, self-dependent, all-inclusive individual*. But, in reaching this perfection, and in the act of reaching it, thought would lose its own character. Thought does desire such individuality, that is precisely what it aims at. But individuality, on the other hand, cannot be gained while we are confined to relations."<sup>7</sup>

Prof. Bosanquet admits a similar failure of thought. "Judgment," he says, "professes to express the nature of the real so far as it can be uttered in a system of predicates and relations. It does not propose or

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Essentials*, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Essentials*, p. 41, and *Logic* Vol. I, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup>*Appearance*, p. 168.

<sup>5</sup>It is true that thought apprehends and formulates the ideal of perfected Individuality; but this ideal is never attained, as a system of judgment, in the interpretation of reality and in the organization of experience. Only varying degrees of truth and reality, and hence of individuality, are realized.

<sup>6</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 162 ff.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 179; italics mine.



suggest, so far as I can see, that the real is another system of predicates and relations, which that constituted by judgment pretends to reproduce or resemble. Therefore *its failure is one and decisive, simply consisting in the fact that it is not, like the higher experience which we suppose to be the sum and substance of Reality, solid and immediate as well as perfectly individual and non-contradictory.*"<sup>1</sup> Immediacy, then, an all-inclusive 'Oneness' which excludes relation, is the essential nature of Reality, and it is this character of Reality which forever prevents thought from grasping it.<sup>2</sup> In this Mr. Bradley<sup>3</sup> and Prof. Bosanquet agree.<sup>4</sup>

It is not to be understood, however, that thought, though it never attains perfect Individuality—the one absorbing Experience, does not express the nature of perfect truth and Reality. It does attain truth and reality in varying degrees, and in this fact lies the ground for insisting that thought participates in the nature of perfect truth and Reality. "Reality is operative *in* truth," says Prof. Bosanquet, "The nature of the latter's self-maintenance as tested by the principle of coherence, non-contradiction, or individuality, (all of them expressions for the same character) leaves no doubt of that."<sup>5</sup> Again, Prof. Bosanquet says, "Truth stands on its own ground, as a fulfillment under its own conditions of the nature of reality."<sup>6</sup> Mr. Bradley's chapter on "Degrees of Truth and Reality"<sup>7</sup> is in full accord with Prof. Bosanquet's position: "Our judgments, in a word, can never reach as far as perfect truth, and must be content merely to enjoy more or less of *Validity*. I do not simply mean by this term that, for working purposes, our judgments are admissible and will pass. I mean that less or more they actually possess the character and type of absolute truth and reality."<sup>8</sup> It follows from these and similar statements of Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley that thought is always in contact with truth and reality—the doctrine that the Absolute is everywhere, implies the same—and that the criterion of the less or more of truth and reality is expansion or all-inclusiveness, on the one hand, and

<sup>1</sup>*Logic* Vol. II, p. 289; italics mine.

<sup>2</sup>To the extent that Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet shift from the epistemological to the existential or ontological point of view in theory of knowledge, (the tendency is much stronger in Mr. Bradley than in Prof. Bosanquet,) they incline to identify thought and Reality. But thought cannot *be* Reality, for the latter includes feeling and energy. Neither Mr. Bradley nor Prof. Bosanquet make adequate provision in their systems for a *real*, creative source and ground of energy.

<sup>3</sup>See *Appearance*, pp. 382–383.

<sup>4</sup>H. H. Joachim's difficulties with the Coherence theory of truth, based on the discursive character of thought, places him in practical agreement with Prof. Bosanquet. See *The Nature of Truth*, p. 64 ff., 178 ff.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, p. 289.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 291.

<sup>7</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 359 ff.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 362.

internal harmony, on the other. These two characteristics are the two sides of one and the same principle—non-contradiction or individuality.<sup>1</sup> There is no absolute untruth, and no unreality among existences. Below, so to speak, is the unmeaning, the false and the unreal; above, fully mediated, rearranged and transmuted, is truth and reality. Coherence, Individuality—wideness plus harmony—this is everywhere the goal toward which experience strives.

In closing our discussion on "Knowledge, Existence and Reality," it may be well to notice that Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet depart from the master, Hegel, on the relation of thought to reality. "Since thoughts are Objective thoughts," says Hegel, "Logic, therefore, coincides with metaphysics, the science of things set and hold in thoughts. . . . thoughts accredited able to express the essential nature of things."<sup>2</sup> It is his theory of the Notion that binds thought to Reality.<sup>3</sup> The Notion, in Hegel's doctrine, appears to be complete and perfectly organized experience through the function of thought. It is the all-inclusive 'whole' to which thought in the systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet strives, but never attains. Thought being co-extensive with all forms of experience, including immediacy, thought has the capacity of beginning below with the diversity in the immediately 'given' or mere 'being' and rising by the power of the immanent dialectic to the immediacy above, i.e., to Being, to the Absolute, the all-inclusive One. This is possible in Hegel's doctrine because the notion of Being is at once both the emptiest and the most comprehensive, the most abstract and the most real, the lowest and the highest of categories. Thus, for Hegel, thought wholly exhausts the real.

Prof. Bosanquet's conception of the relation of thought to reality appears to be closer to Hegel's than Mr. Bradley's. He views thought as co-terminous with experience. Thought's immanent dialectic, functioning in and through the 'concrete universal,' carries it nearer and nearer to the perfectly coherent and all-inclusive Individual; but it is halted in the end from taking the final step with Hegel, because thought is not able to resolve fully its relational character. Why, with Hegel, thought should not lose itself in the immediacy above—in Being or the Absolute,—is not clear since immediacy is a form of experience for Prof. Bosanquet into which any content can fall.

With Mr. Bradley the case is different. He begins by recognizing immediacy as a form of experience separate and distinct from consciousness or thought. Thought begins with and works upon the diversity which

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, pp. 363 ff., 375; Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, p. 289.

<sup>2</sup>*Enc.* §24.

<sup>3</sup>Wallace, Wm., *The Logic of Hegel*, pp. 287 ff.

it finds in immediate experience. But thought is essentially relational in character, its essence lies in the separation of 'existence' and 'content,' and any resolution of this essence annihilates thought. Thus Mr. Bradley cannot conclude with Hegel that thought attains an immediacy above the dialectic, because he views immediacy below thought as a stratum of experience essentially different in character from thought.

A criticism of the position of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet on the theory of thought and knowledge, also a criticism of their views of the relation of thought and reality, will be given in Chapter IV.

## CHAPTER IV

### REALITY AS SYSTEMATIC AND INDIVIDUAL

In the foregoing chapters we sought to set in a clear light the theory of knowledge as maintained by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet. We now turn to consider critically the implications of this theory upon their view of reality and upon the relation of thought to reality. A restatement, in a summary way, of the argument according to which Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet arrive at their respective views will place us in a position to begin the critical study to which the major portion of this chapter is to be given.

The argument upon which Mr. Bradley declares Reality to be systematic and individual may be stated thus: Reality is directly present to the percipient through a "limited aperture"<sup>1</sup> in what he calls 'immediate experience.' It presents itself as a felt 'this,' a "unity, complex but without relation." What is 'given' is absolutely unique and individual. The character of this 'given' is a clue to the structure and nature of ultimate reality.<sup>2</sup> Thought, moreover, which is co-extensive with consciousness, (immediate experience being below consciousness,) begins the structure of knowledge upon the diversity which it analyzes out of the immediately 'given.' Everything beyond the immediately 'given,' "though not less real, is an expansion of the common essence which we feel burningly in this one focus."<sup>3</sup> Judgment is the function of thought which builds the structure of knowledge. It consists in the reference of ideal content to reality. Thought, thus, constituted by a subject-object relation and employing ideas as 'meanings' which it refers to the world of objective experience, constructs reality *pari passu* with the structure of knowledge. This is made possible by the fact that thought's universals are not abstracted from the particulars, they are not formed by selective omission from among the particulars; rather, they are the pervading identity of the particulars, the particulars being the diversity in the universals. Thought's universals, then, are concrete, and not abstract, as viewed by purely formal logic. Now knowledge and reality being constructed by an identical process, namely, consciousness through the function of the judgment, the criterion of one will be the criterion of the other. Thus the criterion of truth and reality arises in experience, out of our contact with reality, and this cri-

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, p. 260.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

terion is that without which experience cannot be organized—non-contradiction.

Judgments, however, though continuous and interrelated among themselves by internal ties through identities and differences, are constituted, nevertheless, by the separation of 'content' from 'existence.' Yet, if they remain thus, how will they contain immediate presentation? Thus contradiction is present—even necessary to all forms of predication. From this it follows that contradiction, as in Hegel's system, is the moving dynamic of thought's dialectic to greater and greater systematic coherence in the structure of knowledge. Contradiction moves thought to expand so as to include its Other, negated in every affirmation. This Other is not something foreign to that which excludes it; it is its very essence.<sup>1</sup> Negativity, then, as the spirit of otherness, is an essential aspect of the nature of thought. Together with contradiction,<sup>2</sup> the moving dynamic of thought, negativity constitutes the dialectic by which thought organizes about its universals the diversity incident to experience and forms a structure of knowledge increasingly coherent, inclusive, and individual.

As every judgment appears in an aspect of necessity, namely, that of taking its place in the system of knowledge, and every judgment is an affirmation and further definition of reality, the whole system of knowledge is, in effect, referred to reality, the whole system of knowledge is, in effect, referred to reality in every judgment. (The negative judgment is no exception, since it also implies an affirmation.) This is the ground for asserting that reality is constructed and sustained by knowledge. But knowledge never attains the perfectly coherent and individual. Yet, reality is certainly free from contradiction; it must somehow reconcile and harmonize its diversity, for everything which exists is included in reality; otherwise, something is outside, and it is not ultimate Reality.

Reality must be a 'whole,' a unity above relation, and somehow immediate like its presence in immediate experience. Moreover, the organization of experience, upon the basis of principles inherent and essential to itself, reveals an increasing degree of individuality; and this also points

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Appearance*, p. 240.

<sup>2</sup>Negation or Negativity is not to be confused with Contradiction. "Contradiction as we have tried to explain it, is an unsuccessful or obstructed Negativity; Negativity a successful or frictionless contradiction." (Bos., *Principle*, p. 231.) Contradiction occurs as an incident of imperfection in the organization of systems. It consists in "differents' being ascribed to the same term while no distinction is alleged within that term such as to make it capable of receiving them." (*Ibid.*, p. 224.) As perfection in system is approached, Contradiction vanishes. Contradiction, thus, is a mark of imperfection, whether in truth or in reality. Negativity, on the other hand, is the "spirit of otherness;" it is "correlative to Affirmation," it is solved contradiction, and, as such, it plays a larger part as contradiction diminishes and as Perfection in system is approached. Negativity is a character of the inmost structure of the Real. (See Bos. *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 289.)



to a higher and supreme Individuality above the structure of knowledge—an Absolute Experience, an All-inclusive Whole where all diversities are 'somehow' re-arranged, transmuted and transcended in an immediacy analogous to the immediacy below thought.

Summing up, we may say there are three arguments, more or less related, upon which Mr. Bradley takes his position that ultimate Reality is systematic and individual: 1) In immediate experience (below consciousness) we have reality present in "feeling," which is a non-relational whole.<sup>1</sup> 2) "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself" (contradiction interpreted as applying the diverse to the same); "here is an absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute, either in endeavoring to deny it, or even in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity."<sup>2</sup> This means that the non-contradictory character of reality is a postulate necessary to thought and the organization of experience. 3) The increasing degree of unity, coherence, and individuality present in the structure of knowledge mediated by thought, points to the perfect Individuality and All-inclusive, Absolute Experience where 'existence' and 'content' are one as in the immediacy below thought.<sup>3</sup>

It will not be necessary to review the whole argument by which Prof. Bosanquet arrives at the view that ultimate Reality is systematic and individual, especially since, to a large extent, he is in full agreement with Mr. Bradley. We shall be content to mention how Prof. Bosanquet differs from Mr. Bradley on this point, and conclude with a summary similar to the one in the preceding paragraph.

1) Prof. Bosanquet recognizes an immediate experience in which reality impinges upon the mind<sup>4</sup> and in which is offered a 'given' as material to be worked into the structure of knowledge. The 'given' for Prof. Bosanquet, however, is not discontinuous, but continuous, with its extension or expansion through the judgment. Prof. Bosanquet's doctrine of immediacy at the lower extremity of thought, like that of Hegel, recognizes no indeterminate 'given.' For him, as for Hegel, what is 'given' is relatively particular and abstract, and it awaits to be mediated by thought for its fuller meaning. There is no mental content which may not become immediate. The process by which the 'given' is expanded in thought is in general the same for Prof. Bosanquet as for Mr. Bradley.

2) The nature of consciousness to be a 'whole,' a 'world,' constantly emphasized by Prof. Bosanquet, is not so prominent in Mr. Bradley's theory of knowledge. In this doctrine that consciousness tends to be a

<sup>1</sup>*Essays*, pp. 159-198, especially pp. 160 and 192-195.

<sup>2</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 136-137.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 352, 362 ff.

<sup>4</sup>*Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 72, 108.

'whole' or a 'world,' we find Prof. Bosanquet's clue to the solution of ultimate problems. The sense in which consciousness reveals itself as a 'world' is variously indicated. a) For example, in the field of visual perception, what we have is consciousness like an atmosphere enveloping its objects. It is the nature of consciousness to include and the nature of the objects to be included. b) Every judgment is a single 'idea' with two distinguishable aspects, subject and predicate, related in the form of identity in difference. It is the identity aspect which Prof. Bosanquet exalts, though with Mr. Bradley, he recognizes the contradictory aspect involved in separating subject and predicate. c) The universals which thought employs (we are reminded again and again) are not abstract, but concrete, self-particularizing universals which leave behind nothing not taken up into the concrete whole. They are syntheses of differences, and as such constitute the *nisus* toward individuality.<sup>1</sup>

3) Thought has its essential nature, not in its abstract, relational and discursive aspect, as Mr. Bradley tends to emphasize, but in the 'concrete universal'—the *nisus* to totality. (Here Prof. Bosanquet is on common ground with Hegel.) *Individuality* or *non-contradiction* as a criterion of truth and reality thus, more clearly than in Mr. Bradley's system, receives its content *pari passu* with the organization of experience. Its character as an immanent principle is more carefully guarded and consistently recognized than by Mr. Bradley. The abstract and discursive character of thought is only a necessity incidental to thought's proceeding in short steps; or, we may say, the relational aspect of thought—it is an *aspect only* and not its true nature—strikes our attention because we are inclined to view thought in small bits rather than in wide expanses.

4) Again, Prof. Bosanquet, more than Mr. Bradley, tends to set in prominence the constructive and synthetic aspect of thought; the analytic aspect is subordinate to this. The Hegelian dialectic, in agreement with the master, reaches down into the immediacy at the lower extremity of thought, and, carried forward by the power of contradiction and negation inherent in thought, all but reaches in full attainment the immediacy of the Absolute Experience at the upper extremity of thought. The increasing unity and individual character of knowledge stands out prominently. Just why the dialectic should fall short of attaining its ideal, as it does not in the hands of Hegel, is not so clear in Prof. Bosanquet's system as it is in the case of Mr. Bradley's. Mr. Bradley's dialectic is restrained from entering the promised land because its field of operation is consciousness, inclusive of feeling, will, and cognition, but not the 'feeling' of immediate experience which is below consciousness. Prof. Bosanquet's dialectic, on

<sup>1</sup>*Principle*, p. 23.



the other hand, like Hegel's, works into the immediacy of sense experience; but it is not clear why, if consciousness is co-extensive with experience, and any mental content may become immediate, as Prof. Bosanquet says, he should not, with Hegel, allow it to attain the immediacy of the Absolute Experience, toward which it more and more approaches. At this point, influenced by Mr. Bradley's emphasis of the relational and discursive character of thought, Prof. Bosanquet leaves Hegel and joins Mr. Bradley.

There are, then, three closely related arguments which form the basis for Prof. Bosanquet's position that ultimate Reality is comprehended in the concept Individuality, an all-inclusive, 'whole' which embodies all diversity in a transcendent immediacy: 1) The nature of consciousness to include, to be a 'whole,' a 'world;' this, in final analysis, is Prof. Bosanquet's clue to the nature of ultimate Reality. 2) Individuality or non-contradiction, as the criterion of truth and hence of reality, is revealed to be the very essence and immanent principle of thought in its organization of experience. 3) The structure of knowledge as a whole presents more and more a non-contradictory or systematic and individual character, as larger and larger sweeps of reality are organized into it. This points beyond to the all-inclusive, ultimate reality which certainly must have more of the same character—nay, it must be perfect individuality.<sup>1</sup>

With this restatement of the argument leading up to the view that ultimate Reality is systematic and individual, we pass on to a critical study of the same. We may inquire, in the first place, to what extent the theory of judgment employed by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet ties them down from the beginning to a certain metaphysical doctrine.

Mr. Bertrand Russell (with others) has called attention to the tendency of metaphysical Absolutism to view relations, in the final analysis, as no relations.<sup>2</sup> This tendency may be viewed as making its appearance in two forms involving the theory of judgment. In the first place, it views the ultimate subject of every judgment as Reality, taken as self-existent and non-contradictory; and secondly, in so far as every predicate ascribes a content to reality, it involves a separation of 'existence' and 'content,' and it is so far contradictory. In other words, and briefly, all predication involves contradiction. "This theory," as Mr. Russell well says, "is in fact contradictory. For if the Absolute has predicates, then there are predicates; but the proposition 'there are predicates' is not one which the present theory can admit."<sup>3</sup> Mr. Russell's criticism is particularly directed against Lotze's doctrine of relations, but it is clear that it applies as well to the doctrine of Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet. Mr. Russell's

<sup>1</sup>*Principle*, pp. 250, 267.

<sup>2</sup>*The Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 15; *The Principles of Mathematics*, pp. 447, 448.

<sup>3</sup>*The Principles of Mathematics*, p. 448.

treatment of the problem of relations in this connection implies that some relations may be external to the terms related. This view we have had occasion to reject; but aside from this position, involved in his criticism of the theory of judgment in Absolutism, a position quite untenable, we may accept his reaction to the doctrine assailed.

That Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet hold to a theory of judgment involving the view that Reality, as self-existent and non-contradictory, is the ultimate subject of every predicate, and that all predication involves contradiction, can hardly be doubted. Sufficient evidence has been advanced in the preceding chapters, but we will again cite a few instances. Mr. Bradley tells us: "All judgment. . . predicates its idea of the ultimate Reality. Certainly I do not mean by this to deny that there is a limited subject."<sup>1</sup> "Ultimate Reality is such that it does not contradict itself."<sup>2</sup> "Our criterion is individuality, or the idea of complete system."<sup>3</sup> "Judgment adds an adjective to reality, and this adjective is an idea because it is a quality made loose from its own existence, and is working free from its implication with that."<sup>4</sup> "If you predicate what is different you ascribe to the predicate what it is *not*; and if you predicate what is *not* different, you say nothing at all."<sup>5</sup> "(i) It is (as we have seen) true that predication is in the end self-contradictory. (ii) It is true that relations (a) do, and (b) do not, presuppose their terms. Terms (a) must be, and (b) cannot be, different through being related. And within any related term there is a difference which sets up an endless process. (iii) It is true that to predicate of the Absolute involves contradiction, because it involves an unjustified difference between subject and predicate. It implies that the Absolute as subject is not the Absolute but a distinction made within it, and so on indefinitely."<sup>6</sup>

Prof. Bosanquet, in the final analysis, is in practical agreement with Mr. Bradley: "Every judgment, perceptive or universal, might without altering its meaning be introduced by some such phrase as, 'Reality is such that. . . ,' 'The real world is characterized by. . .'"<sup>7</sup> "Now the doctrine of a single Individual Reality rests on the demonstration that no finite individuals are self-complete and self-contained, and that therefore none such can be self-existing substances, or irreducible subjects of predication."<sup>8</sup> It is argued also from the Law of Identity that "Reality, therefore, is one throughout."<sup>9</sup> "Reality, the Law of Contradiction asserts, is a *consistent* unity."<sup>10</sup> "Contradiction consists in 'differents' being ascribed

<sup>1</sup>*Essays*, pp. 253-254; see pp. 257 ff.

<sup>2</sup>*Appearance*, p. 136.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 542.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 164; see also p. 172.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>6</sup>*Essays*, p. 253 n.

<sup>7</sup>*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 73.

<sup>8</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 252; see also pp. 253 ff.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 211.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 213.



to the same term, while no distinction is alleged within that term such as to make it capable of receiving them."<sup>1</sup> "There are places for all predicates; and when all predicates are in their places, none of them is contradictory to the other. . . . Contradiction. . . is an imperfection in the organization of systems."<sup>2</sup> "The whole difficulty springs from trying to attribute to given fact the features of ultimate Reality. In truth, the actual world is charged with contradiction."<sup>3</sup>

We observe that the theories of judgment propounded by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet are identical in principle. Now exactly wherein lies the contradiction as charged by Mr. Russell. We shall endeavor to maintain that it lies in an effort to play fast and loose with the doctrine of relations. On the one hand, namely, in ultimate Reality—The Absolute, there are no relations. The Absolute is above relations. It 'somehow' (we are not told how) swallows up, transmutes, and transcends all relations. It is an all-inclusive ONE which holds in non-relational togetherness all its appearances. Thus relations *do not* exist, for ultimate Reality is without crease or crinkle. On the other hand, any effort to deal with reality involves us in an infinite regress of terms and relations. From the standpoint of the finite percipient and thinker, relations abound everywhere, and in vain does he try to get above or beyond them. Every judgment involves the separation of 'existence' and 'content;' it is applying to a subject a predicate which it is not, and this is the very essence of contradiction. As we observed in Chapter III, thought is forever relational and discursive; it falls short of attaining the ultimate Individuality. Thought never succeeds in eliminating contradiction. Or, what is the same thing, the finite thinker is never able to view the universe *sub specie aeternitatis*. Thus there *are* relations. Reducing these propositions to symbolic form we see the contradiction in its full force. According to the implications of this theory we must be able to say, 'A is not-A' and 'A is A.' Now I submit that, if anywhere there is contradiction, this is one, even upon the basis of the exposition of the Law of Contradiction as given by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet.

The attempt to obviate this conclusion by insisting, as both Mr. Bradley<sup>4</sup> and Prof. Bosanquet<sup>5</sup> do, that the *immediate* subject of every judgment is not the whole of Reality but a limited portion, does not resolve the contradiction. Suppose we leave aside the view that the subject of every judgment is ultimate Reality and say that the subject of every judgment is some portion of Reality. What follows is that subject and predicate are complementaries and not contradictories, as they must be considered on

<sup>1</sup>*Principle*, pp. 223-224.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 225.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 227.

<sup>4</sup>*Essays*, pp. 253 ff.

<sup>5</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 258.



any true view. But what happens to the immanent dialectic to the 'whole'? We have cut the main nerve. So to retain the moving dynamic of the dialectic, we must fall back upon the view that the ultimate subject of every judgment is ultimate Reality as a 'whole.' This makes the ultimate criterion of Reality effective, and only upon this ground can it be maintained that predication involves contradiction. That Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet actually do accept the latter alternative, namely, that ultimate Reality is the subject of every judgment<sup>1</sup> and preserve the force of the dialectic in fact, is clear when they come to discuss the reality of good and evil, time and change—in short, any finite existence. These phenomena are unreal (as aspects of the 'whole') because they are measured by the standard of the Absolute.

Wherein lies the error? The error, previously discussed, and one which may be viewed from different angles, will here be considered to lie in two postulates, one explicitly stated and the other persistently applied. The first of these postulates is that the one criterion of Reality is Individuality or non-contradiction, interpreted as transcending all relations. No exception is allowed. The second postulate is that Identity and Diversity, unity and plurality, are inherently contradictory. Or, to state the matter differently, Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet's theory of judgment involves the confusion of two standpoints in viewing the universe, the standpoint of an Infinite or Absolute thinker who perceives the universe intuitively and at once, and the standpoint of a finite thinker who must view the universe piecemeal. Not being able to get the point of view of the Infinite, we must approach it from the standpoint of the finite.<sup>2</sup> From this view that Reality is supra-relational, it follows that our finite and relational point of view misrepresents Reality.

Let us notice again, briefly, how these postulates are applied to experience. Take any object, a piece of marble, for example. We know it by its qualities; it is 'hard,' 'smooth,' 'white,' 'heavy,' and 'square.' But how can marble be all these and yet the one piece of marble? How can it be many in one? Add these adjectives or qualities, and yet we cannot reconstitute the unity of the marble. The predication of qualities *ad infinitum* will never exhaust the subject, for, as the content of the predicate enlarges, the content of the subject enlarges also. Thus any effort to bring the subject and the predicate together into a unity fails, and we are told that all predication involves self-contradiction. We cannot affirm that 'one' is 'many,' or that 'many' is 'one', for to do so is to assert the identity of

<sup>1</sup>Observe that the acceptance of the doctrine that ultimate Reality is the subject of every judgment recognizes, in a sense, the validity of the Ontological argument. Brad., *Appearance*, pp. 394-460; Bos., *Principle*, p. 80.

<sup>2</sup>See James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, pp. 165 ff.

contradictories. In a similar way we may take up any phenomenon, or category of thought—Mr. Bradley has a special gift for disclosing contradictions—say, space, time, relation, cause, the Self, goodness, *et cetera*, and in every case we find ourselves ascribing to a thing what it is not. In brief, contradiction meets us on every hand. Nothing can be found self-complete or self-contained. Finite existences are not self-existing substances. All that finite thought can apprehend is honeycombed with terms and relations—it is 'appearance,' and Reality is not presented in 'appearance.'<sup>1</sup> We never know, and what is worse, we cannot know, Reality. This, as we saw, was the conclusion of Chapter III. —

We return to consider a point previously observed, namely, that the fallacy here involves a misinterpretation of the logical principle of Identity. As observed in Chapters II and III, Prof. Bosanquet reveals a tendency to stress 'identity' and skimp 'difference,' except in *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, where he discusses contradiction and negativity as the power of the dialectic, and in Chapter IX, Vol. II of his *Logic*, where he concludes with Mr. Bradley that thought, because of its relational character, cannot attain Individuality; in the latter, identity and difference are viewed as hopeless contradictions. Mr. Bradley, as indicated above consistently stresses the 'difference' aspect of thought and skimps the 'identity' aspect, while insistently calling our attention to their mutual contradiction. We need here only restate the conclusion arrived at in Chapters II and III. Mr. Bradley, influenced by his doctrine of immediate experience, in which he claims reality is 'given' as a whole without relations, and influenced further by the logic involved in taking the absolute criterion as involving the transcendence of relations in the Absolute, is forced to interpret identity and diversity, unity and plurality, as contradictory, whereas, as we noticed, they are really complementaries. There can be no thought unless we take Identity to mean identity in difference, and this rightly interpreted brings no contradiction into the judgment. Prof. Bosanquet, on the other hand, influenced by the tendency of consciousness in all its forms to be a 'whole' or a 'world,' and influenced further by taking Individuality, as the absolute criterion, to transcend relation, (though certainly this is not revealed in experience, even though it be admitted that knowledge tends toward system,) is more and more inclined to view identity in difference as bare Identity. The conclusion in Prof. Bosanquet's view is quite as fatal for thought as in the case of Mr. Bradley.

<sup>1</sup>The term "Reality" is used here as equivalent to the Whole or Individuality. Since thought everywhere remains relational and self-contradictory, it never apprehends the Real, but always appearance. The confusion and difficulty which thus arises from a doctrine of appearance and Reality is discussed more at length in Chapter V.

And when we remember that the Law of Identity and the Law of Contradiction are complementary, we see that the outcome for thought and knowledge in the case of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet is not greatly different.

It is entirely relevant at this point to call attention to another conclusion arrived at in Chapter II. We observed there that Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet neglect to take proper account of the Neo-Realistic doctrine of relations. We had occasion to notice that, while Neo-Realism goes too far in its reaction against the universal application of the internal theory of relations as maintained by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, and asserts the existence of some external relations, the more intelligible view was to take relations as internal, but varying in degrees of relatedness. Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet fail to take account of all the possible and defensible positions in the doctrine of relations so fundamental in their systems. We are not driven, we submit, to choose between Absolutism and a chaotic world of tiny Absolutes, as Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet propose. The thrust has its teeth, we admit, for Neo-Realism which asserts the existence of objects independent of mind. Certainly what is experienced is *in* relation. So far there can be no doubt that relations are internal, for all knowledge involves a subject-object relation. But not all relations exist in equal degrees of relatedness. This is evident from the most elementary to the most complex experience.<sup>1</sup>

The problem of inference is a point in case. If relations are equally relevant, as the doctrine of Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet implies, then there is no point short of the Absolute where a process of inference may logically cease. This view, besides lacking justification in finite experience, seems to underestimate the rôle of the *problem* in thought. In so far as it tends to view truth as a matter purely of the logical relation of a proposition to others and as tested by logical stability alone,<sup>2</sup> it is a tendency toward abstraction and logicism, and the reaction of Neo-Realism (and of Pragmatism, as well) is valid. A judgment may be true *now* and not in the end. In all reasoning there comes a point where it is not necessary to consider any other terms than those under consideration. Inference may stop because the problem is solved. Interest and purpose, the demands of experience, in short, may be satisfied. As Prof. Sabine says, "It is hard to believe that a criterion of truth is not seriously handicapped by being unable to recognize, or at least by being able only half-heartedly to recognize, the vast number of judgments (surely the majority of all we

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<sup>1</sup>See J. A. Leighton, *Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 23, 1914, pp. 17 ff., especially p. 21.

<sup>2</sup>*Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 21, p. 554.

make) which neither in time to come nor at any time are thought by anybody to need revision."<sup>1</sup>

Still it may be asserted by the adherent of the doctrine of external relations, or, by the Absolutist who fears we are about to assert a world of tiny Absolutes, that not all reality is now nor ever shall be the object of a finite mind. Let it be granted. But we affirm that any reality now known, or any reality inferred from what is known, appears in human experience and is so far mind-dependent. Moreover, any reality not now known in human experience either by immediate presence or by inference (of course, any other reality cannot logically trouble us), but which shall later be known, we may assert, will have a relation to human experience and will be so far dependent. The doctrine of internal relations cannot be obviated, though experience will allow us to hold that some relations make no difference and are so far external. As Prof. J. A. Leighton well says, "All actual individua, and all relationships which they sustain, must be now or at any other time, internal to the totality of the real. To say this is to say no more than that in knowing, we are dealing with our data as parts of a universal order. But that settles nothing as to the relative degrees of independence and self-determination to be accorded to the members of the total reality."<sup>2</sup>

We have had occasion to notice also that the doctrine of thought and relations as maintained by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet has met with opposition from another side. Pragmatism contends that Absolutism overstresses the purely formal or logical aspect of thought at the expense of the valid claims of the teleological aspect. Absolutism tends to view reality and experience with Spinoza *sub specie aeternitatis*, whereas finite experience is compelled to view the world from the standpoint of its discontinuities. This, in principle, is also the reaction of James Ward in *Naturalism and Agnosticism* where he calls attention to the discontinuities in experience and defends the claims of contingency in the universe as over against the necessity, e.g., in the concrete universal of Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley. "The actual is wholly historical."<sup>3</sup> "The historical is what we *understand* best, and what concerns us most."<sup>4</sup> While the reactions of the Pragmatist and James Ward are similar in principle, they have implications which are decidedly different, and for this reason it will be well to view them separately.

<sup>1</sup>The tendency to substitute *mere* logical analysis of knowledge for an adequate account of living, concrete experience is only too strong in Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, though it is stronger in the former than in the latter.

<sup>2</sup>*Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Edwin Creighton*, p. 114.

<sup>3</sup>Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, p. 281.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 280.

Pragmatism views thought from the standpoint of the relations of the particular problem at issue. Prof. John Dewey, for example, says, "Reflection follows so naturally upon its appropriate cue, its issue is so obvious, so practical, the entire relationship is so organic, that once grant the position that thought arises in reaction to specific demand, and there is not the particular type of thinking called logical theory because there is not the practical demand for reflection of that sort. Our attention is taken up with particular questions and specific answers. What we have to reckon with is not the problem of, How can I think *überhaupt*? but, how shall I think right *here and now*? Not what is the test of thought at large, but what validates and confirms *this* thought?"<sup>1</sup> The substance of this charge against Absolutism is that thinking takes place in the face of a particular problem. Thought does not appear on the scene merely to mend a break in the systematic coherence of a logical system. Its function is instrumental to the task of resolving particular conflicts in experience, and, as such, it is essentially a biological function developed in the struggle for existence to fit the organism to cope more effectively with its environment. Clearly, then, the mind being an instrument of action, the test or criterion of truth upon this theory will not be logical coherence and non-contradiction, but 'does it work.' This statement of the position of Pragmatism on the point at issue, though brief and general, suffices to exhibit the chief point of conflict between Absolutism and Pragmatism.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet endeavor to meet the attack from the side of Pragmatism, and their effort may be summarized thus: Pragmatism (or Instrumentalism) is not free from ambiguity and confusion in the explanation of its position.<sup>3</sup> This is particularly true with reference to its claim that truth is made and that the test of truth is 'satisfaction' or 'does it work.' With respect to the doctrine that thought is an instrument of action and appears only when some practical problem is to be solved, Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet readily grant that thought is an instrument of action and that it does appear to solve 'practical' problems. But they maintain that to view thought solely from this viewpoint, is to take it too narrowly—it is to take an aspect or element of thought for the whole. The human mind is a complex, e.g., of intellect, feeling, and will. But it must have a unity. This unity cannot be obtained by taking an element or aspect of the complex and making it absolute, the other aspects being reduced to mere subordinate means. Thought, as the unity of the human

<sup>1</sup>*Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 3. The major portion of the work from which we have quoted is given to an exposition of what is implied here and a criticism of opposing views. See also, *How we Think* by the same author.

<sup>2</sup>See Wm. James, *Pragmatism*, and *The Meaning of Truth*.

<sup>3</sup>Brad., *Essays*, pp. 66 ff., 127 ff.



mind, must be viewed as conterminous with human experience<sup>1</sup> and any effort to make any aspect of mind the basis of the interpretation of the nature of the whole is an abstraction. Thus when a 'practical' problem is faced, it makes no difference what kind of problem, it appears in a context of experience, and this context is determinative of its particular character. The context having to do with the nature of the problem, it is clear that, while 'satisfaction' or "workableness" must be realized before the problem is solved, harmony, or coherence with experience is the more ultimate criterion. Thought, therefore, is instrumental as a means, but the end is harmony or coherence with experience.<sup>2</sup> 'Satisfaction,' which in itself is difficult of definition and formulation as a regulative principle of knowledge, is a test of truth, but it is subordinate to, and included in, the demand of experience for order, system, and harmony.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, therefore, incline to view Pragmatism as being too much engrossed in the genetic and psychological aspect of truth and as having never gone on to consider the fuller nature of truth as involving the organization of experience and as having metaphysical implications.<sup>4</sup> Truth for them involves mediation, and the most fully mediated experience is the most true. Perfect truth (there are degrees of truth) for Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet is "the most organized organization of reality in the medium of judgment."<sup>5</sup> Truth for them, as we pointed out in Chapter III, is found in the Individual and non-contradictory. "Truth's natural destiny is the return once more into unbroken union with Reality, and to restore at a higher level that totality out of which it has emerged."<sup>6</sup>

It is when Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet depart from the position of a valid and defensible Idealism, as defined in the earlier portions of this work, and take the rôle of Absolute Idealists (or Speculative Idealists), as the latter definition of truth implies, that Pragmatism makes out a case against them. Yet Pragmatism, too, takes a one-sided view of thought. When Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet insist that purpose and interest are justly accounted for in the concrete universal of thought<sup>7</sup> and that the most fully mediated is the most true,<sup>8</sup> we are inclined to agree with Pragmatism that we have been carried away from the contingencies of concrete experience and have become the victims of a particular logical theory. As Prof. Dewey well says, "What we have to reckon with is not the problem of, How can I think *überhaupt*?"<sup>9</sup> The objection to this viewpoint has already been given and it does not need to be repeated here.

<sup>1</sup>Bos., *Principle*, pp. 293 ff.

<sup>2</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, p. 249.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 247 ff; Brad., *Essays*, pp. 134 f.

<sup>4</sup>Brad., *Essays*, p. 72; Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, p. 247.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, p. 248. <sup>6</sup>Brad., *Essays*, p. 347. <sup>7</sup>Bos., *Principle*, pp. 52-56.

<sup>8</sup>Brad., *Essays*, p. 146; *Appearance*, pp. 359-400.

<sup>9</sup>*Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 3.

We turn now to consider James Ward's criticism directed against Mr Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet's tendency, in spite of claims to the contrary, to ignore the contingencies of concrete experience. It is against the concrete universal's power to take proper account of the unique and individual in experience that the opposition is launched. Mr. Ward says, "This incommensurability of the necessary and contingent, the scientific and the historical, answers to the difference between validity and reality, and shows, at the same time, that 'reality is richer than thought.' Thought gives only 'science,' not existence; we cannot, by piling up propositions secure the simplest 'positon.' Thought, again, gives us only the universal, the relational; from the particular, which is the surd for it—or the real meeting point or subject of relations—it must start, but to this particular it can never return save by traversing an interminable series."<sup>1</sup>

Henri Bergson, as we noticed above, also views thought as incapable of apprehending the real, unique and individual. But he finds a solution of the difficulty in 'intuition.' Prof. A. E. Taylor, in his treatment of "The Logical Character of Descriptive Science"<sup>2</sup> is in practical agreement with James Ward on the relation of thought's universals to the concrete events of experience. The force of the attack in the case of James Ward, Henri Bergson, and Prof. Taylor, each from his own metaphysical standpoint, is directed against accepting the deliverances of science in the form of laws as an ultimate and final explanation of things. The contention is that, since the laws and principles of science are at most formulae in the nature of statistical averages, they cannot lay any claim to giving a full and adequate account of the unique character of events, and hence ignore entirely all spontaneity and freedom in the world. The validity, within proper bounds, and utility of the laws which describe uniformities in nature and the universe as a whole, are not assailed in the least. It is only when these principles of uniformity are carried over and applied as an ultimate explanation of reality that their validity and use is challenged.

Now in so far as Prof. Bosanquet asserts the power of the 'concrete universal' to take full and detailed account of the individual and unique in experience, it is open to this charge, and he accepts the challenge. Mr. Bradley's system is not so much exposed to this attack, because of his doctrine of immediate experience and because his work is less constructive as a whole. In fact, for the most part, he seems to concur in the attitude of James Ward. However, in his chapter on "The Degrees of Truth and Reality," and in other portions of his works where he takes a constructive attitude, we see the implication of the force of his universals. So the attack

<sup>1</sup>*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, p. 282; see also Vol. II, p. 90.

<sup>2</sup>*The Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 279 ff.

is not without its point even in the case of Mr. Bradley. It must be remembered, moreover, that neither Mr. Bradley nor Prof. Bosanquet assert that thought is able to apprehend the wholly individual. Thought falls short of grasping the non-contradictory because of its relational character. For Bosanquet, as we pointed out, thought reaches down into the immediate at the lower extremity of thought and only falls short in not attaining immediacy at the upper extremity of thought. For Mr. Bradley, we noticed, thought fails to reach into the immediate on either limit.

Prof. Bosanquet takes special pains to ward off the attack, and to show that the 'concrete universal' really absorbs and transmutes into a higher unity and meaning all that can really be called significant and worthwhile in experience.<sup>1</sup> Thought taken, not as a special faculty, but as "The active form of a totality, present in all and every experience of a rational being,"<sup>2</sup> is one with the experience of freedom,<sup>3</sup> gives significance to sensation,<sup>4</sup> is the life of feeling, conation, and cognition;<sup>5</sup> in short, thought takes all the concrete and unique aspects of our experience, "draws them out of their blankness and exhibits them as aspects of the difference made in a living world of contents."<sup>6</sup> Thought, indeed, has a mediate side, "but all concrete thought has become immediate no less than mediate."<sup>7</sup> Thought is always in part intuitive;<sup>8</sup> it always remains at home, as well as goes abroad. It is just because thought is the *nisus* toward the whole, because it somehow drags along the spontaneities and the unique character of individuals, because its universals are true syntheses of differences, because it is all the time giving meaning to the unique which would otherwise be abstract—because of this, it may be said to be a true account of the real.

Prof. Bosanquet further maintains that since the 'concrete universal,' as an embodiment of the individual, has its true nature within (as inward), it is one with the spiritual; and the spiritual "in its own proper nature is inwardness as opposed to externality." But, as we have observed, it is the very nature of the 'concrete universal' to absorb and include the external. Thus true inwardness is outwardness absorbed. "Externality can subsist only as subordinated to inwardness; but inwardness can subsist only in the conquest of externality."<sup>9</sup> "The moral is, then, that as we approach Individuality we are not to look for diminution of content, of structure, of determinateness. Individuality will show itself as inwardness and spirituality, not by emptiness and abstraction, not even by blank

<sup>1</sup>*Principle*, Lecture II.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 61, 67.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>*Principle*, p. 76.

intensity of incommunicable feeling, but, in a word, in the characteristics of 'a world.' Mechanism and externality will in a sense be superseded, . . ."<sup>1</sup> Thus, in the higher Individuality, we do not have more, but less of "spontaneousness, if that means 'indetermination,' laxity of connection, and unaccountable new development; and more of logic, more of expansion towards giving full effect to demands which emerge by systematic necessity from the articulation of the whole. . . .; more of the *amor intellectualis Dei* resting on clear spiritual insight. Inwardness will not be the banishment of all that seems outward, but the solution of the outward in the circulation of the total life."<sup>2</sup>

It is clear from this brief treatment of the 'concrete universal' that Prof. Bosanquet, while endeavoring to meet the opposition of James Ward only places in clearer light the inherent weakness (or strength, as he views it) of the position attacked. Prof. Bosanquet's reply, in a word, consists in arguing that Mr. Ward does not distinguish the abstract universal of formal logic and his own (Prof. Bosanquet's) use of the universal as the concrete pervading identity of differences. Mr. Ward's assertion that history is the true type of the actual is rejected as involving the fallacies of naive Realism, because history is a hybrid form of experience and is incapable of any considerable degree of 'being or trueness.'<sup>3</sup> Mr. Ward's claims for a recognition of the rights of freedom and contingency in a theory of knowledge and reality is met with the reply that there is no freedom or contingency except that which is found in the logic of Individuality. How much freedom and contingency Prof. Bosanquet's theory allows is made clear in the following: "It is true that I now believe that the development of the concrete universal requires the absorption of purpose in a system so complete that the specification of any part as an end is impossible. Or, rather the purpose *qua* purpose is negligible. . . ."<sup>4</sup> Prof. Bosanquet insists that either his position must be conceded or we must accept the position of naive Realism with all its fallacies.

In Lecture III, in *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, Prof. Bosanquet defends the claims of science to give an ultimate explanation of experience and reality, by bringing the principle of uniformity and general law as examples under the concrete universal. "Uniformity, then, as a principle of science, is a uniformity not in the way of resemblance but in the way of identity; not a repetition of resembling elements but the coherence of differences in a whole."<sup>5</sup> "Individuality, therefore, meaning not empty eccentricity, but the character of a system as self-contained and coherent, is fully in harmony with the Uniformity of Nature."<sup>6</sup> We

<sup>1</sup>*Principle*, pp. 76-77.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 78 f.

<sup>4</sup>*Bos.*, *Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 26, 1917, p. 271.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 120; see pp. 121 ff.



need not pursue the argument further. Plainly it is the persistent and consistent tendency of Prof. Bosanquet to view things *überhaupt*, and this standpoint has been examined and its fallacy exposed.

In closing we may say that Prof. Bosanquet's difficulty here, as elsewhere, is in supposing that the possible alternatives in theory of knowledge and reality are covered in the dilemma (and this applies to Mr. Bradley as well), either (1) a reality viewed as an all-inclusive whole and above relations, or (2) a universe of tiny Absolutes. It is the old problem of relations, and we suggest again that it is possible to interpret experience upon a doctrine of relations viewed internally, but with varying degrees of relatedness and internality. We suggest, further, that only upon such a doctrine can the claims of freedom and contingency, purpose and interest, be taken into account. Such a view of relations, doubtless, leads away from Absolutism and forces us to accept a metaphysical pluralism; but it will be a *real* many-in-one—a universe or a *one* in which there are many reals connected by ties of varying degrees of relatedness.

## CHAPTER V

### THE ABSOLUTE

The Speculative Idealism of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, we have tried to show, is an effort to work out the full implications of experience. It is a philosophy which presumes to begin with experience as viewed by common sense and science, and shows that every existence implies the 'whole'—the Absolute.<sup>1</sup> Its fundamental assumption, accepted upon the demonstration of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and further argued as necessary to the objective validity of experience (see Chap. II), is that mind and reality are complementary and reciprocally interdependent.<sup>2</sup> If this be true, according to their doctrine, the form and nature of experience in part and in whole will be a revelation of the character of part and whole of reality. Thus as any part of finite experience or the whole of finite experience, whether in reference to external objects or to thought itself, exhibits a tendency to go beyond itself, so in reality, the part exists for the whole. The logic and ideal of truth is in the 'concrete universal;' this much is determined by experience itself. Once begin the process of thought, or, once begin to examine the self-maintenance of phenomena, and we are inevitably carried to the whole by the spirit of logic inherent in them. The nature of the inference to the Absolute, as viewed by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, which it was the burden of Chapters III and IV to set in clear light, we saw to consist chiefly in: 1) The doctrine of inductive inference, and 2) the doctrine of Negativity. It remains now to explain exactly what the Absolute is, how it is to be conceived, and lastly to consider whether the doctrine can stand against criticism.

Let us take Mr. Bradley's view first and observe what the Absolute is and how it is to be conceived. He says: "Reality then is one, and it is experience."<sup>3</sup> "The Absolute is not many. . . . The universe is one in this sense that its differences exist harmoniously within one whole, beyond which there is nothing."<sup>4</sup> "The Absolute is. . . an individual and a system."<sup>5</sup> "Reality is one Experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations. Its character is the opposite of that fabled extreme which is barely mechanical, and it is, in the end, the sole perfect realiza-

<sup>1</sup>Brad., *Essays*, p. 251; Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, p. 77.

<sup>2</sup>*Principle*, pp. 363, 367.

<sup>3</sup>*Appearance*, p. 530; see also pp. 454, 519.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 144. <sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*,

tion of spirit. We may fairly close this work then by insisting that Reality is spiritual."<sup>1</sup>

Can anything be said about the concrete nature of reality? Mr. Bradley answers affirmatively. "When we ask as to the matter which fills up the empty outline, we can reply in one word, that this matter is experience. And experience means much the same as given and present fact. We perceive, on reflection, that to be real, or even barely to exist, must be to fall within sentience. Sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real. We may say, in other words, that there is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence. Feeling, thought, and volition. . . . are all the material of existence, and there is no other material, actual or even possible."<sup>2</sup>

Summing up, we may state Mr. Bradley's view of the nature of Reality in four propositions: 1) Reality is one; 2) Reality is an harmonious system, a unity above (and so without) relations; 3) Reality is experience; and 4) Reality is One Experience, individual and perfect.

How, briefly, does he arrive at this conclusion? Various arguments are employed, as we have observed. Chief among them, however, are the following: 1) The character of the content in immediate experience—it appears as one, without relation.<sup>3</sup> This experience, while imperfect and unstable, serves to suggest to us how the 'total experience' may include feeling, thought, and will in non-relational form. 2) Another line of argument consists in showing that somehow "every fragment of appearance qualifies the Whole;"<sup>4</sup> "we could discover nowhere the sign of a recalcitrant element."<sup>5</sup> "Everything, that is, implies everything else."<sup>6</sup> "Closely related to these arguments and distinctly implied in the latter is, 3) The postulate that "ultimate Reality is such that it does not contradict itself"<sup>7</sup> and this principle as employed is enforced by 4) The Ontological argument.<sup>8</sup>

Accepting for the moment the validity of these arguments as proving that Reality is one, a system, harmonious and without relation, it is not clear just why the 'whole' should be called Experience. Upon this Mr. Bradley says: "The test in the main lies ready to our hand, and the decision rests on the manner in which it is applied. . . . Find any piece of existence, take up anything that any one could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or, point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being,

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 552; see *Essays*, p. 246.

<sup>2</sup>*Appearance*, p. 144.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 159 f.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 511.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>*Essays*, p. 251 n.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 136.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 394 ff.

which is not derived from, and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. . . . I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality."<sup>1</sup> Reality must be experience, because all we know consists wholly of experience.<sup>2</sup> "The Absolute holds all possible content in an individual experience where no contradiction can remain."<sup>3</sup> The point of the argument seems to be that, because all the finite mind can possibly know exists in the form of experience, i.e., is essentially psychical or is nothing apart from a knowing mind, therefore ultimate Reality must also be of the same character—it must be experience. The Absolute "cannot be less than appearance, and hence no feeling or thought of any kind can fall outside its limits. And if it is more than any feeling or that which we know, it must still remain more of the same nature. It cannot pass into another region beyond what falls under the general head of sentience."<sup>4</sup> To attempt to state what Reality is in other than experiential terms, according to Mr. Bradley, is to attempt to do the impossible and the unmeaning. Before making any further explanation of this point, or offering any critical remarks, let us go on to notice how Prof. Bosanquet conceives ultimate Reality.

"Reality", Prof. Bosanquet asserts, "is one but its presentation varies."<sup>5</sup> The Law of Identity leaves no room for discontinuity in the world, therefore, "reality. . . is one throughout."<sup>6</sup> "Reality, the Law of Contradiction asserts, is a *consistent* unity."<sup>7</sup> "The principle of Excluded Middle, then, ultimately affirms that Reality is not merely one and self-consistent but is a system of reciprocally determinate parts," it is a self-determining whole.<sup>8</sup> Prof. Bosanquet further describes Reality as "absolute being,"<sup>9</sup> the all-inclusive,<sup>10</sup> that which transcends all parts, whether outside self or internal to self and personality.<sup>11</sup> Reality is an Absolute Experience<sup>12</sup> which transcends and includes in an harmonious whole all lesser experiences. It is perfect individuality. "The general formula of the Absolute, I repeat, the transmutation and rearrangements of particular experiences, and also of the contents of particular finite minds, by inclusion in a completer whole of experience, is a matter of everyday verification."<sup>13</sup> Again, "Individuality is the ultimate completeness of that character of wholeness and non-contradiction which we first generalized under the name of logical stability."<sup>14</sup> "In the ultimate sense, . . . .

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, p. 145.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 522.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 147.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 77.

<sup>6</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, pp. 210-211.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 213.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 214.

<sup>9</sup>*Principle*, p. 257.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 260.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 372 ff.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 250.

<sup>13</sup>*Principle*, p. 373.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 68.



there can only be one individual, and that, *the* individual, the Absolute."<sup>1</sup> "We say then with Mr. Bradley, following, of course, Plato and Hegel, that the individual which as we have seen is the only true form of the universal, is the Real,"<sup>2</sup> and "the individual is one with the spiritual."<sup>3</sup>

Summarizing, we find precisely what we found in the case of Mr. Bradley; that (1) Reality is one; (2) Reality is a harmonious experience, a unity above (and so without) relations; (3) Reality is experience; (4) Reality is one experience, individual and perfect.

Again, briefly, what are the arguments which lead Prof. Bosanquet to postulate the Absolute? We may summarize them thus: (1) The nature of consciousness in all its forms to be a 'whole,' a 'world.' (2) In the organization of experience, Individuality becomes more and more the immanent criterion of truth and reality; or, stated otherwise, everything that *is* implies everything else in such a way that any element or feature of reality can be raised by the mind to the position of a self-related significant whole.<sup>4</sup> This is the argument *a contingentia mundi* and is the nature of the fundamental inference to the Absolute.<sup>5</sup> (3) As knowledge approaches its completion or perfection, it exhibits an increasing degree of systematic coherence and Individuality or non-contradiction; and to this argument is added the force of (4) the Ontological argument with some reservations.<sup>6</sup>

It is clear from the foregoing, as well as from the discussion in the preceding chapters, that Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, while employing slightly different terminology with reference to the Absolute, (Mr. Bradley using the term 'Absolute Experience' more generally and Prof. Bosanquet the term 'Individuality,') have in mind the same kind of 'whole' or 'all-inclusive' Being. Prof. Bosanquet does employ the term 'Absolute Experience'<sup>7</sup> and the term 'perfect experience,'<sup>8</sup> and the term 'higher experience' in reference to the Absolute, though he seems not so insistent or explicit in their use. The term 'Individuality' derives its content from the 'concrete universal,' and since this is the very core of finite experience and is described as spiritual, it follows that the 'Individual' must be conceived as identical with the Absolute Experience of Mr. Bradley. Prof. Bosanquet also, with Mr. Bradley, finds in the common everyday experience of the finite mind an analogy to the manner in which the Absolute transmutes and transcends the elements of which it is composed. He says, "So far from its being a strange or unwarranted assumption that the experience of conscious units are transmuted, reinforced and rearranged, by entrance

<sup>1</sup>*Principle*, p. 68.

p. 58 n.

p. 72.

vol. I, p. 231.

<sup>5</sup>*Principle*, pp. 262 ff.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 393.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 371, 390.

into a fuller and more extended experience, the thing is plainly fact, which, if we were not blinded by traditional superstition, we should recognize in our daily selves as a matter of course."<sup>1</sup>

Prof. Bosanquet points out further that the manner in which minds unite and reinforce each other in a society, the manner in which individuals and minds participate in the State, in art, and in religion,—all offer analogies of how existences unite to form the Absolute. He would have us see that the conception of the Absolute as an all-inclusive, all-absorbing experience is not a strange or foreign doctrine; on the contrary, he would have us see that the "transmutation of experience, in accordance with the law of non-contradiction in its positive bearing, is the principle of daily life. And if this is admitted here, there can be no reason for making it a fundamental difficulty when we come to deal with ultimate reality. There is no hiatus in the transition."<sup>2</sup> Thus, Prof. Bosanquet holds, we have the best clue to the nature of individuality "in the contrast between the forms of mental life in which self-transcendence is at its minimum with those in which it approaches its maximum."<sup>3</sup> Our highest experiences, then, will give us the closest analogy to the nature of the Absolute.<sup>4</sup>

It will carry us further in our study of ultimate Reality if we notice a distinction explicitly made by Mr. Bradley and more or less everywhere implied by Prof. Bosanquet, between Reality and 'appearance.' We have made use of this distinction before but have not explained its meaning. We must now ask, exactly how does this distinction arise and what are its implications for a theory of Reality?

The distinction between 'appearance' and Reality has its origin in the particular theory of thought, and its implications, to which Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet adhere. The point is this: "The essence of reality lies in the union and agreement of existence and content, and, on the other side, appearance consists in a discrepancy between these two aspects."<sup>5</sup> When it is assumed that Reality as an all-inclusive supra-relational whole is the ultimate subject of every judgment, we have one aspect of the source out of which the doctrine arises. When it is assumed, further, that identity and diversity, or unity and plurality, are inherently contradictory (this doctrine is explicit in Mr. Bradley and implicit in Prof. Bosanquet), we have the other aspect of the source. Judgment is the function of thought by which truth and reality are constructed and sustained, we observed in Chapter IV. Now judgment subsists upon relations, as Mr. Bradley says, upon the separation of content and existence. Thought's ideal, however, is to attain perfect truth and to construct a reality wholly

<sup>1</sup>*Principle*, p. 372.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 377.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 274.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 269ff.

<sup>5</sup>*Brad., Appearance*, pp. 455-456.



individual. But in reaching this goal of immediate insight, it would lose its relational character, it would commit suicide. Without pursuing this study of the nature of thought further, since it has been already fully given in the preceding chapters, we may say, briefly, that the source of the distinction between 'appearance' and Reality lies in the overt tendency of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet to play fast and loose with the category of relations. On the one hand, Reality is above relations, and ultimately in the absolute 'Whole', *there are no relations*; on the other hand, thought subsists upon relations, and *there are relations*. In other words, the doctrine of 'appearance' and Reality implies a dual standpoint—the Absolute and the finite. This inconsistency was exposed and discussed in Chapter IV.

Now just what is meant by the doctrine of 'appearance' in the systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet? Does it imply that reality nowhere appears and in no case is presented to finite percipients? To this question Mr. Bradley specifically replies, and the same answer is implied in Prof. Bosanquet's theory: "Yes, but also in the end No. The Absolute really appears, but the conditions of its appearance are not known. . . . The real appearance of the Absolute in finite centers is a thing which therefore in the above sense can rationally be at once affirmed and denied."<sup>1</sup> "The above sense" referred to is this: Because nothing intelligible can be set against<sup>2</sup> the Absolute as a non-contradictory whole (the self-contradictory cannot be real),<sup>3</sup> "its truth is ultimate and final; while on the other side, that truth remains defective and must in a sense be called untrue."<sup>4</sup> Again, it is plain, we are met with a reply which involves at the same time an Absolute and a finite point of view.<sup>5</sup>

Let us see how Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet seek to maintain these two viewpoints, at one time assuming the viewpoint of the Absolute, at another, the viewpoint of the finite, but in the end holding to the two simultaneously. Accordingly, the Absolute will be at one time the all-embracing Reality, the all-inclusive Whole which 'somehow' unites in a perfect, supra-relational, single experience, all its aspects. For example, Mr. Bradley tells us, "Reality consists . . . in a higher experience superior to the distinctions which it includes and overrides."<sup>6</sup> ". . . the Absolute is not, and can not be thought as, any scheme of relations. If we keep to these, there is no harmonious unity in the whole."<sup>7</sup> "But surely the Absolute is not shut up within our human limits. Already we

<sup>1</sup>Essays, pp. 272-273.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 273.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Spinoza's conception of Substance under the form of eternity and under the form of time; also his doctrine of necessary modes and contingent modes.

<sup>4</sup>Appearance, p. 195.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 267.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 273.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

have seen that its harmony is something beyond relations."<sup>1</sup> "There is but one Reality, and its being consists in experience."<sup>2</sup> And Prof. Bosanquet tells us, "Reality . . . is one throughout."<sup>3</sup> "There is, of course, an ultimate Reality; a higher experience than ours."<sup>4</sup> It is an 'absolute being',<sup>5</sup> that which transcends all its parts in a supra-relational whole;<sup>6</sup> it is an absolute experience.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, and at other times, the Absolute *is* its appearances and outside of its appearances it does not exist. Reality is everywhere present and there is nothing we know quite so well as the Absolute; for everything which exists (existence is a form of the appearance of the real)<sup>8</sup> belongs to reality, and our experience is always *of* that which exists. So it is absolutely false to assert that Reality never appears and that, because of this, it is strange and foreign to the finite mind, as Prof. Wm. James suggested.<sup>9</sup> Mr. Bradley says, "Certainly a man knows and experiences everywhere the ultimate Reality, and indeed, he is able to know and experience nothing else."<sup>10</sup> "The Absolute is present in, and, in a sense, it is alike each of its special appearances; though present everywhere again in different value and degrees."<sup>11</sup> Again, "we can find no province of the world so low but the Absolute inhabits it. Nowhere is there even a single fact so fragmentary and so poor that to the universe it does not matter. There is truth in every idea however false, there is reality in every existence however slight."<sup>12</sup> Prof. Bosanquet in a similar tone says, "It is a mistake to treat the finite world, or pain, or evil, as illusion. To the question whether they are real or are not real, the answer must be, as to all questions of this type, that everything is real so long as you do not take it for more than it is."<sup>13</sup> On the view here accepted, finiteness, pain and evil, are essential features of Reality, and belong to an aspect of it which leaves its mark even on perfection."<sup>14</sup>

Again, and in the end, Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet maintain the two views simultaneously. Mr. Bradley says: "All is appearance, and no appearance, nor any combination of these, is the same as Reality. This is half the truth, and by itself it is a dangerous error. We must turn at once to correct it by adding its counterpart and supplement. The Absolute *is* its appearances, it really is all and every-one of them."<sup>15</sup> "Appearance without reality would be impossible, for what then could

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 214.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 455.

<sup>3</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 211.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 264.

<sup>5</sup>*Principle*, p. 257.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 372.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 250.

<sup>8</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 317, 400.

<sup>9</sup>*Pluralistic Universe*, p. 381.

<sup>10</sup>*Appearance*, p. 448.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 457.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 487.

<sup>13</sup>This is a two-edged sword.

<sup>14</sup>*Principle*, pp. 240-241.

<sup>15</sup>*Appearance*, p. 486.



appear? And reality without appearance would be nothing, for there certainly is nothing outside appearances. But on the other hand Reality (we must repeat this) is not the sum of things. It is the unity in which all things, coming together, are transmuted, in which they are changed all alike, though not changed equally."<sup>1</sup> Concluding and finally, Mr. Bradley says, "The Absolute is each appearance, and is all, but it is not any one as such. And it is not all equally, but one appearance is more real than another. In short, the doctrine of degrees in reality and truth is the fundamental answer to our problem. Everything is essential, and yet one thing is worthless in comparison with others. Nothing is perfect, as such, and yet everything in some degree contains a vital function of Perfection."<sup>2</sup> With this position Prof. Bosanquet is in entire agreement, as our treatment in Chapter IV indicated. The solution of the matter lies in the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality, or as Prof. Bosanquet says, "everything is real so long as you do not take it for more than it is."<sup>3</sup> Answering the charge that his view of Reality makes all finiteness illusion, Prof. Bosanquet says, "In a certain sense the two views, that which disposes of them as illusions and that which accepts them as immanent in perfection though not just as they seem, may be forced into approximation."<sup>4</sup> Again, quoting Mr. Bradley with approval, he says, "Higher, truer, more beautiful, better, and more real, these, on the whole count in the universe as they count for us. . . . For on the whole, higher means for us a greater amount of that one Reality, outside of which all appearance is absolutely nothing."<sup>5</sup>

Before going on to consider how all appearances 'somehow' constitute the Absolute, let us notice more exactly the significance of this doctrine of appearance as related both to thought and reality. It is just because thought is the function by which mind constructs and sustains reality that this doctrine of appearance, as noticed above, involves both the theory of thought and theory of Reality. The doctrine of appearance, as Mr. Bradley asserts, arises and is necessary because of "the presence in everything finite of that which takes it beyond itself."<sup>6</sup> The point is further expanded when he says, "For us anything which comes short when compared with Reality, gets the name appearance. But we do not suggest that the thing always itself is an appearance. We mean that its character is such that it becomes one, as soon as we judge it. And this character, we have seen throughout our work, is ideality. Appearance consists in the looseness of content from existence; and, because of this self-estrangement-

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 487-488.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 487.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 269; *Appearance*, p. 550; Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, pp. 252-253.

<sup>4</sup>*Essays*, p. 272.

<sup>5</sup>*Principle*, p. 240.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 241.



ment, every finite aspect is called an appearance. . . . Everywhere the finite is self-transcended, alienated from itself, and passing away from itself towards another existence. Hence the finite is appearance because, on the one side, it is an adjective of Reality, and because, on the other side, it is an adjective which itself is not real."<sup>1</sup>

Prof. Bosanquet's position is in principle the same, differing only to the extent, and because, of the closer analogy between the work of thought and Reality as a whole in his view. Defining Contradiction as consisting in the ascription of "differents" to the same term,<sup>2</sup> or, as "an imperfection in the organization of systems," he says, "Contradiction in this sense is rightly pronounced unthinkable, and cannot, therefore, be a characteristic of Truth or of Ultimate Reality."<sup>3</sup> Yet, there is a sense in which Contradiction is an actual existent and a characteristic of Reality. "It must, I infer, be admitted that every day fact, which is given in normal experience, is self-contradictory, as well as actual."<sup>4</sup> In explanation of this he says, "The whole difficulty springs from trying to attribute to given fact the features of ultimate Reality. In truth the actual world is charged with contradiction."<sup>5</sup> Thus, for Prof. Bosanquet, as for Mr. Bradley, contradiction is characteristic of everything finite, for what is finite is 'ideal' and what is known takes the form of 'ideality.' Viewed from a slightly different standpoint, that of Negativity which is 'fundamental in all that is real'<sup>6</sup> (contradiction for Prof. Bosanquet is an obstructed Negativity and Negativity a successful or frictionless contradiction), we find Prof. Bosanquet coming to the heart of his position when he says that Negation and Affirmation grow *pari passu*. ". . . negation is fundamental in a systematic whole. Its members, in order to be, must also not be. . . . It seems erroneous, therefore, to hold that Negativity vanishes as perfection is approached. The reverse seems to be the case."<sup>7</sup> Thus for Prof. Bosanquet as for Mr. Bradley, the doctrine of 'appearance' and Reality arises out of the necessity, on the one hand, for thought to work in an *identity in difference*, or what is the same, from another standpoint, the instability of the finite—its tendency to self-transcendence. "What is here meant is not precisely difference, but difference as subsumed under the general character of negation, that is to say, diversity or distinctness as regarded from the point of view of an attempted union."<sup>8</sup>

We have observed the origin and nature of the distinction which leads Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet to differentiate between 'appearance' and Reality; we have noticed also that it is not a doctrine tacked on, but

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 485-486.

<sup>2</sup>*Principle*, p. 224.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 225.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 226.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 227.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 231.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 231-232.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 233.

of the very warp and woof of their closely related systems; we have found that for both, the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality, a doctrine whose criterion is wideness and consistency, is the final solution of the problem. Let us notice now, briefly, that for both, *how* finite diversity or 'appearance' is supplemented, transformed, transmuted and transcended in an all-inclusive, non-relational, single Experience, is unknown and inexplicable. This question is as unanswerable as why there is diversity or 'appearance' at all. Mr. Bradley, for instance, says, "Why there are appearances, and why appearances of such various kinds, are questions not to be answered. But in all this diversity of existence we saw nothing opposed to a complete harmony and system in the Whole. The nature of that system in detail lies beyond our knowledge, but we could discover nowhere the sign of a recalcitrant element. . . . So we venture to conclude that Reality possesses—how we do not know—the general nature we have assigned to it."<sup>1</sup> Prof. Bosanquet also admits the failure of finite thought and experience to apprehend fully the Absolute Experience. He says, "Its failure is one and decisive, simply consisting in the fact that it is not, like the higher experience which we suppose to be the sum and substance of Reality, solid and immediate as well as perfectly individual and non-contradictory."<sup>2</sup> Yet, both Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet maintain that abundant analogies to the immediate and all-absorbing experience of the Absolute may be found in finite experience. The doctrine of degrees of truth and reality, according to which, as truth is wider and more consistent or less so, we have greater or less approach to the coherence and unity of Reality, clearly and adequately provides for this.<sup>3</sup> The chief support, they maintain, for the belief in the Absolute Experience, is the manner in which we experience our own psychical moods and attitudes to blend and lose themselves in an all-inclusive unity. Mr. Bradley, after pointing out that for us "to realize the existence of the Absolute" is impossible, for "in order thus to know we should have to be, and then *we* should not exist,"<sup>4</sup> yet maintains it is possible to gain an idea of its main features, and suggests two possible sources of such knowledge: (1) "In mere feeling, or immediate presentation, we have the experience of a whole. This whole contains diversity, and, on the other hand, is not parted by relations."<sup>5</sup> This experience is very imperfect and unstable, it is, in fact, a unity below relations. "But, it serves to suggest to us the general idea of a total experience, where will and thought and feeling may all once more be one"<sup>6</sup> in a unity above relations. (2) "Further, the ideas of goodness, and of the beautiful,

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, pp. 511-512.

<sup>2</sup>*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 289; see *Principle*, pp. 272 ff

<sup>3</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. II, pp. 287 ff.; *Appearance*, p. 550.

<sup>4</sup>*Appearance*, p. 159.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 160.

suggest in different ways the same result. They more or less involve the experience of a whole beyond relations though full of diversity."<sup>1</sup>

Prof. Bosanquet is quite in agreement with Mr. Bradley on this point, though he sees no analogy in immediate presentation to the nature of the Absolute Experience. The clue to the nature of Individuality is, for him, found in the higher experiences of the finite in which the lower are subsumed.<sup>2</sup> It is the positive and constructive principle of contradiction—or the spirit of the 'whole'—which enables one to unite in one system, e.g., the perception of the earth's surface and the conception of the antipodes, or which enables one to see how "the emotion attending the parental instinct passes into the wise tenderness of the civilized parent, and the instinct itself, as we are told, develops into the whole structure of social beneficence. And it is this, only further pursued, that forces us to the conception of the Absolute. I am aware of no point at which an arrest of the process can be justified."<sup>3</sup> Other analogies to the all-inclusiveness and transcendence of the Absolute may be found in our religious and aesthetic experiences.<sup>4</sup> Thus a comparison of our higher experiences in their inclusion and transcendence of the lower helps us "to meet one of the fundamental difficulties in the conception of an absolute experience"<sup>5</sup> and "no one, it seems, is unreasonable enough to make it a fatal difficulty that we do not profess by metaphysical argument to attain and come into possession of the perfect experience."<sup>6</sup> And Mr. Bradley in a similar tone says, "Our complete inability to understand this concrete unity in detail is no good ground for our declining to entertain it."<sup>7</sup>

Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet maintain that this conception of the Absolute, as related to its appearances, must be kept clear of certain 'vicious analogies' and false Absolutisms. These errors, in the main, consist in taking some distinction within the 'whole,' or some aspect of the same, and setting it up as real by itself.<sup>8</sup> In our study of this point we shall resume our critical attitude.

The implications of the Absolutism of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet takes on a somewhat vicious character when its full meaning is comprehended, particularly when it is observed that according to the full blown Absolutism of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, good and evil, truth and error, time and space, purpose and interest, and the Self are unreal. Nothing is ultimately worthy of the name Reality, but the 'whole.' The setting up of any one of these as real, or all of them together with other aspects of

<sup>1</sup>*A ppearance*, pp. 160 and f.

<sup>2</sup>*Principle*, p. 269.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 267-268.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 269.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 273.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>*A ppearance*, p. 160.

<sup>8</sup>*Essays*, pp. 470 ff



our experience—this is the “vice of abstractionism;”<sup>1</sup> it is the setting up of false Absolutes. The Real must be viewed as self-complete and self-contained.<sup>2</sup> Thus truth and error cannot be real; truth is always partially false as well as partially true, and error is always partially true as well as partially false.<sup>3</sup> Take good and evil. These also upon examination will be found to be unstable and self-discrepant. “As with truth and error, so with good and bad, the opposition is not absolute,”<sup>4</sup> we are told. Thus good and evil are relative and never absolute. Take the good in any sense in which it is commonly regarded. Take it as the pleasant, as self-realization, or as inner morality; in none of these meanings will it be found self-consistent and complete.<sup>5</sup> The same is true of evil. View it as pain, as failure to realize any end, or even as immorality, and in none of these senses is it capable of self-maintenance.<sup>6</sup> Or, again, take time and space. Mr. Bradley asserts that they are unreal as such. To predicate either of reality involves contradictions. “Time and space are mere appearance, and that result is quite certain. Both, on the other hand, exist; and both must somehow in some way belong to our Absolute.”<sup>7</sup> Prof. Bosanquet fully agrees. Of time, he says, “Then is not time real? I answer that everything is real, so long as we do not take it for what it is not.”<sup>8</sup> (That two-edged sword.) “Time is real as a condition of the experience of sensitive subjects, but it is not a form which profoundly exhibits the unity of things.”<sup>9</sup> Or, lastly, take the Self. Certainly we will find reality here, if anywhere. But again we are to be disappointed. The Self, like other portions of the all-inclusive ‘whole,’ is set up, now as a Self with body excluded, now as the total contents of experience at one moment, now as essential Self, now as personal identity, *et cetera*, eight in all, each as a Self of straw to be knocked over and cast aside because not one of them contains ultimate Reality. In conclusion Mr. Bradley tells us that “the self is no doubt the highest form of experience which we have, but, for all that, is not a true form. It does not give us the facts as they are in reality; and, as it gives them, they are appearance, appearance and error.”<sup>10</sup>

Prof. Bosanquet, while a bit more respectful in his view of the Self, because it is through selves that nature is taken up, transmuted and absorbed in the Absolute, nevertheless in the end views it as unreal. He views the Absolute as a being embracing in perfect unity all mind and nature. He maintains that the details of externality in nature are elicited into, and held together in, mental foci which thus function as agents for

<sup>1</sup>*Essays*, p. 471.

<sup>2</sup>*Bos., Logic* Vol. II, p. 279.

<sup>3</sup>*Appearance*, p. 192; *Bos., Logic*, Vol. II, p. 280.

<sup>4</sup>*Appearance*, p. 401.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 197 ff.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 205; see pp. 35 ff.

<sup>8</sup>*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 258 and ff; also *Principle* p. 338.

<sup>9</sup>*Appearance*, p. 119.



the transmutation and absorption of Nature into the Absolute.<sup>1</sup> But the mental foci or the selves are only real in what they are for themselves. Compared with the Reality of the 'whole,' they are unreal. The Self in the end is also transmuted and transcended in the perfect experience. "Every finite being has some limits. . . . It is not a perfect microcosm or miniature of the universe; so that its knowledge, love, and happiness do not keep step together. That is natural for *beings which are fragments of a greater being*."<sup>2</sup> With Prof. Bosanquet as with Mr. Bradley, the Self is most real and true, it is fullest and strongest, not when in hostility to the not-Self, a condition implying contradiction, but when the not-Self is most expanded and included in the Self. This extension of the Self—as in other forms of knowledge, where expansion implies more truth and reality—to include more of the not-Self, involves the solution of contradiction on the one side, and on the other, the development of a fuller Negativity. Though in this expansion of the Self, involving an inclusion and absorption of the not-Self—or, in the continual passing out of itself and regaining of itself in a larger whole as in self-sacrifice,—though in this we have the best clue to the nature of the perfect all-inclusive experience, yet because the Self must always fall short of the 'whole,' it must be regarded as only a fragment of reality and so far appearance. Accordingly, finite purpose and interest, being aspects in the experience of a Self which has no ultimate reality, must also be unreal. They, too, though not illusory if taken for what they are, become unreal and illusory if regarded as having ultimate reality.<sup>3</sup> "So individuality, the principle of reality and the consistent whole, takes us on beyond personality in the strict sense, beyond the consciousness of self which is mediated by an opposing not-Self, into the region where we go out of the self and into it by the same movement, in the quasi-religion of social unity, in knowledge, art, and in religion proper."<sup>4</sup>

We have now observed some of the consequences which follow from the doctrine of 'appearance' and Reality. We have seen that what finite experience, in individual and collective form, is accustomed to call real and ultimately worthwhile, when measured by a supra-mundane standard is rejected as appearance, as self-contradictory and incomplete in itself. And we are inclined to ask again whether there is not a fallacy in the reasoning which requires such a conclusion?

The fallacy is not a new one; it is the one to which we have referred repeatedly. It consists in taking Reality as an all-inclusive 'whole,'

<sup>1</sup>"Finite minds the living Copula of Nature and the Absolute". . . . Bos., *Principle* p. 371.

<sup>2</sup>*Principle*, pp. 376-377; italics mine.

<sup>3</sup>*Principle*, pp. 122 ff. esp. p. 155; see also Bos., *Value*, Lect. IX, esp., pp. 68-69.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 270.

non-contradictory and intimate like the immediacy of sense-perception, and measuring any suggested portion of reality, say, the good, time, or the Self, by this standard. Certainly, if we accept the fundamental assumption of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, the rest follows. But this assumption concerning the nature of ultimate Reality was found to be not only unnecessary, but also unwarranted. All that we can logically postulate at the outset in the organization of experience is that the universe is rational and that some kind of unity exist. It remains to discover the exact character of this unity through the organization and systematization of experience. We observed in our discussion of the problem of relations that the inference to the Absolute on that ground was not warranted. Relations, we saw, must be viewed as internal in character, but not as excluding a variety of degrees in relatedness. The doctrine of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, therefore, which tends to evaporate our most real existences, experiences and tangible realities into fragments of a timeless system, savors of the pure logicism of Spinoza. It is a doctrine which itself goes astray from considering the valid claims of experience as a whole, by taking up an aspect of it (the tendency to system) and, by a one sided interpretation, exalting it into an absolute criterion. The logic of such a system ultimately requires that we view every fragment of the universe as imperfect and that perfection is possible, and actually does exist, in the rearrangement, transmutation, and absorption of these imperfect existences. Or, stated otherwise, since every existence, is as such, unreal appearance, or error, Reality and Truth 'somehow' consist in the gathering up of all the unrealities, appearances and errors into a transcendent immediacy, perfect and absolute. But, having neither insight nor interest sufficient to follow such a logic into the single and perfect experience of the Absolute, we must remain content with our finite viewpoint, and object to being carried out of our element.

But just how are we to conceive the Absolute? Is the Absolute to be identified with God? Mr. Bradley specifically rejects this conception. He says, "The Absolute for me cannot be God, because in the end the Absolute is related to nothing, and there cannot be a practical relation between it and the finite will."<sup>1</sup> The God of religion is an object of worship in some form, hence he comes into relation with finite selves, and relation, we have found, is the most troublesome of categories. So the Absolute cannot be identified with God for God is always, as an object of worship, in some sense less than the universe. He is 'appearance' like ourselves. Prof. Bosanquet is in full agreement with Mr. Bradley on this point.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*Essays*, p. 428, and ff.

<sup>2</sup>When Prof. Bosanquet apparently identifies the Absolute and God in *The Prin. of Ind. and Value*, Appendix I, his note p. 387 is to be kept in mind: "I do not gather that any difference between God and the Absolute is treated as relative here."

With Mr. Bradley he observes that the religious attitude is largely practical, that it 'contemplates God in imaginative shapes,' and that it conceives him as one for whom evil is not annihilated. Such a being cannot be the Absolute which is supra-relational, a Perfection in which evil, with the other contents of the temporal order, is transmuted and absorbed. "Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Lord Omnipotent, Creator, Providence—none of these terms can apply to a Universe or an Absolute which has nothing outside it."<sup>1</sup> "The conclusion is, in a word, that the God of religion inherent in the Completest experience, is an appearance of reality, as distinct from being the whole and ultimate reality."<sup>2</sup> The same argument, of course, excludes the identification of the Absolute with personality, for personality implies relations. "The highest Reality, so far as I see, must be super-personal," we are told by Mr. Bradley. Prof. Bosanquet, with the same passion for self-subsistence in his view of Reality, condemns alike the 'thing,' the 'legal personality,' and the 'self for reflective self-consciousness,' as vicious analogies for Individuality.<sup>3</sup> Each of these upon examination, Prof. Bosanquet maintains, will be found to be capable of several meanings; they presuppose something outside and beyond them; they are never self-complete, hence they cannot be taken as patterns or types of Reality.

Similar objections will be found to viewing the Absolute as Will or Purpose, as Prof. Royce does.<sup>4</sup> It is just because Will and Purpose can never be the 'whole' of a world, because they are always conditioned, that they fall short of Reality. To set up Will or Purpose as Absolute is to commit the fallacy involved in Kant's 'categorical imperative' or 'Ought'; it is to take as self-complete what requires a basis of content upon which to work. Thus, "in a word, every want, will and purpose, or ought, is a partial phenomenon within a totality."<sup>5</sup> Concluding this point, we may say, search the universe, in the heavens above or on the earth beneath, nowhere can anything be found worthy, whether great or small, to be called real or capable of being regarded as a type of Reality.

Yet Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet persist in speaking of the Absolute as a single, all-inclusive, perfect Experience. Everything must be included in it. In the first place, it is a single experience, non-relational and immediate. Secondly, it is a 'whole' in which everything is present—truth and error, good and evil, time and the timeless, space and the non-spatial, Self and the not-Self, pain and pleasure, joy and sorrow, change and the changeless, teleology and mechanism, even God and the Adversary,—all are there, transmuted, transcended in an immediate 'whole.' And Mr. Bradley insists that with it all there is a balance of pleasure over pain,

<sup>1</sup>*Value*, p. 249.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 255.

<sup>3</sup>*Principle*, pp. 283 ff.

<sup>4</sup>Royce, *World and the Individual*, Series I, pp. 36 ff.

<sup>5</sup>*Principle*, p. 392; see also *Appearance*, p. 483.



though Prof. Bosanquet objects to ascribing any such attribute to the Absolute.<sup>1</sup> Prof. Bosanquet tells us that just as in the artist's masterpiece there is present all his failures, as well as his successes, so in the Absolute, 'somehow' imperfections are taken up, transmuted and transcended in a perfection which is above and beyond them.<sup>2</sup> Thirdly, the Absolute is Experience. This follows, it is argued, from the fact that all that we know comes to us as experience. The Absolute, therefore, though it may be more, must be more of the same nature.

It would be pertinent here to ask if the simile of the artist's masterpiece does not exhibit more truly the absence of failures and imperfections than their presence, but we pass on to consider some other suggested helps to the understanding of how the Absolute is a single, all-inclusive Experience. Prof. Bosanquet proposes that we think of the mind of Dante in the *Divine Comedy* in relation, on the one hand, to the spatial universe (in this case Italy), and also, on the other hand, to the characters in the poem.<sup>3</sup> Externality in space and time is represented in the experience through the presence of Italy, and through it, the universe as a whole is more or less implied. Again, the characters of the poem give themselves up to "the great experience which was the poet's mind, and are constituent parts of it."<sup>4</sup> Yet the effectiveness of the poem requires that they be regarded as free in thought and action. The poem in this case being semi-historical, the characters are real agents in a definite place and time. Our attention is also called to the fact that "these selves are in their degree participants in the moods, volitions and perceptions which, taken as a whole of experience, are the substance and tissue of the poet's mind in the poem—the conflicting passions of Italy. . . in a word, of human nature within a certain historical region."<sup>5</sup> Just as Dante's mind laid hold of Italy and the world through the characters of the poem, every character being a center which absorbs some portion of the external world, so we are to understand that the Absolute Experience makes use of finite centers (these are all soaked in their environment) to affirm itself in and throughout the whole universe. Prof. Bosanquet grants that this analogy is very imperfect and remote and that any effort to bring the Absolute down to the plane of human understanding is futile, because it involves dissociations within the Absolute which are really not there. But, he maintains, "there is no fusion or union which we conceive ourselves bound to ascribe to the Absolute in its own form, which has not something to represent it in the world of time and space."<sup>6</sup> And, at last,

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, p. 199; Bos., *Principle*, p. 244.

<sup>2</sup>*Principle*, pp. 389 ff.

<sup>3</sup>*Principle*, pp. 380 ff.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 381.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 384.



we are told, the above analogy holds *only* if we place ourselves within the world of Dante's mind and take the events and characters as he took them.<sup>1</sup> Alas, this is the crucial point. Our light has turned to darkness. Certainly, if we place ourselves inside the world of Dante's mind, the parts and the whole of the experience will be related as they are. But this does not prove nor explain—and this is the vital point—that the characters and events employed in the poem have their reality *by being included* as parts of the poem. These same characters and events may be employed by another poet (providing they are historical), with an entirely different purpose, and as a result, both will be different. It follows, therefore, that these characters and events must be viewed as having a reality unique, individual, and original in themselves, a reality not given to them by being *included* in the individual whole of a poem. In fact, what they are in themselves conditions how they may be included in any new relationship other than that of their historical nature.

Prof. Royce has suggested that the eternal character of the Absolute in its inclusion of all events and existences in a non-temporal whole may be conceived as explicable upon the doctrine of the span of consciousness and the 'specious present.'<sup>2</sup> Upon this basis it is all a matter of the time-span of consciousness. The 'present' or 'now' in finite perception is regarded, not as a point between past and future, but of longer or shorter expanse of time. In such a psychical present, it is possible to hold the notes of a musical phrase, either as a unity or in succession. A varying number of such notes may be synthesized into the 'specious present.' Moreover, finite individuals differ in their capacity to thus group objects. If, now, we view the Absolute Mind (the Absolute for Prof. Royce is a perfect individual Self) as having a span of consciousness capable of embracing the events and existences of the universe either in succession or at a single stroke, just as the finite mind grasps the notes of a musical phrase in a unity or while present views them successively, our problem is solved.

This explanation Prof. Bosanquet rejects upon the ground that what is before in the time-span of consciousness affects or modifies what comes later, and consequently the chain of events in the longer span of consciousness will, in the end, not be the same in actual content as what they would be for the mind of shorter time-span. The analogy does not help us, Prof. Bosanquet asserts, because, while everything must be present, it is transformed, transmuted, and transcended in respect to what it is for the finite mind. So we are left again without help, except, as before indicated, we have clues as to what the Absolute Experience must be from the manner in which our higher experiences transcend and include our lower ones.

<sup>1</sup>*Principle*, p. 385.

<sup>2</sup>*The World and the Individual*, Series II, p. 145.

But Prof. Royce makes another suggestion. The Absolute Mind or Experience as a 'whole,' he asserts, becomes intelligible if we view it upon the analogy of the mathematical concept of self-representative series.<sup>1</sup> The argument, which is based upon the modern doctrine of the infinite series, may be stated thus: An important characteristic of an infinite series is that it can be adequately 'represented' by a part of itself; that is if we take any infinite series, say 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . we can construct a second series, for example, 1<sup>2</sup>, 2<sup>2</sup>, 3<sup>2</sup>, 4<sup>2</sup>, . . . by the second power of these numbers, in which the terms will be derived by a definite law from those of the first series to which they correspond. Every term in the second series is also a term of the first series, selected out of it by a definite principle. Now this second series is also infinite and is capable of being represented by selection according to a definite law in a third series, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus we may go on constructing infinite systems in which each is fully represented in the preceding one. Now Prof. Royce admits that an infinite series, as above defined, involves an infinite regress; but, since the self-representation of any such infinite series is capable of definition as a single, internal purpose, in advance of the discovery that such purpose involves an endless regress, we may employ the conception as a true type of what we mean by the infinite. Prof. Royce further asserts that the absolute of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet must be ultimately defined upon this analogy or it is not the Absolute, or anything real at all.<sup>2</sup> He says, "In brief, every system of which anybody can rationally assert anything is either a self-representative system, in the sense here in question, or else, being but a part of the real world, it is more or less arbitrarily selected, or an empirically given portion or constituent of such a system,—a portion whose reality, apart from that of the whole system is unintelligible."<sup>3</sup>

Neither Mr. Bradley nor Prof. Bosanquet see any help in this proffered aid. Prof. A. E. Taylor, whose conception of the Absolute is similar to that of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet's, makes use of the difference in the nature between an infinite series and a finite series as analogous to the difference between an infinite individual and a finite individual (the infinite series has its law within it, while the finite has not); but he also rejects it in the end as inadequate to express the nature of ultimate reality and for reasons similar to those advanced by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Bradley rejects the analogy upon the ground that both the

<sup>1</sup>Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Series I, Supplementary Essay, pp. 507 ff. The logical character of this conception of the Infinite is clearly expressed in Mr. Bertrand Russell's work, *The Principles of Mathematics*, Vol. I, pp. 361 ff.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 513.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 513-514.

<sup>4</sup>Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 116, 150 ff.

principle of self-representation and its products are self-contradictory. They involve relations, and relations cannot hold in the Absolute.<sup>1</sup> The principle is self-contradictory because "it carries within itself a difference and a negation which it at once asserts and denies."<sup>2</sup> The product is discrepant because it implies a relation to the pattern or mold. If it does not thus imply an original, then the result is not copying (in the case of Prof. Royce's example of the map) nor representation.<sup>3</sup> Prof. Bosanquet rejects the analogy upon practically the same ground, though his rejection is argued from the standpoint of the nature of the Absolute. The Absolute is not, as infinite and self-complete, numerable at all.<sup>4</sup> Its nature of perfect harmony, coherence and unity, forbids its being dragged down and characterized by a self-representation. He says, "You cannot enumerate the members of a poem or picture, or of a great character. You can find in them numerable parts, but these are not their parts" as viewed from the standpoint of the whole.<sup>5</sup> So with the Absolute. You can find numerable parts—it has diversity, but these numerable parts are not relevant to the sense in which such parts are experiences in the Absolute. The Absolute is an infinite 'that' (in Mr. Bradley's sense) for which every fragment of existence and every self yearns and in which they find complete satisfaction; it is that *immediate unity* which cannot be reached by any finite, conceptual devices which imply relations. The nature of a self-representative series, Prof. Bosanquet grants, does remotely suggest that the spiritual element of a true infinite does contain or repeat the structure of the 'whole,' "not, however, by a one-to-one correspondence of terms, but by a differentiated response to organic necessities."<sup>6</sup> The same fallacy, Prof. Bosanquet maintains, is present in Prof. Royce's illustration of map making.<sup>7</sup> The map is not a true representation of a country. The essential and true nature of a country is of spiritual character and is better represented by the manner in which it develops a university here, a church there, and a school somewhere else. Thus to interpret the Absolute upon the analogy of a mathematical concept is just to miss the delicacy of adjustment in the spiritual character of the perfect Experience.<sup>8</sup>

It is clear from their rejection of all finite analogies as aids to understanding the constitution of the ultimate Reality, as well as from their view of the nature of thought and knowledge, that Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet mean to insist to the last upon the relational character of thought

<sup>1</sup>*Essays*, p. 279.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 276 ff.

<sup>4</sup>Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Series I, p. 506.

<sup>5</sup>Bos., *Logic* Vol. I, pp. 163-165; *Principle*, pp. 38 ff., 393-395. For further difficulties in this conception see "The Infinite, New and Old" by Prof. J. A. Leighton, *Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 13, 1904, pp. 497 ff.

<sup>6</sup>*Principle*, p. 38 n. f.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 394.

<sup>8</sup>*Principle*, p. 38 n.



and the supra-relational character of the Absolute. And this means that they will rest their case in an ultimate distinction between 'appearance' and Reality, affirming that what we experience is never Reality, but only appearance. Now it is relevant to ask whether this distinction between appearance and reality does not logically imply, as we suggested in Chapter II, a lapse into the phenomenalism and noumenalism of Kant. Hegel clearly obviated the difficulty of such a distinction by making every appearance, on the one hand, an appearance of reality, and, on the other hand, by providing in his theory of thought for its capacity to reach down into immediacy at its lower extremity and to reach up into the higher immediacy of ultimate reality, at the upper extremity.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet have, as we observed, cut themselves off from this way of escape in their theory of thought. Now Mr. Bradley specifically repudiates the doctrine of Thing-in-itself<sup>2</sup> when applied to his view of Reality, and Prof. Bosanquet, though not openly, by implication takes the same position. Will the system of thought and Reality as maintained by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, and as herein set forth, warrant and support such a repudiation? This, briefly, we wish to examine.

It is clear that for Kant phenomena are not ultimate Reality (though they have a reality relative to the cognitive faculty) and that we never know Things-in-themselves. The latter, however, are affirmed as an inference, or as an act of faith. Faith, with Kant, is a rational belief in the realm beyond sense. In this realm, faith is as universal and necessary as the categories are in the world of sense experience. Things-in-themselves, therefore, exist, as e.g., the Self and God, but they are beyond the grasp of the Understanding which is discursive in its operation. The Understanding is viewed as a faculty or department of the mind which functions by applying the categories to the data of sense perception. It gives us only phenomena, because it brings a formal element to objects in the knowledge process. But Reason, which is a higher and more inclusive function of mind than the Understanding, makes a demand which is satisfied only in an act of faith, namely, the belief in the realities of the super-sensible world—the Things-in-themselves. Thus Things-in-themselves exist as the ultimate *source and ground of what appears as phenomena*. The origin, then, of the distinction between phenomena and noumena in the system of Kant may be roughly stated thus: 1) The failure to view mind as unitary in its operation; 2) A one-sided view of the complementary character of mind and object in the knowledge process, especially his view of the *a priori* character of the formal element of knowl-

<sup>1</sup>Wallace, Wm., *The Logic of Hegel*, pp. 239 ff.

<sup>2</sup>*Appearance*, p. 183.



edge; 3) His insistence upon the rational necessity of postulating, as objects of Faith, the supersensible world of God, the Self, and Freedom.

Now it would seem that though the motives for setting up a distinction between 'appearance' and Reality in the case of Kant, on the one hand, and Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, on the other, are different, the logical outcome is equally fallacious. We have observed that the ground for the distinction in the systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, though differing, may be summed up thus: (1) The nature of experience in part and in whole; and (2) the demands of the absolute criterion of Truth and Reality. We submit that, in so far as Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet maintain that finite thought is incapable of comprehending ultimate reality, that Reality is above and beyond the finite, just so far they have fallen into the Kantian fallacy. And here, we insist, the 'appearances' of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet and the 'phenomena' of Kant are identical. But there are certain differences to be noted, and to these we must now give attention.

Prof. Bosanquet's conception of mind is free from the departmental view. Mr. Bradley, however, yields to this error in his doctrine of 'immediate experience' and in his tendency to identify thought with the function of the intellect or Kant's Understanding (*Verstand*). Here we are face to face with the source of the discursive character of thought so prevalent in the systems of Kant and Mr. Bradley. Again, we notice that Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet provide for a doctrine of degrees of truth and reality, as applied to appearances, and in this they differ from Kant. This doctrine is given a degree of plausibility by their metaphysical Absolutism, and it is this unitary and all-inclusive character of the Absolute which, Mr. Bradley asserts, clears his doctrine of the charge of the Thing-in-itself.<sup>1</sup>

Prof. J. B. Baillie, whose view on the relation of thought and reality more fully agrees with Mr. Bradley's than with Prof. Bosanquet's, takes special pains to explain how an Absolutism of the type of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet's may make use (rather *must* make use) of the Kantian distinction between phenomena and Reality and yet dispense with the Thing-in-itself.<sup>2</sup> His argument may be stated as follows: That there should be a knowable sphere beyond experience in Kant's system was required by his theory of thought, more particularly, the *a priori* character of the categories. Accordingly, the noumenal world is a 'limit' to experience, and the noumenal and phenomenal world are clearly separated. On the other hand, the distinction between 'appearance' and Reality in the systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet is a distinction *within*

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, p. 183.

<sup>2</sup>Baillie, *Idealistic Construction of Experience*, pp. 66 ff.

experience, "not between what is a part of experience and what cannot be so." "There is no beyond to experience at all" since everything is included. Thus "the distinction is one which falls *inside* experience itself and is constituted by the nature of Understanding as a stage of experience."<sup>1</sup> Prof. Baillie goes on to explain that the reason why the distinction is drawn only inside the life of Understanding and does not appear at the level of perception, is because "What is solely present in Perception, the variety of sensible qualities and the flux of things, is here merely a moment or aspect of Understanding, viz., its aspect of diversity, appearance, phenomena. For Perception *there are no phenomena* at all: for they *are wholly and only as they are in Perception*. There is no beyond, no noumena, in perceptual experience; their *esse* is their *percipi*. For Understanding there are phenomena, because there is deeper unity, they are phenomena *with reference to their inner principles of unity or Laws*."<sup>2</sup> Thus, upon this view, a noumenon or Absolute beyond all experience is a contradiction in terms. But, on the other hand, by reason of the fact that the Absolute cannot be present at once and 'given' in the form of an immediacy, justice can be done to Kant's distinction without approving the error in the doctrine of Thing-in-itself.

It is clear at once that this defense of the distinction between appearance and Reality rests upon the assumption that the doctrine of Reality as an all-inclusive, single Experience has been established. The argument can, therefore, have no more weight than the assumption upon which it rests. We have observed that a metaphysical monism, such as that of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, rests upon a fallacious doctrine of relations and a one-sided view of the fundamental postulates of knowledge. If, then, the monism of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet is untenable, the argument that appearances are real because they are included in the 'whole,' must go also. And we are left, it seems to me, with the Kantian problem, wholly insurmountable, unless we assume that Reality is actually known in finite experience. If this latter assumption is not granted—it is an assumption warranted by our practical relations with the world—we are ever pursued by an eternal doubt, and the skeptics have been yielded their point. A skeptical strain is very prominent in Mr. Bradley's first book of the *Appearance and Reality*, as well as in other portions of his works, and if we were to take these portions as his last word, we should class him with the Skeptics. A more comprehensive view of his metaphysics, however, leaves no doubt but that he is serious in his doctrine of degrees of truth and reality, which, we have noticed, is more consistently maintained by Prof. Bosanquet.

<sup>1</sup>Baillie, *Idealistic Construction of Experience*, p. 202.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

Let us notice, further, that the two-world view of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet involves a fallacy with respect to the criterion of truth and reality, as employed by them. As in the case of Kant's system, critics validly ask, *how*, if you shut Reality off from the world of experience, do you know that you have only phenomena? So in the case of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, we ask, if ultimate Reality is an all-inclusive, perfect Experience beyond the grasp of the finite mind, how do we know that we have 'appearance' and not Reality? Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet admit that ultimate Reality is never experienced in its innermost nature. Yet they presume to apply the test of ultimate Reality as a criterion to its appearances, with the view to proving that they are appearance; or, with the view to finding what degree of self-maintenance they possess. Again, we suggest that such reasoning assumes alternately two standpoints, the Absolute and the finite, without establishing the right to do so. The fallacy therefore, is the same in principle as that of Kant.

It is a familiar doctrine in science that any hypothesis or ultimate principle of explanation must rest upon positive cases wherein the principle works, and, moreover, these positive cases must represent the great majority of instances for which the theory is a principle of correlation. In the systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, the absolute criterion or ultimate principle of explanation has its ground in negative instances. The principle is established because no 'recalcitrant element' can be found. The fallacy in this unscientific procedure is not, in the final analysis, obviated by the contention that the criterion is taken from experience and receives its content *pari passu* with experience. The fact remains that no positive case is found, nor is the finite mind capable of finding one, where the criterion of non-contradiction and Individuality is actually satisfied. And, besides, when Mr. Bradley tells us that (though he persists in urging that our knowledge is absolute so far as it goes) "what we know is, after all, nothing in proportion to the world of our ignorance" and, that "we do not know what other modes of experience may exist, or, in comparison with ours, how many they may be,"<sup>1</sup> we are inclined to feel that the absolute criterion, though *per impossible* it were founded upon experience, has too scanty a foundation. Certainly, as Mr. Bradley says, "we have thus left due space for the exercise of doubt and wonder."<sup>2</sup> Our 'doubt and wonder' are intensified when we consider that even thought and its product knowledge, are after all only appearances among others. "Philosophy . . . is itself but appearance,"<sup>3</sup> we are told. May it not be, then, upon this theory and especially when it is granted that there may be other forms of experience than our own, and the world of our ignorance is greater

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, p. 548.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 549.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 453 ff.

than that of our knowledge,—may it not be that the ‘whole’ into which all finite existences are swallowed up and transcended is something entirely different from anything known by the human mind? The space here left open in the doctrine of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, I submit, is more than necessary for a ‘healthy skepticism.’<sup>1</sup>

But why ask for an Absolute so foreign to the finite mind? Why insist that Reality must be an all-inclusive whole, an immediacy in which content and existence form a non-relational ONE? Does not a true and valid interpretation of identity and system require diversity—*real* difference? Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet set out in their systems by interpreting Identity as meaning identity in difference and Contradiction as meaning that a statement cannot be both true and false at the same time; they end by interpreting Identity as bare Identity and Contradiction as permitting not the least departure from a perfect unity, a Unity or One which excludes *real* diversity. Again, we submit, it is a case of a dual viewpoint. But, accepting Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet’s original interpretation of Identity and Contradiction as the only tenable one, as we have shown, we maintain that an Absolute which is beyond and above relations certainly goes beyond our power to say what it is or what it is not. Consciousness, as we pointed out in Chapters II and III, exists in, or is constituted by, a subject-object relation. Annihilate this, and all power of knowing, as far as human experience goes, is destroyed. An Absolute Experience, therefore, which is non-relational is without meaning. In this doctrine of a non-relational Absolute we have a recurrence of the theory of Anaximander or, more exactly, the monism of Parmenides. But what is a One without a Many? Are not these terms correlative? Even in their effort to set up an absolute One, Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet are forced to employ the categories of thought; and certainly, if anywhere, it is contradictory to speak of One without the Many.

Moreover, it seems appropriate to offer a final protest, in unmistakable terms, upon two aspects of the theory of the Absolute as maintained by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet: 1) Is it not a psychological abstraction to speak of the Absolute as Experience, and yet not the experience of a self or of selves? Every experience of which the finite mind knows anything is a psychical content as felt or owned by a self. Furthermore, if our own experience, in the character of the transmutation and absorption of the lower in the higher, is an analogy, however inadequate, of how the fragmentary and imperfect is absorbed in the perfect Absolute Experience, (Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet hold that there is an analogy here,) certainly there must be a self (or selves) as the subject of this Absolute

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 549.



Experience. If this is not granted, then the term *Experience* is an abstraction without meaning. 2) If a consistent logic culminates, as Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet insist, in the view that reality is an all-inclusive, *perfect* and *timeless* Whole or Experience, it is difficult to see how the concepts, e.g., of our physical, biological, normative, and social sciences are to have the meaning we give to them; in fact Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet admit that in the Absolute they are unreal and illusory. Energy and life, time and change, spontaneity and creativeness in nature, evolution and growth, freedom and progress, truth and beauty, purpose and goodness, the striving and aspiration of the Self with all its privacy and uniqueness,—these, and any other contents of the finite mind, have only relative validity and do not hold in ultimate Reality. Prof. Bosanquet seems to grant that these concepts have a greater degree of (relative) reality than Mr. Bradley, but even for him they are transcended in a higher unity in which their finite character is entirely lost. We are ready to admit that there are degrees of truth and reality; experience seems to warrant this view. But, we maintain, the acceptance of this view does not imply nor logically require that we conceive the reality of the highest order as a supra-relational whole in which all distinction is lost. Any interpretation of reality which carries us beyond our temporal and growing finite categories, and so nullifies the most tangible and real facts of experience, is, in the end, no interpretation at all. It lands us in a Buddhist Nirvana—the ocean of eternal Oneness where the waves of individuation coalesce in everlasting Calm, where all distinction is swallowed up, and where, logically there is only endless Silence—Nothing. Our protest consists in an appeal for a satisfaction of the demands of human experience in a logic and metaphysics which, in its interpretation of the universe, finds a place for the most tangible realities of life, and which preserves the dynamic categories of human thought. Anything beyond this, in any case, is hazardous presumption.

A strain of Mysticism and Faith is present in the systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, as in most metaphysical monisms, and doubtless it is this which helps to sustain the argument. Mr. Bradley, in fact openly accepts a mystical element, and the same is quite implied in Prof. Bosanquet's system. Mr. Bradley tells us, "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct."<sup>1</sup> "Philosophy demands, and in the end it rests on, what may fairly be termed faith."<sup>2</sup> "So far as philosophy is *condemned to act on an unverified principle*, it continues to rest upon faith."<sup>3</sup> The

<sup>1</sup>*Appearance*, p. xiv; see also p. v.

<sup>2</sup>*Essays*, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 27; italics mine.

object of the instinctive belief in the case of Mr. Bradley is expressed on the last page of his work *Appearance and Reality*, (p. 552,) "Reality is one Experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations." And the unverified principle which is accepted upon faith is the absolute criterion—non-contradiction or Individuality.

Prof. Bosanquet's system in the end, while differing from Mr. Bradley's in detail only, rests upon the same instinctive belief and operative faith.<sup>1</sup> He says, "I have never in the long run found it possible to construe the world without an element which might be called mystical."<sup>2</sup> And certainly if we are to accept Mr. Bertrand Russell's designation of the convictions common to all mystics (his position appears tenable), we must assert that a mystical tendency is present throughout the philosophical systems of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Russell suggests that all mystics share in the following beliefs: 1) That knowledge is possible through revelation, insight or intuition, as well as through sense and reason; 2) That Reality is a Unity and that there is no opposition or division anywhere; 3) That time is ultimately unreal; and 4) That evil also is unreal and only appearance.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet openly subscribe to these four tenets in the creed of Mysticism,<sup>5</sup> as the body of our study shows, and it is this element which leads them to posit the existence of ultimate Reality beyond the reach of human experience, and to accept a criterion of truth and Reality which, for the finite mind, is never wholly realized. With whatever success we have shown that this view of Reality and its criterion are untenable, the same applies in criticism of the above mentioned tenets of mysticism, for Absolutism and Mysticism seldom appear divorced.

In conclusion, we may say, that the ultimate incomprehensibility of the Absolute as viewed by Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, together with the unwarranted grounds upon which it is sustained, forces us to look elsewhere for a satisfactory explanation of Reality. Again we propose, in view of the utter failure of the Absolutism of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, on the one hand, to give the most reasonable account of experience, chiefly on account of its fundamental error on the character of relations, its tendency in final analysis, to interpret Identity as bare identity and Contradiction as excluding difference; and, on the other hand, the tendency of Neo-Realism to play fast and loose with relations,—in view of this, it appears we must find the true explanation and interpre-

<sup>1</sup>*Logic* Vol. II, pp. 252 ff.; *Principle*, pp. 238, 251 ff.

<sup>2</sup>"Realism and Metaphysics", *Phil. Rev.*, Vol. 26, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup>Russell, B., *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 1-32.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>5</sup>The mysticism of Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet is speculative, not unlike that e.g., of Plotinus, Meister Eckhart, and Bruno.

tation of experience in a metaphysical pluralism mid-way, so to speak, between these positions. This is not the place for a complete constructive treatment of a theory of thought and reality worked out in harmony with the principles of a consistent pluralism; but a general statement showing the direction which such a theory must take may be given.

We believe that Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet successfully defend the position of Objective Idealism against all attacks of Neo-Realism and Subjectivism. Mind and object must be viewed as complementary and reciprocally indispensable. This is the *sine qua non* of knowledge. Mind is thus a center in which the nature of reality comes to self-consciousness. Reality, on this view, is not hidden behind a curtain, nor is it apprehended only through a peep-hole in the curtain of sense perception. Reality is present in sense perception and it is further comprehended in knowledge, which is the organized and systematized arrangement of experience under the regulative principles of thought. The organization of reality goes along *pari passu* with the systematization of experience, and reality, in fact, "is experience as actual or possible or both."<sup>1</sup> "Reality is what is, or may be, experienced, and what may be inferred from experience."<sup>2</sup>

Reality, we contend, must be interpreted in terms of finite experience, not the experience of the Absolute; the categories of human thought must be respected, simply because the finite mind is inherently incapable of employing any others. Moreover, Reality must be taken for what it is found to be in the progressive organization of experience. This implies, in the first place, that relations of some sort exist, binding the universe into a unity; but it does not imply nor require that all relations be reduced to the whole-part type. Rather, as we have shown, relations must be taken as internal in character, but differing in degrees of relatedness, some making so little difference in our teleological experience that, for practical purposes, they may be regarded as external. Reality, on this view, will be found to possess a unity, but its diversity will be quite as real; it will be *one*, but it will also be *many*. In the second place, because of the complementary character of mind and reality, reality will not be a static, timeless and non-teleological perfection; rather will it be a growing, evolving system, tending to greater and more refined unity and order. This latter contention is enforced by the fact that reality must ultimately be interpreted upon the pattern of that reality which is known best, and from which, as a center, all the organization of experience takes place—the Self.

Accepting the Self, then, as a self-revelation of the universe and as truly representative of the form in which all reality exists (the best clue to the

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<sup>1</sup>Leighton, Prof. J. A., *The Field of Philosophy*, 2nd. ed. p. 355.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

